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ADR 0113 and to-be 27: address the review of the vault rework

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Two decisions taken with the author:
- Genesis delivers and the vault adopts. The vault cannot run first — it is built on the runtime base
  the installation makes after the store, broker and controller, and it learns its work over the bus.
  Genesis generates the foundation's first shared secrets, seals them to the operator key, and
  delivers them to the vault through the path an operator's value takes; from then on the vault holds
  and rotates them. This answers ADR 0085's own reason for rejecting vault-only minting, which 0113
  now names instead of stepping around.
- Rotation re-confirms on every pass. An applier repeats its confirmation until acknowledged, so a lost
  message costs one pass; an applier that stops after applying locks readers out until its supervised
  restart, and that window is stated and shown, not claimed away.

Fixes:
- Scope: a shared secret is made by the vault; a private key (node sealing keys, the operator's key,
  the certificate authority) is made where it is used. The inventory adds the makers the first version
  missed: node and builder broker passwords, and enrolment tokens.
- Broker accounts are created by the broker's provisioner, not the controller, so the controller never
  holds their plaintext; mesh-broker delivers amqp again — one broker per mesh — and only mesh-store
  delivers nothing.
- secret is a reserved provision: only the mesh-vault holder may provide it, and no pin routes around it.
- A secret's contract says whether a recipient applies it or reads it at start; appliers are never
  restarted for it, init-only secrets are applied, and confirmation is to-be 13's standard.
- Operator secrets are one rule everywhere: a secret requirement answered by the vault (0112 no longer
  says otherwise). A data provider's adapter may return fields; the data-return check names a lab consumer.
- 'Holder' now means a seat's holder only; a secret has recipients.
This commit is contained in:
jochen
2026-09-25 23:27:58 +02:00
parent fa2c09a2c5
commit 1b5f2c2c1a
7 changed files with 253 additions and 165 deletions
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02-DECISIONS/0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md
+17 -8
View File
@@ -92,13 +92,21 @@ and which assignment holds it, including seats nobody holds. An unheld seat is a
has no X", not an error.
**A seat delivers a provision only where the mesh has one answer for everyone.** That is a design
decision about the provision, not about the seat. The artifact store, the npm registry, git and the
vault are each one per mesh by their own records, so their seats deliver them. The store and the
broker are not: [to-be 23](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/23-choosing-a-provider.md) has each node running its
own stores, with a consumer served by the one on its own machine. So `mesh-store` and `mesh-broker`
keep guarding that the foundation's own server is singular, and deliver nothing. Were they to
decision about the provision, not about the seat. The broker, the artifact store, the npm registry,
git and the vault are each one per mesh by their own records, so their seats deliver them. The store
is not: [to-be 23](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/23-choosing-a-provider.md) has each node running its own
stores, with a consumer served by the one on its own machine, and the foundation's store is the
controller's own memory, provider to nobody ([to-be 21](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/21-the-installation-in-full.md)).
So `mesh-store` guards that the foundation's store is singular, and delivers nothing. Were it to
deliver, every database consumer on every node would be sent to the control-node's store.
**A seat may reserve its provision.** Where a second provider would break a rule the provision exists
for, only the seat's holder may provide it at all: the parser refuses anyone else, and a pin cannot
choose anyone else. `secret` is the one reserved provision. The vault is one per mesh because a second
one *"would be a second place to lose"* ([ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md), as amended), and
a second `secret` provider is exactly that, whether a pin chose it or not. Every other delivered
provision may have second providers, which a pin can choose.
