ADR 0259: a rehearsal, not a drill; the announcement at the terminal checked; the operator's steps with nox, and the standard-input gap said

02-DECISIONS/0259-an-ask-is-a-message-on-the-bus-any-channel-answers-it-and-the-asker-acts-on-a-warrant.md

@@ -497,7 +497,8 @@ with the router not knowing its own machine, it approved. Now:
    the call's key, and the channel the operator's answers are proven on became the agent's. Now the secret of
    a module running as an account of its own (the router, Telegram, the desk channel) is refused at the desk
    before anybody is asked, naming the line to type at the controller's terminal instead —
-   `mesh-controller secret accept <node> telegram telegram-token`, read without echo. There it is announced
+   `nox secret accept <node> telegram telegram-token` (`nox` is `mesh-cli`'s alias; on the control-node,
+   from the operator's own account, it is the controller's terminal, ADR 0272). There it is announced
    on every channel, the one being replaced among them (it still runs on its old token until the next push),
    **before** it is kept, and not kept when that announcement fails. A grant test holds that only the desk
    machine's launcher, carried by that machine's runtime, may answer its prompt; for any other module's
@@ -532,7 +533,7 @@ Telegram, or from the mesh MCP server." The asker's words never name a channel.
 
 | Rule | Checked by |
 |---|---|
-| An asker publishes asks only under its own name, and hears only its own warrants | controller grant tests: a module using `operator-channel` is granted `accept.ask.<itself>` and `event.decided.<itself>`, no wildcard; a live drill publishing under another name is refused by the server |
+| An asker publishes asks only under its own name, and hears only its own warrants | controller grant tests: a module using `operator-channel` is granted `accept.ask.<itself>` and `event.decided.<itself>`, no wildcard; the lab's proof `asks` publishing under another name on a real bus is refused by the server |
 | Only the router publishes a warrant | controller grant test: `event.decided.*` is in no principal's publish list but the holder's |
 | A channel publishes only its own kind's answers, links and proofs | controller grant tests over a kinded claim; a second claim of a kind is refused |
 | A code is never on a stream | controller test: no stream's subjects cover `mesh.seat.*.proof.>` |
@@ -557,12 +558,13 @@ Telegram, or from the mesh MCP server." The asker's words never name a channel.
 | Only the serving controller answers `root-free`; a machine waiting for its first setuid search is not root-free | controller grant test `TestOnlyTheServingControllerMayAnswerRootFree` (one answerer); `TestAMachineWaitingForItsFirstSetuidSearchIsNotRootFree`; `TestRootNotFreeIsQuietWhileTheFirstSearchRunsAndKeyedApartFromDA` |
 | A desk unlink in the first hour bars nothing; root lifts any bar (N1-router) | router tests `TestAnUnlinkFromTheDeskInTheFirstHourBarsNothing`, `TestBreakGlassLiftsABarOnRelinking` |
 | A trusted party's secret is never given at a desk; only the desk machine's launcher answers its prompt (N1-give) | controller tests `TestATrustedPartysSecretIsNeverTakenAtADesk`, `TestOnlyTheDeskMachinesLauncherMayAnswerItsPrompt` |
+| At the controller's terminal, a trusted party's secret is announced on every channel before it is kept, and not kept when the announcement fails; a machine the mesh does not know is refused before anybody types (N1-give) | controller tests `TestATrustedPartysSecretGivenAtTheTerminalIsAnnouncedBeforeItIsKept` (fails when the announcement before keeping is removed), `TestAGiveNamingAMachineTheMeshDoesNotKnowAsksNobody` |
 | A silence never takes an approval back (M1) | controller test `TestAnAcknowledgementNeverSharesAnAskWithAnApproval`, with the condition silenced as the controller silences it |
 | The router never waits on the controller while holding its work | router test `TestTheRootFreeWordIsNotAskedWhileTheWorkIsHeld` |
 | The self-check counts the login shell only where `execute` is served, and what it cannot measure fails | controller probe tests (`TestTheLoginShellCountsOnlyWhereExecuteIsServed`, the unmeasured case) |
 | The whole flow, before anyone uses it | the lab's proof `asks` (mesh-lab): a real bus with the controller's composed grants, the router and the Telegram channel in runtimes of their own accounts, a fake Telegram API — approve acted once, decline, expiry, a replayed tap, a tap from another account, a forged warrant, an ask under another name, an ask from a module that may not ask |
 | The controller holds no channel code | review; the controller's module imports no channel package |
-| End to end | live acceptance after rollout (mesh-lab `asks/live-acceptance.sh`): the controller's `drill`, started at its terminal alone, approved on the phone, acted on once and performing nothing; the hand-act reads `warrant drill drill=approve`, by "the operator, as telegram identity …", via "telegram (telegram), user id verified", proofs P1 |
+| End to end | live acceptance after rollout (mesh-lab `asks/live-acceptance.sh`): a **rehearsal** (`rehearse`), started at the controller's terminal alone, approved on the phone, acted on once and performing nothing; the hand-act reads `warrant rehearsal rehearsal=approve`, by "the operator, as telegram identity …", via "telegram (telegram), user id verified", proofs P1 |
 | An answer from another account is refused and the operator is told which account tried | router test (`TestEveryAnswerThatIsNotTheOperatorsIsRefusedAndSaid`); the lab's proof |
 | A message carrying an ask's answers is never folded into a digest | router test (`TestAnAsksMessageWithOneAnswerIsNotFoldedIntoADigest`); the lab's proof, where it was found |