Issue 076 opened: a served fact made at first start cannot be served; ADR 0097's refusal of an undeclared base is live
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@@ -27,3 +27,6 @@ sidecar beds proved a sidecar alone, which the module beds prove whole; the mini
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grant beds proved a grant with a second store beside the foundation's, which the grant bed and
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the vault bed prove against the catalogue. Retired, with their scenarios. Two remain declared:
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route-forwarding, which needs the certificate authority beside the proxy, and the large mesh test.
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*Route-forwarding's conversion is blocked:* the catalogue's authority cannot be raised as written
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([issue 076](../076-a-served-fact-made-at-first-start-cannot-be-served/00-report.md)).
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@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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---
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status: located
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opened: 2026-09-21
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located-in: [mesh-catalog modules/step-ca, mesh-controller internal/catalogue (serves)]
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fixed-by:
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amended-design:
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---
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# A served fact made at first start cannot be served, so the catalogue's authority cannot start
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## Symptom, as observed
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The catalogue's certificate authority module declares its root certificate, its root key and
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that key's password as its own secrets, and writes each into a file the container is told to
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initialise from. The mesh mints an own secret as random bytes. Random bytes are not a
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certificate: as written, the authority cannot initialise, and no bed has ever raised it — the
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whole-mesh bed that names it has not run since it was converted. Found while converting the
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route-forwarding bed to the catalogue's proxy, which requires the authority beside it.
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The authority can make its own root at first start — the certificate bed raises it that way and
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it issues within a second. What it cannot do then is tell the mesh what that root is: a
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consumer of `acme-ca` is given `${bound:acme-ca:root}` from the provider's `serves`, which is
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written in the manifest before anything runs.
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## Why it matters beyond this instance
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- **Two kinds of secret the vocabulary does not distinguish.** A value the mesh may invent (a
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password) and a value only the module can produce (a key pair, a certificate) are both
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"own secrets", and the mesh invents both.
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- **A served fact that exists only after first start** has no way into a binding. Anything a
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module generates and its consumers must trust — a root, a public key, a fingerprint — is in
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the same position.
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- Every consumer of `acme-ca`, which today is the route proxy, is blocked with it.
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## What would close it
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Either a module may say a secret is *made by the module* — the mesh reserves the name, the
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module writes the value once, the mesh takes custody of it and delivers it where it is bound —
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or a served fact may be *contributed at run time* by the provider's runtime rather than written
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in its manifest. The first is the smaller change and covers the root certificate; the second is
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what a fingerprint or a public key wants. Decided, then the authority raised in the lab beside
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the proxy, which is the route-forwarding bed's conversion.
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