**The first set is the twelve seats already claimed, plus two.** Thirteen claims are in use, and
they name twelve seats because two alternative modules claim `the-resolver-configuration`. This
record admits every seat the catalogue and the controller claim today, so no module is refused by
@@ -108,8 +116,8 @@ it:
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `mesh-controller` | mesh | — | `mesh-controller` | [0079](0079-the-foundation-seats-are-named-after-their-servers.md) |
| `mesh-store` | mesh | — | `postgres` | [0079](0079-the-foundation-seats-are-named-after-their-servers.md) |
| `mesh-broker` | mesh | — | `lavinmq` | [0079](0079-the-foundation-seats-are-named-after-their-servers.md) |
| `mesh-vault` | mesh | `secret` | nothing yet: `mesh-vault` claims it | this record, for [issue 106](../04-ISSUES/106-the-vault-claims-no-seat/00-report.md) |
| `mesh-broker` | mesh | `amqp` | `lavinmq` | [0079](0079-the-foundation-seats-are-named-after-their-servers.md) |
| `mesh-vault` | mesh | `secret`, reserved | nothing yet: `mesh-vault` claims it | this record, for [issue 106](../04-ISSUES/106-the-vault-claims-no-seat/00-report.md) |
| `the-artifact-store` | mesh | `artifact-store` | `distribution` | [0075](0075-two-stores-and-which-provides-what.md) |
| `the-catalogue` | mesh | — | `mesh-catalog` | this record |
| `npm-package-registry` | mesh | `npm-package-registry` | `gitea` | [0109](0109-a-package-registry-seat-is-one-per-ecosystem.md) |
@@ -166,7 +174,8 @@ question real.
| A claim outside the set is refused | Manifest-validation tests for an unknown seat, the wrong scope, and a delivering seat whose claimant does not provide. |
| Every module in use claims a seat in the set | A controller test parses every catalogue manifest and fails on any refused claim. The lab's beds read the same manifests ([ADR 0089](0089-a-bed-reads-the-catalogue-it-proves.md)). |
| The holder answers for a provision its seat delivers | Resolution tests: two providers with the seat held; a pin overriding the seat; a second provider on the consumer's own machine, where the holder still answers; the seat unheld with two providers, and with **one** provider, both refused naming the seat. |
| A seat delivers only a one-per-mesh provision | A controller unit test: `mesh-store` and `mesh-broker` deliver nothing, so a database consumer is still served by co-location. |
| A seat delivers only a one-per-mesh provision | A controller unit test: `mesh-store` delivers nothing, so a database consumer is still served by co-location, and `mesh-broker` delivers `amqp`. |
| A reserved provision has no other provider | The parser refuses a module providing `secret` without claiming `mesh-vault`, and resolution refuses a pin on a `secret` requirement. |
## References
02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md
+8 -8
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ unresolved requirement and what could answer it, all at once.
| **another module** | a database, a bucket, a vhost, a secret, a route | provisions and bindings |
| **the node's host** | a directory, a port, facts about the machine | resource paths, `${port:}`, `${machine:}`, facts |
| **the mesh** | the module's identity and names, and the delivery of every answer | derived logins and generated names; the controller's delivery |
| **the operator, through the assignment** | a value a person chooses: a public name, a greeting, an external key | settings, carried literals |
| **the operator, through the assignment** | a value a person chooses that is not secret: a public name, a greeting, a number of workers | settings, carried literals |
A module provider is chosen as [ADR 0084](0084-which-provider-serves-a-consumer.md) and
[ADR 0110](0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md) say: a pin, then the holder of a
@@ -77,14 +77,14 @@ A host provider is always the module's own node, because a host path or a port m
other. An operator value is the assignment's, or the requirement's default, or unresolved.
**A person's value stays cheap.** An operator requirement's contract is a type and, optionally, a
default. It needs no provider module, no grant and no credential. An operator value that is secret,
like an external API key, is still the operator's: the vault is where it is *kept*, as an
operator-delivered value ([ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md)), not who
provides it.
default. It needs no provider module, no grant and no credential.
**Every secret is made by the vault, and a provider answers with resources and data**
([ADR 0113](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md)). A provider that needs a secret for a consumer
requires it from the vault, like any consumer. The mesh carries every answer back.
**Every secret is a `secret` requirement, answered by the vault**, with no exception by kind
([ADR 0113](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md)). An external API key an operator chooses is no
different: the operator delivers it to the vault ([ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md)),
and the module requires a `secret` like any other. A provider that needs a secret for a consumer
requires it from the vault, like any consumer, and answers with resources and data. The mesh carries
every answer back.
**A directory is a host provision.** Its contract is the owner and mode the module needs, including
the owner its image expects ([ADR 0107](0107-persistent-data-is-a-directory-bind-never-a-named-volume.md)).
