Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jochen 1b5f2c2c1a ADR 0113 and to-be 27: address the review of the vault rework
Two decisions taken with the author:
- Genesis delivers and the vault adopts. The vault cannot run first — it is built on the runtime base
  the installation makes after the store, broker and controller, and it learns its work over the bus.
  Genesis generates the foundation's first shared secrets, seals them to the operator key, and
  delivers them to the vault through the path an operator's value takes; from then on the vault holds
  and rotates them. This answers ADR 0085's own reason for rejecting vault-only minting, which 0113
  now names instead of stepping around.
- Rotation re-confirms on every pass. An applier repeats its confirmation until acknowledged, so a lost
  message costs one pass; an applier that stops after applying locks readers out until its supervised
  restart, and that window is stated and shown, not claimed away.

Fixes:
- Scope: a shared secret is made by the vault; a private key (node sealing keys, the operator's key,
  the certificate authority) is made where it is used. The inventory adds the makers the first version
  missed: node and builder broker passwords, and enrolment tokens.
- Broker accounts are created by the broker's provisioner, not the controller, so the controller never
  holds their plaintext; mesh-broker delivers amqp again — one broker per mesh — and only mesh-store
  delivers nothing.
- secret is a reserved provision: only the mesh-vault holder may provide it, and no pin routes around it.
- A secret's contract says whether a recipient applies it or reads it at start; appliers are never
  restarted for it, init-only secrets are applied, and confirmation is to-be 13's standard.
- Operator secrets are one rule everywhere: a secret requirement answered by the vault (0112 no longer
  says otherwise). A data provider's adapter may return fields; the data-return check names a lab consumer.
- 'Holder' now means a seat's holder only; a secret has recipients.
2026-09-25 23:27:58 +02:00
jochen fa2c09a2c5 ADR 0113 and to-be 27: the vault makes every secret — provisioning all the way down
A secret comes into being seven ways today: provider credentials, own secrets (54 modules), broker
accounts through a command that is easy to forget, a vault that only records what the controller
mints (6 modules), operator values, licences, and root secrets. The vault was built to end own secrets
and did not; the old path was never retired.

0113 is rewritten as a waterfall. The vault makes every secret and nothing else does. A provider that
needs a secret for a consumer requires it from the vault, declared once in its provision's contract
and expanded per consumer by resolution; the vault delivers it to both holders, each sealed to its own
node, so a provider's code is unchanged. Own secrets, broker passwords, operator values and licence
credentials take the same path. Genesis is not an exception: it raises the vault first and asks it,
so there is one way a secret is made from the first one on. The vault can sit at the bottom because it
requires nothing but a broker account.

One shared mint function in the SDK was considered and rejected: generation becomes uniform but custody
stays spread over every provider's machine, and each SDK language needs its own implementation.

Rotation is asked of the vault and is provider-first: the value goes to the holder that accepts it,
which confirms, before the holder that presents it gets it, so the lockout window shrinks to the
consumer's own restart, and an unconfirmed provider holds the rotation rather than half-doing it. The
host derives which processes to restart or recreate from the requirement a definition reads, so no
definition declares restart-on for a secret. A rotation shows unconfirmed until each consumer restarted
and passed its health check. Issue 103 becomes a prerequisite.

The file is renamed to match what it now decides. 0112 follows.
2026-09-25 23:10:52 +02:00