ADR 0186: a ban list never holds a neighbour, and the mesh's own bans are its own wherever they hang; design 31
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@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ updated: 2026-10-02
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decisions:
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- 02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md
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- 02-DECISIONS/0179-the-intrusion-seat-serves-its-verbs-and-every-door-declares-its-jail.md
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- 02-DECISIONS/0186-a-ban-list-never-holds-a-neighbour.md
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---
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# 31 — A module declares its fail2ban jail, and the mesh composes them per node
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@@ -92,3 +93,13 @@ the daemon's, and both are read through the console.
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*How it is checked:* ADR 0179's table.
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## What the first jails taught, 2026-10-02
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[ADR 0186](../../02-DECISIONS/0186-a-ban-list-never-holds-a-neighbour.md). Within an hour of the
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first public jail the home server had banned the house's own router: the router reflects local
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traffic, so every client in the building arrives as the gateway's address. The never-ban list now
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holds every private range as well as the mesh's own. And the mesh read its own ban chain as a
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foreign rule set on that machine, because the chain hangs off the container runtime's user chain and
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that machine's forward policy is the runtime's DROP — the reader now calls a chain of source-named
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refusals a ban wherever it hangs, as it already did for the packet filter's own tables.
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