02-DECISIONS/0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md
+136 -97
View File
@@ -6,34 +6,39 @@ deciders: jochen
reconstructed: false
---
# 113. The vault makes every secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both
# 113. The vault makes every shared secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both
## Context
**A secret comes into being seven different ways today**, counted across the catalogue and the
**A shared secret comes into being many different ways today**, counted across the catalogue and the
controller on 2026-09-25:
| kind | made by | used by |
|---|---|---|
| a credential between a consumer and a provider | the controller | 19 modules |
| a module's own secret (`own-secrets`) | the controller, as a random value nothing owns | 54 modules |
| a broker account | the controller, but only when a person runs a separate command; otherwise the random value above, which cannot work ([issue 095](../04-ISSUES/095-a-module-assigned-after-genesis-has-no-broker-account/00-report.md)) | 49 modules |
| a module's broker account | the controller, but only when a person runs a separate command; otherwise the random value above, which cannot work ([issue 095](../04-ISSUES/095-a-module-assigned-after-genesis-has-no-broker-account/00-report.md)) | 49 modules |
| a node's and the builder's broker accounts | the controller, each in its own code path | every node, the builder |
| an enrolment token | the controller | every node joining |
| a `secret` from the vault | the controller mints it, and the vault only records it ([ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md), as amended) | 6 modules |
| a value an operator accepts | a person ([ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md)) | where accepted |
| a licence for model access | a separate controller context with its own store | model consumers |
| the mesh's root secrets | genesis, sealed to the operator key | the foundation |
| the foundation's root secrets | genesis, sealed to the operator key | the foundation |
**The vault was built to end the second row, and did not.** ADR 0085 says a module's own secret
*"stops being a generated value that nothing owns"*. 54 modules still use one, and 6 use the vault.
The replacement was added and the old path was never retired. The same has happened to the broker
account, a special case of the second row that fails silently when the separate command is forgotten.
The replacement was added and the old path was never retired.
**Rotation has its own gaps.** To-be 13 makes rotation one command, all-or-nothing, and states the
window in which a consumer cannot authenticate: the provider has taken the new password, and the
consumer has not yet restarted with it. A consumer restarts only if its definition remembered to say
so, and a container fed by an env-file is not recreated when that file changes, so it keeps the old
value ([issue 103](../04-ISSUES/103-a-container-is-not-recreated-when-a-file-it-reads-changes/00-report.md)).
Nothing confirms that the new secret works.
**ADR 0085 considered and rejected making the vault the only maker**, because *"the controller must
mint in order to deliver any provision — the vault's own credential among them"*: the vault cannot
make the credentials that exist before it does. That objection is real, and this record has to answer
it rather than step around it.
**Rotation has gaps.** To-be 13 makes rotation one command, all-or-nothing, with a stated window in
which a consumer cannot authenticate. A consumer restarts only if its definition remembered to say so;
a container fed by an env-file is not recreated when that file changes
([issue 103](../04-ISSUES/103-a-container-is-not-recreated-when-a-file-it-reads-changes/00-report.md));
and some secrets are read only when a service first initialises, where a restart changes nothing.
**And providers cannot answer with data.** [ADR 0048](0048-a-provider-creates-the-credential-the-mesh-minted.md)
left *"delivering provider-generated data back to a consumer"* to a separate decision. The analytics
@@ -41,86 +46,112 @@ provider's site id and the DNS provider's record have no way back, and say so in
## Considered Options
**1. Keep the controller minting, and tidy the seven paths.** Rejected. The paths are the problem:
each is made, kept, rotated and audited differently, and tidying keeps all seven.
**1. Keep the controller minting, and tidy the paths.** Rejected. The paths are the problem: each is
made, kept, rotated and audited differently, and tidying keeps them all.
**2. Every provider mints its own secrets, with one shared function in the SDK.** Rejected. It makes
generation uniform and leaves custody scattered: every provider's machine holds secrets the vault
never sees, so rotation, audit and the operator's break-glass copies cover only some of them. The
function would also need a conforming implementation in every language a provider is written in.
