diff --git a/04-ISSUES/003-firewall-scope-is-read-by-no-code/00-report.md b/04-ISSUES/003-firewall-scope-is-read-by-no-code/00-report.md
index f2b5d5c..9115d64 100644
--- a/04-ISSUES/003-firewall-scope-is-read-by-no-code/00-report.md
+++ b/04-ISSUES/003-firewall-scope-is-read-by-no-code/00-report.md
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: fixed
 opened: 2026-08-22
-located-in: []
-fixed-by:
-amended-design:
+located-in: [mesh-control/internal/catalogue, mesh-catalog/modules/firewall]
+fixed-by: the manifest refuses unknown keys, `from` is the field that scopes a port and it is rendered to nftables, and the firewall module applies it
+amended-design: 0050-a-machine-firewall-is-the-sum-of-what-it-listens-on.md
 ---
 
 # 003 — A firewall rule's `scope:` is read by no code
@@ -31,10 +31,27 @@ any check.
 - Five manifests carry the key. Zero code paths consume it.
 - Recorded as an observation on 2026-08-22.
 
-## Open questions
+## Resolution
 
-- Should the manifest reject unknown keys outright? That is the general fix; this is one
-  instance of it.
-- Were the five declarations intended to restrict something that is currently open? Each needs
-  checking against what the node actually exposes — the declaration cannot be trusted either
-  way.
+Both open questions are answered, and the chain from a declared scope to a packet actually dropped
+is closed — recorded as [ADR 0050](../../02-DECISIONS/0050-a-machine-firewall-is-the-sum-of-what-it-listens-on.md).
+
+- **Unknown keys are refused, not accepted.** `ParseManifest` decodes with
+  `DisallowUnknownFields`, so a `scope:` key the firewall type does not have is now rejected at the
+  manifest — the general fix, of which this was one instance. A key that reads as a restriction can
+  no longer be one nothing enforces.
+- **The field that scopes a port is `from`, and it is read.** A `listens` entry names its source —
+  `mesh`, `anywhere` or `machine` — and the control plane renders the union of every module's
+  `listens` into a node's whole nftables rule set (`AsNftables`), default-drop with an accept scoped
+  to exactly the source each port named. The five `scope:` declarations were the wrong spelling of
+  that intent; `from` is the right one, and it is enforced.
+- **A module applies it.** The rendered rule set is written to the node (the `filtering` resource),
+  and the `firewall` module (mesh-catalog) loads it — the last link, without which the rules were
+  computed and never dropped a packet.
+
+## Original open questions
+
+- Should the manifest reject unknown keys outright? — **Yes; it does now** (`DisallowUnknownFields`).
+- Were the five declarations intended to restrict something that is currently open? — They meant to
+  scope a port and used a key nothing read; expressed through `from`, that intent is now enforced.
+  Any manifest still carrying `scope:` is refused at parse, so it is found rather than believed.