File 020 — a certificate is issued and never collected; close Phase 1

Against a real ACME server the proxy orders, the challenge is answered
at the name on port 80 through the proxy itself, the authorisation goes
valid, finalisation is accepted, and the authority issues a certificate.
The client then posts to an empty URL to collect it, and never does.

Read from the authority's own log rather than inferred. Across one run
it issued two certificates and accepted finalise three times: the client
reaches issuance every attempt and fails at the same step after it.

Ruled out and recorded, so nobody repeats it: the directory is complete;
the authority's API certificate covers the address; the challenge path
works. A hand-written server config was suspected and was wrong —
replacing it with the server's own default, changing only the challenge
port, gives the identical error.

Filed rather than pursued because what remains is interop between two
libraries against a server that exists to be a test server, and may say
nothing about a real authority. What the mesh needed to show, it showed:
a routed name gets a certificate ordered from a configured authority,
and an unrouted one gets nothing — that second assertion passes.

Phase 1 closes with this one item partly open. Two of its four tasks
needed no code at all, the network shape was built, and the next thing
to learn comes from moving a module rather than a fourth lab run.

03-DESIGN/01-to-be/00-work-breakdown.md

@@ -60,11 +60,18 @@ Found by taking real modules and asking what they would require. Each is a gap i
 | ~~1.1~~ | ~~An **object-store provision**~~ — **done 2026-08-31**, and it needed no change to the mesh: see below | seven assertions against a real store |
 | ~~1.2~~ | ~~**A session as a consumer of a licence**~~ — **done 2026-08-31**, and it also needed no change: see below | two sessions on one machine, different licences, each its own key |
 | ~~1.3~~ | ~~A **network** shape, and ordering within a module~~ — **done 2026-08-31** | the shape is created and removed; ordering was already there, and is now asserted |
-| 1.4 | **Public certificate issuance** | a name reachable from outside is served with a certificate from a public authority, obtained against a **staging** endpoint unless told otherwise ([`04-ISSUES/004`](../../04-ISSUES/004-certificate-issuance-targets-production/00-report.md)) |
+| 1.4 | **Public certificate issuance** — **built; one gap** | ordering, the challenge and issuance are proven against a real authority; **collecting the issued certificate is not** ([`04-ISSUES/020`](../../04-ISSUES/020-a-certificate-is-issued-and-never-collected/00-report.md)) |
 
 **1.3 and 1.4 block later ones** and are listed now so they are not met as surprises. 1.3 is what
 a mail system needs and nothing else so far does.
 
+**Phase 1 is closed with 1.4 partly open**, deliberately. Two of its four items needed no code at
+all; the network shape was built; and certificates are configured correctly, order correctly, and
+are issued correctly — the client does not collect what the authority issued, against a server
+that exists to be a test server. That is filed rather than chased, because the remainder may say
+nothing about a real authority and the next thing to learn comes from moving a module rather than
+from a fourth lab run.
+
 **Checkpoint:** each is demonstrated in the lab before the module needing it is attempted.
 
 ### 1.2, and the same surprise twice

04-ISSUES/020-a-certificate-is-issued-and-never-collected/00-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+---
+status: open
+opened: 2026-08-31
+located-in: [mesh-control, mesh-lab]
+fixed-by:
+amended-design:
+---
+
+# 020 — A certificate is issued and never collected
+
+## Symptom
+
+Against a real ACME server in the lab, the proxy orders a certificate for a name the mesh routes,
+the challenge is answered, the authority **issues the certificate** — and the proxy never obtains
+it. Every TLS handshake then fails, and the order is retried indefinitely.
+
+The client's error, once per attempt:
+
+```
+http: TLS handshake error: Post "": unsupported protocol scheme ""
+```
+
+A POST to an empty URL: the certificate's location, on an order the authority considers valid.
+
+## What is proven, and it is most of it
+
+Read from the authority's own log rather than inferred:
+
+```
+Starting 3 validations
+authz … set VALID by completed challenge …
+POST /finalize-order/ → Order … is fully authorized. Processing finalization
+Issued certificate serial 3ef142939115ee88
+```
+
+**The hard half works.** The order is created, the HTTP-01 challenge is answered *at the name being
+certified* on port 80 through the proxy itself, the authorisation goes valid, finalisation is
+accepted, and a certificate is issued. Across one run the authority issued **two** certificates and
+accepted finalise **three** times — the client reaches issuance every attempt and fails at the same
+step after it.
+
+**And the policy that guards the quota is proven too.** The second assertion in the same file
+passes: no certificate is ordered for a name nothing routes, so a scan cannot spend an account's
+rate limit.
+
+## What is not known
+
+**Whether this happens against a real authority at all.** Everything above is against Pebble, which
+exists to be a test server. The failure is in the last hop between one client and one server, and
+may say nothing about behaviour against a public authority.
+
+## Ruled out
+
+| | |
+|---|---|
+| the directory | fetched and complete — `newAccount`, `newNonce`, `newOrder`, `revokeCert` all present |
+| the authority's API certificate | covers `127.0.0.1`; the bundle is named explicitly and verification is not skipped |
+| a hand-written server config | suspected, and wrong. Replacing it with the server's **own** default config, changing only the challenge port, gives the identical error |
+| the finalize URL being empty | the authority logs finalisation being accepted |
+| the challenge path | the authorisation goes valid |
+
+## Where it might be
+
+- **The order's `certificate` field is absent when the client reads it.** The client waits for the
+  order to become valid and only then fetches, so an empty location on a valid order is the
+  remaining shape.
+- **A moving tag was used.** `pebble:latest` advertises a draft *profiles* extension in its
+  directory. A pinned older version is being tried — the third time today that not pinning a tag
+  cost a run.
+
+## Why this is filed rather than pursued
+
+**The mesh-side behaviour is proven and the remainder is interop between two libraries.** Continuing
+would be several more twenty-minute lab runs against a server that is not the one production uses,
+to chase a defect that may not exist there.
+
+**What the mesh needed to show, it showed**: a name it routes gets a certificate ordered from a
+configured authority, and a name it does not route gets nothing. The configuration is right, the
+challenge path is right, and issuance happens.
+
+## What would close it
+
+- The same scenario against a different ACME implementation — a second server, or a real staging
+  endpoint from a machine that can reach one. **If it passes there, this is a Pebble interop
+  detail and the issue closes with that recorded.**
+- Or the client's request captured on the wire, showing what the order actually contained when the
+  location was read.
+
+## Evidence
+
+- `mesh-lab test/integration/certificates.test.ts`, scenario `a-public-name`
+- One assertion passes (no certificate for an unrouted name); one fails (a routed name is never
+  served).