**2. Every provider mints its own secrets, with one shared function in the SDK.** Rejected. Generation
becomes uniform, but custody stays spread over every provider's machine, so rotation, audit and the
operator's break-glass copies cover only some secrets. Each SDK language needs its own implementation.
**3. The vault makes every secret, and a provider that needs one requires it, like any consumer.**
Chosen. A provider serving a consumer requires a secret for that consumer from the vault. Secrets
become provisioning all the way down, with one maker at the bottom.
**3. Raise the vault first at genesis, so it makes even the first secrets.** Rejected. The vault is
built on the shared runtime base, which the installation makes only after the store, the broker and
the controller exist, and the vault learns what to answer from the controller over the bus. Running
it first means reordering the whole installation and giving the vault a second way of being asked.
**4. The vault makes every shared secret; genesis delivers the first ones to it.** Chosen. It answers
0085's objection with a mechanism the mesh already has: a value delivered to the vault.
## Decision
**The vault makes every secret in the mesh.** Generation, to a secret's contract, exists in the vault
and nowhere else. The controller mints nothing.
**There are two kinds of secret, and each has one rule.**
**A provider that needs a secret for a consumer requires it from the vault.** A provision's contract
declares it: *for each consumer, one secret*. Resolution expands that into one requirement per
consumer, named for the consumer. So gitea requiring a database makes the database's provider require
a secret named for gitea, and the vault answers it. The provider's own code does not change. It is
handed a login and a password, as it is today.
- **A shared secret** is a value more than one party must hold: a password, a token, an API key. **The
vault makes every one.** Nothing else in the mesh generates a shared secret.
- **A private key** is made where it is used and never leaves: a node's sealing key, the operator's
key, the mesh's certificate authority. This is not a second way of making secrets. A private key any
other party ever held would no longer be private.
**A secret has holders, and the vault delivers to each.** The database credential has two: the
provider, which creates the login with it, and the consumer, which presents it. The vault hands it to
the mesh, which delivers it to each holder sealed to that holder's node. Plaintext exists in the
vault while it is made and on each holder's machine, and nowhere else. The controller carries sealed
values it cannot open.
**Every shared secret is a `secret` requirement, answered by the vault:**
**Every other secret takes the same path:**
- a **credential between a consumer and a provider**. A provision's contract declares *for each
consumer, one secret*, and resolution expands it into one requirement per consumer. So gitea
requiring a database makes the database's provider require a secret for gitea, and the vault
answers it. The provider's own code does not change: it is handed a login and a password, as today;
- a module's **own secret**. `own-secrets` is retired;
- every **broker account**: a module's, a node's, the builder's. The broker delivers `amqp` through
its seat ([ADR 0110](0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md)), and the broker's own
provisioner creates each account from the vault's secret, like any provider. The controller no
longer creates accounts, and there is no separate command to forget;
- an **enrolment token**;
- a **secret operator value**, such as an external API key, which the operator delivers to the vault
([ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md)). A licence's credential is one of these.
What the licences context adds, refreshing a token, is provider behaviour, decided in its own record.
- a module's **own secret** is a `secret` requirement the vault answers. `own-secrets` is retired;
- a **broker account** is the module's identity on the bus. Its name is the mesh's, its password is a
secret the vault makes, and the controller creates the account with it, as it creates accounts
today. There is no separate command to forget;
- an **operator's value** that is secret is handed to the vault, which provides it like any other
secret. It is never replaced by rotation ([ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md));
- a **licence's** credential is an operator's value the vault keeps. What the licences context adds,
refreshing a token and a manager holding the refresh credential, is provider behaviour, decided in
its own record.
**Only the vault may provide `secret`.** A module providing it must hold the `mesh-vault` seat, and
the parser refuses one that does not. A pin cannot route a `secret` requirement anywhere else, because
there is nowhere else.
**Genesis is the vault's first answer, not an exception.** Genesis raises the vault before anything
else and asks it for the foundation's secrets: the store's superuser, the broker's admin and its hashed
form, and the vault's own broker account. The vault answers with the same code it always uses, before
the bus exists. Genesis mints nothing itself.
