Merge pull request 'ADR 0191: the mesh resolves only its own names; a public name resolves publicly' (#320) from decision/0191-the-mesh-resolves-only-its-own-domain into main

03-DESIGN/01-to-be/08-connectivity.md

@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ code:
   - mesh-controller internal/catalogue/filtering.go
   - mesh-controller examples/route-proxy
   - mesh-controller internal/identity/authority.go
+  - mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/plan.go (the names the roster publishes)
   - mesh-host internal/identity/serving.go
   - mesh-host internal/apply (the service that reflects a rule set)
-updated: 2026-10-02
+updated: 2026-10-03
 decisions:
+  - 02-DECISIONS/0191-the-meshs-resolver-holds-only-the-meshs-own-names.md
   - 02-DECISIONS/0180-the-found-front-end-is-uninstalled-once-a-machine-is-converged.md
   - 02-DECISIONS/0170-the-firewall-seat-serves-its-verbs.md
   - 02-DECISIONS/0169-a-machine-joins-through-the-tunnel-and-the-bus-is-never-public.md
@@ -421,7 +423,22 @@ that module and nothing else.
 the argument for the table in ADR 0009 being a table: the pattern is only obvious once seen, and
 the cost of not seeing it is inventing a mechanism that already exists.
 
-### And the public names a proxy serves must resolve in the mesh too
+### The mesh resolves only its own names; a public name resolves publicly
+
+**The mesh's resolver holds names under the mesh suffix and nothing else** — every machine, and through
+it every route's internal name `<label>.<node>.internal`
+([ADR 0151](../../02-DECISIONS/0151-a-routes-internal-name-is-composed-under-the-node-that-serves-it.md)).
+**A public name the mesh serves is never given a private answer**: it is forwarded and resolves to the
+public address, from a member and from anything else the resolver answers — a resolver may serve a
+machine's LAN, and a phone on that LAN must get the address it can reach
+([ADR 0191](../../02-DECISIONS/0191-the-meshs-resolver-holds-only-the-meshs-own-names.md)). Inside the
+mesh, a routed service is reached, and certified by the internal authority, under its internal name.
+*Checked by the controller's catalogue tests — every name the roster carries ends in the mesh suffix —
+and on a machine by asking its resolver for a public name the mesh serves: the answer is the public
+address.*
+
+*What follows is how the mesh got here, kept because the reasoning it rejects is the expensive half to
+rediscover.*
 
 *2026-09-09, found by an internal certificate authority that could not issue.* The mesh writes every
 `<node>.internal` name into every declared container and treats the public names a proxy serves as a
@@ -444,6 +461,13 @@ would go stale the day one changes. The mesh propagates the names it was told to
 knows nothing about what they mean
 ([ADR 0066](../../02-DECISIONS/0066-public-routing-is-name-agnostic.md)).
 
+*2026-10-03, withdrawn.* Publishing public names with private answers turned every resolver that also
+serves a LAN into an outage for that LAN's non-members — a phone was handed the control-node's tunnel
+address for the mail server — while every check, run from a member, passed. Its reason had gone: routes
+have internal names since ADR 0151, and the proxy certifies public names from a public authority and
+internal names from the internal one. Superseded by the rule at the head of this section
+([ADR 0191](../../02-DECISIONS/0191-the-meshs-resolver-holds-only-the-meshs-own-names.md)).
+
 ## 3 — Exposure
 
 Settled by [ADR 0007](../../02-DECISIONS/0007-connectivity.md); summarised here because
@@ -871,13 +895,15 @@ is unchanged. **The same code path certifies against an internal authority as ag
 only the issuer differs.** That is what makes trusted certificates possible for a mesh whose names
 the public internet cannot resolve.
 
-**And it does not work until the routed name resolves inside the mesh** — the §2 finding above,
-arriving here because this is what needed it. The authority's challenge reaches the routed name only
-once that name is in internal resolution; a public authority is handed that dependency by public
-DNS, and an internal one has to be handed it by the mesh. *Checked by a handshake to a routed name
-that verifies against the internal root and nothing else — which cannot succeed unless the issuer
-first reached the name to certify it*
-([ADR 0066](../../02-DECISIONS/0066-public-routing-is-name-agnostic.md)).
+**The internal authority certifies internal names; a public one certifies public names.** The
+authority's challenge reaches the name it certifies, so each certifies what it can resolve: the
+internal authority a route's `<label>.<node>.internal`, which the mesh resolves, and a public authority
+the public name, which public DNS resolves. A proxy holds both, and a public name is never certified
+by the internal authority. *Checked by a handshake to a route's internal name that verifies against
+the internal root and nothing else, and one to its public name that verifies against the public
+roots* ([ADR 0191](../../02-DECISIONS/0191-the-meshs-resolver-holds-only-the-meshs-own-names.md)).
+Until 2026-10-03 this paragraph had the internal authority certify public names, which needed them
+resolved inside the mesh ([ADR 0066](../../02-DECISIONS/0066-public-routing-is-name-agnostic.md)).
 
 ## 6 — One statement behind exposure, filtering and certificates
 
@@ -983,10 +1009,9 @@ The list is worth having in one place, because it is most of the argument:
   operator's to move between meshes, but the manifest layer still stores it as a literal — so today
   the composition is a per-node override rather than the design. The interpolation that would let a
   module carry a label and a node carry the domain, and the mesh join them, does not yet exist.
-- **Publishing route names into internal resolution.** The same ADR requires a granted route to be
-  resolvable inside the mesh, not only routable from outside it; the mechanism that writes
-  `<node>.internal` into containers does not yet also write the routed names, which is why an
-  internal issuer cannot currently validate one without a hand-placed entry.
+- **Withdrawing public names from internal resolution.** The roster still publishes every routed
+  public name at its serving node's private address, which ADR 0191 forbids; until the controller
+  stops, a resolver that answers a LAN hands that LAN's non-members addresses they cannot reach.
 
 ## The hub adopts the predecessor's tunnel