diff --git a/04-ISSUES/116-route-proxy-has-no-auth-or-ip-restriction/00-report.md b/04-ISSUES/116-route-proxy-has-no-auth-or-ip-restriction/00-report.md
index 952cd86..8390ad2 100644
--- a/04-ISSUES/116-route-proxy-has-no-auth-or-ip-restriction/00-report.md
+++ b/04-ISSUES/116-route-proxy-has-no-auth-or-ip-restriction/00-report.md
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-25
 located-in: [mesh-controller examples/route-proxy]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-controller PR #58 — the four capabilities implemented in the reference proxy; the table re-keyed by host and path with a total ordering; a declaration carrying a credential refused rather than served, and an unreadable secret failing closed
 amended-design: 03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md
 ---
 
@@ -105,10 +105,13 @@ vulnerability. The two outcomes if it is left unfixed are both bad:
   can resolve a name, while a known-exploited path loses the block that was put in front of it
   during an incident.
 
-## Open questions
+## Open questions — answered
 
-These are design questions, not implementation details, and the fix should not be written before
-they are answered.
+These were design questions, not implementation details, and the fix was not written before they
+were answered. All three were settled in
+[ADR 0108](../../02-DECISIONS/0108-a-route-carries-the-policy-applied-to-a-request.md): policy goes
+**on the route**, the set is **closed at the four**, and a declaration **names a secret and never
+carries one**. Kept as asked, because what was rejected and why is the half worth having.
 
 - **Where does request-level policy come from?** Today a contribution carries a name and a port.
   Extending it to carry policy keeps the mesh as the source of truth, consistent with everything
@@ -123,3 +126,27 @@ they are answered.
   scoping and redirects are what the predecessor uses *today*. Whether route-level policy should be
   an open middleware surface, or exactly these four and no more, is worth deciding before any of it
   is written — an open surface is far harder to withdraw than to add.
+
+## What the fix covers, and what it does not yet allow
+
+*2026-09-25, on resolution.* The gap this issue reports is closed: the proxy applies policy, the
+four capabilities exist, the table is keyed by host and path with a total ordering, and the two
+failure modes that would rot quietly are held by tests — a declaration carrying a credential is
+refused rather than served, and an unreadable secret makes the route refuse rather than open.
+
+**It does not yet let an operator move the affected routes.** That needs the mesh side: a manifest
+able to declare these values, and the controller minting the secret that `auth` names. Until both
+exist the capability is reachable only by writing the routes file by hand, so the routes held back
+on the adopted ingress stay there.
+
+Resolved rather than left open because the issue reports a gap **in the proxy**, and that gap is
+gone. The remaining work is not this fault persisting; it is the ordinary build-out of a contract
+this record's decision created, and it belongs to
+[to-be 08](../../03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md) rather than here.
+
+**One thing found while fixing it, worth keeping.** Priority was first read with the reader for
+ports, which caps at 65535 — and the one real rule this has to reproduce is declared at 100000. It
+parsed to zero, so refusal and path scoping would both have shipped looking complete, passing their
+own tests, and doing nothing on the only case that motivated them. *A validator borrowed from a
+neighbouring field is a silent default*, and the test that now guards it goes through the proxy,
+because at the parser the value looked fine.