**A secret has recipients, and the vault delivers to each.** The database credential has two: the
provider, which *applies* it by creating the login, and the consumer, which *presents* it. The vault
hands the value to the mesh sealed to each recipient's node. The controller and the broker carry sealed
values they cannot open.
**A provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries data back.** A provider answers with its
contract's non-secret fields: a site id, a registered name. The mesh delivers them to the consumer as
resolved values. Who a consumer is stays the mesh's: a provider makes what a consumer is *given*,
never what it is *called* ([ADR 0049](0049-a-consumers-identity-fits-the-tightest-backend.md)).
**Genesis delivers, and the vault adopts.** The foundation's first shared secrets exist before the
vault can run: the store's superuser, the broker's admin in the hashed form the broker needs, the bus
accounts of the temporary controller and of the vault itself, and the first enrolment token. Genesis
generates these, seals them to the operator key as today, and **delivers them to the vault when the
vault is installed**, through the same path an operator's value takes. From then on the vault holds,
audits and rotates them. Unlike an operator's external key, the vault can make their replacements, so
they are delivered but replaceable. Genesis is the only thing besides the vault that ever generates a
shared secret, once, before the vault exists, and it hands them over.
**A provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries data back.** A provider's adapter may
answer with its contract's non-secret fields: a site id, a registered name. The mesh delivers them to
the consumer as resolved values. Who a consumer is stays the mesh's: a provider makes what a consumer
is *given*, never what it is *called* ([ADR 0049](0049-a-consumers-identity-fits-the-tightest-backend.md)).
### Rotation
**It is asked of the vault**, by an operator or by the vault's own policy, such as the maximum age a
secret's contract sets.
**It is asked of the vault**, by an operator or by the vault's policy, such as a maximum age in the
secret's contract. A delivered value the vault cannot replace, such as an external API key, is not
rotated by the vault: rotating it means an operator delivering a new one.
**It is provider-first.** The vault delivers the new value first to the holders that *accept* it,
such as the database, and waits for each to confirm it has applied it. Only then does it release the
value to the holders that *present* it, such as gitea. A consumer is never sent a value its provider
has not accepted, so the window shrinks to the consumer's own restart. A provider that does not
confirm holds the rotation: the consumer keeps the old value, which still works, and `status` shows the
rotation as waiting on that provider. It is never half-done and never silently abandoned.
**A secret's contract says how each recipient takes a new value:**
**Restarts are derived, not declared.** The mesh knows which process reads which secret, because the
definition reads it through its requirement ([to-be 27](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/27-a-module-requires-the-mesh-resolves.md)).
When a secret changes, the host restarts every process that reads it, and recreates a container whose
env-file carries it. No definition has to remember `restart-on` for a secret.
| recipient takes it by | example | what happens on rotation |
|---|---|---|
| **applying** it | a provider creating the login; the broker's provisioner updating an account; the store's own provisioner changing its superuser | its provisioner applies the new value; it is never restarted for it |
| **reading it at start** | a consumer reading its password when it starts | the host restarts it, or recreates a container whose env-file carries it |
**It is confirmed.** A rotated secret is shown as unconfirmed until each consumer has restarted with
it and, where its definition declares a health check, passed it. Delivered is not the same as working,
and the mesh says which one it knows.
A secret read only when a service first initialises cannot be rotated by a restart. Its contract marks
it applied, and a provisioner makes the change. The host derives which recipients read a secret at
start from the requirement their definition reads it through, so no definition declares a restart for
a secret.
**It is applier-first.** The vault delivers the new value first to the recipients that apply it. Each
applies it, verifies that the new value authenticates and the old one no longer does, and confirms.
**It repeats that confirmation on every reconcile pass until the vault acknowledges it**, so a lost
message costs one pass. Only after every applier has confirmed does the vault release the value to the
recipients that read it at start.
**The remaining window is stated.** If an applier applies the new value and its provisioner stops
before confirming, the recipients that present the secret are locked out until the provisioner runs
again, because the old value no longer works and they have not been sent the new one. A provisioner is
supervised and restarted when it exits, so the window is bounded by that restart. The mesh shows the
rotation as waiting on that applier for as long as it lasts, never as done.
