Issue 146: a first node now enrols, and is enrolled twice
Two more faults behind the three already fixed. The account a token is the password of was never recorded, and the comment above the issuing code said it was; issuing now records it. Placing the composed list at genesis is the other half — the control plane says what it composed and whoever raises the machine writes it beside the bus, because no declaration can reach a machine that has not enrolled. With that a first node enrols. It is then enrolled twice from one attempt, each minting a credential, and it keeps the answer to the first while the mesh keeps the second. The trail for that one stops at a duplicate that survived message-id deduplication.
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@@ -82,6 +82,54 @@ managing, or genesis carries a user list that includes the first node's enrolmen
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takes over from there. Both are decisions, not patches, and both belong to the genesis step that was
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takes over from there. Both are decisions, not patches, and both belong to the genesis step that was
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deliberately left until last.
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deliberately left until last.
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## 5 — the composed user list has to be placed by hand at genesis *(fixed)*
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The account a token is the password of is **not recorded at all**: the composer names an enrolment
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user for every machine with a live token, nothing minted a credential for it, and the composition
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left it out as a user with no password. The comment above the issuing code already claimed
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otherwise — *"the account is created before the token is handed over"* — which is how it went
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unnoticed. Issuing a token now records that account, with the token's own secret as its password,
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because that is the string the machine will present.
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Placing it is the other half. The list reaches the machine running the bus in that machine's
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declaration, which a machine that has not enrolled does not get, so at genesis it cannot arrive
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that way. **The control plane composes and says what it composed** — `broker accounts`, to standard
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output — and whoever is raising the machine writes it beside the bus's configuration and makes the
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server re-read it. Twice, because two accounts come into existence at different moments: the
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enrolment when the token is issued, and the machine's own when it enrols. A control plane that
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wrote the file itself would have to know where the bus keeps its configuration and how to make it
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reload, which is the module's knowledge and is what the module takes over on the first push.
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With that, **a first node enrols against the bus it just raised** — measured, from bare, in the
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lab.
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## 6 — and is enrolled twice, keeping a credential the mesh has replaced *(open)*
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```
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mesh-controller: enrolled anchor
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mesh-controller: enrolled anchor (the same second)
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```
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One `enrol` on the machine, two enrolments in the control plane. Each mints the node a fresh bus
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password and returns it; the machine keeps the answer to the first, and the mesh keeps the hash of
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the second. The machine then reconnects for ever as a user whose password the mesh rotated out from
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under it — *authentication error - User "node.anchor"* on the bus, `Authorization Violation` in the
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host's log, and a node that never reports.
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What is ruled out: the host asking twice — it asks again only when the mesh says *try again*, and
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a refused attempt is not logged as an enrolment. Redelivery by the consumer — there is one
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consumer, its acknowledgement window is thirty seconds, and the handler is quick.
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What is left: the client re-publishing when an acknowledgement is slow, which is what its defaults
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do. That was addressed by giving the publish a message id derived from its own bytes, so the stream
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discards the copy — **and the duplicate survived it**, so either the id is not reaching the stream
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or the second copy is not a copy. This is where the trail stops.
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Worth saying plainly: **the mint is the fragile part, not the delivery.** An enrolment answered
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twice is survivable if the answer is the same both times, and it cannot be — the mesh keeps only
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the hash, so a second answer is necessarily a different credential. Whatever closes this either
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makes the enrolment arrive once, or stops the second arrival from rotating anything.
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## Where it belongs
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## Where it belongs
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`mesh-host` (the bundle and the enrolment path) and `mesh-controller` (the certificate command, and
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`mesh-host` (the bundle and the enrolment path) and `mesh-controller` (the certificate command, and
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