**It is confirmed.** A rotation is shown as unconfirmed until every applier has confirmed, and every
recipient that reads at start has restarted with the new value and passed its health check, where its
definition declares one.
| step | who |
|---|---|
| asks | an operator, or the vault's policy |
| makes the value | the vault |
| carries it | the controller, sealed, provider first |
| applies it on the provider | the provider's provisioner, which confirms |
| applies it on the consumer | the host, restarting or recreating what reads it |
| confirms it works | the consumer's restart and health check, shown in `status` |
| carries it | the controller, sealed, appliers first |
| applies it | each applier's provisioner, which verifies and confirms on every pass until acknowledged |
| takes it at start | the host, restarting or recreating what reads it |
| confirms it | applier confirmations, then restarts and health checks, shown in `status` |
## What this changes in earlier records
@@ -129,53 +160,61 @@ On acceptance, each of these is superseded or amended by this record, not edited
- [ADR 0048](0048-a-provider-creates-the-credential-the-mesh-minted.md) is superseded: the controller
no longer mints a provider's credential; the vault makes it. That a provider is handed its
credential and seals nothing stands.
- [ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md) is amended: the vault makes a module's own secret rather
than recording one the controller minted, own secrets are retired, and genesis asks the vault for
the root secrets. "The vault stores no plaintext, ever" stands.
- [ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md) is amended: the vault makes every shared secret, own
secrets are retired, and its rejection of vault-only minting is answered by genesis delivering the
first secrets. "The vault stores no plaintext, ever" stands.
- [ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md) is amended: an operator delivers a secret
to the vault.
- [To-be 13](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/13-credentials-and-their-rotation.md) and
[to-be 24](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/24-the-secrets-vault.md) are amended: rotation is provider-first,
derived and confirmed, and the vault is the only maker.
to the vault, and genesis delivers the foundation's first secrets the same way.
- [ADR 0043](0043-a-module-broker-account-is-scoped-by-emits-and-consumes.md) is amended: a broker
account is created by the broker's provisioner, not the controller. Its scoping stands.
- [To-be 13](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/13-credentials-and-their-rotation.md),
[to-be 21](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/21-the-installation-in-full.md) and
[to-be 24](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/24-the-secrets-vault.md) are amended: rotation is applier-first,
derived and confirmed; genesis delivers its secrets to the vault; the vault is the only maker.
- [Issue 103](../04-ISSUES/103-a-container-is-not-recreated-when-a-file-it-reads-changes/00-report.md)
becomes a prerequisite: rotation cannot be trusted while a changed env-file leaves a container on
its old value.
## Consequences
- **The vault is on the path of every new or rotated secret.** Today the controller is, and both run
on the control-node, so no new single point of failure appears. It is stated rather than implied.
- **The vault is on the path of every new or rotated shared secret.** Today the controller holds that
place, on the same node. A secret can no longer be made while the vault is down.
- Resolution expands per-consumer requirements from a provision's contract. The contract declares
them, never the provider's code, so what a provider requires stays predictable from the catalogue.
- The SDK's provider loop gains one thing: confirming that a rotation was applied. Adapters are
unchanged.
- The mesh gains the way back from provider to consumer, for confirmations and for data.
- 54 modules move from own secrets to vault requirements, and the broker account stops needing a
separate command.
- **What got harder:** a secret can no longer be made when the vault is down, where today the
controller makes one regardless. And a rotation waits for its provider. Both move failures from
late and silent to early and visible, which is the trade this record makes throughout.
- The SDK's provider loop gains repeated confirmation of an applied rotation. A credential provider's
adapter is unchanged. A data provider's adapter gains a return value.
- The broker's provisioner gains every bus account, and the controller loses five separate places it
generates a secret today.
- 54 modules move from own secrets to vault requirements.
- **What got harder:** a rotation waits for its appliers, and an applier that stops mid-rotation locks
presenters out until it restarts. Both are shown, not hidden, and the second is bounded by a
supervised restart rather than by someone noticing.
## How it is checked
| Rule | Checked by |
|---|---|
| Only the vault makes secrets | A controller test: no code path mints a secret. A vault test: the one generation function is the only one, and genesis reaches it through the vault. |
| A provider's per-consumer secret comes from the vault | A resolution test: a consumer requiring a database expands to a secret requirement named for it, answered by the vault. |
| A secret reaches each holder sealed to its node | A controller test: each holder's copy opens with that holder's node key and with no other, the controller's included. |
| Only the vault generates a shared secret after genesis | A controller test: no code path generates a shared secret. An installer test: genesis generates exactly the foundation's first secrets and delivers them to the vault. |
| A private key is made where it is used | A test per key: a node's sealing key never leaves the node, and the operator's private key never enters the mesh. |
| Only the vault provides `secret` | The parser refuses a module providing `secret` without holding `mesh-vault`, and resolution refuses a pin on a `secret` requirement. |
| A provider's per-consumer secret comes from the vault | A resolution test: a consumer requiring a database expands to a secret requirement for it, answered by the vault and delivered to both recipients. |
| Values are carried sealed | A controller test: each recipient's copy opens with that recipient's node key and no other; neither the controller nor a message on the broker can open one. |
| Own secrets are retired | A catalogue test: no definition declares an own secret, with a declared list of exceptions that shrinks to empty. |
| A broker account needs no separate command | A resolution test: assigning a module that speaks on the bus yields its account. |
| Rotation is provider-first | A rotation test: the consumer is not sent the new value until the provider confirms; a provider that never confirms leaves the consumer on the old value, shown as waiting. |
| Restarts are derived | A host test: changing a secret restarts every process that reads it, and recreates a container whose env-file carries it, with no `restart-on` declared. |
| Rotation is confirmed | A rotation test: the secret shows as unconfirmed until the consumer restarted and passed its health check. |
| A provider answers data back | A resolution test: the analytics provider's site id reaches its consumer as a resolved value. |
| Bus accounts come from the broker's provisioner | A resolution test: assigning a module that speaks on the bus yields its account, created by the broker's provisioner with no separate command. |
| An irreplaceable delivered value is not rotated by the vault | A vault test: a rotation request on an operator's external key is refused, naming the operator as its source. |
| Rotation is applier-first and re-confirmed | A rotation test: presenters are not sent the new value until every applier confirms, and a confirmation lost in transit is repeated on the next pass. |
| Restarts are derived from how a secret is read | A host test: a secret read at start restarts its reader, and recreates a container whose env-file carries it; an applied secret restarts nothing. |
| Rotation is confirmed | A rotation test: an applier confirms only after the new value authenticates and the old one does not, and the rotation shows unconfirmed until every reader restarted and passed its health check. |
| A provider answers data back | A lab test with a consumer requiring analytics: the provider's site id reaches it as a resolved value. |
## References
- [ADR 0048](0048-a-provider-creates-the-credential-the-mesh-minted.md): the decision this supersedes,
and the return path it left open
- [ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md), [ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md),
[ADR 0049](0049-a-consumers-identity-fits-the-tightest-backend.md): the vault, the operator, and identity
- [ADR 0085](0085-a-secret-is-a-provision.md): the vault, and the objection this record answers
- [ADR 0092](0092-an-operator-delivers-a-pair-credential.md), [ADR 0049](0049-a-consumers-identity-fits-the-tightest-backend.md),
[ADR 0043](0043-a-module-broker-account-is-scoped-by-emits-and-consumes.md): delivered values,
identity, and broker accounts
- [ADR 0112](0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md), [to-be 27](../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/27-a-module-requires-the-mesh-resolves.md):
everything a module needs is a requirement
- [Issue 095](../04-ISSUES/095-a-module-assigned-after-genesis-has-no-broker-account/00-report.md),
02-DECISIONS/README.md
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@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ python3 00-META/checks/index.py fail if stale
- **0099** — [A step that runs once names what it reads, and runs again when it changed](0099-a-step-that-runs-once-names-what-it-reads.md)
- **0110** — [A seat is a module assignment from a closed set, and it may deliver a provision](0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md)
- **0112** — [A module definition names no node, no mesh and no path: everything it needs is a requirement the mesh resolves](0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md) *(proposed)*
- **0113** — [The vault makes every secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md) *(proposed)*
- **0113** — [The vault makes every shared secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md) *(proposed)*
### How it is built