Written as one document because the five are one design. They share inputs,
they must agree, and every one of them today is computed in a different place
by a different module from a different copy of the same facts.
The through-line is that none of the five can be answered by a machine alone,
so all five are decided centrally and delivered as `file` resources. That costs
no new host vocabulary and removes both remaining direct database connections
from nodes -- wireguard and traefik are the only two, and both are connectivity.
Three decisions fall out, all proposed:
0050 -- reachability is declared, not inferred from an address. The RFC1918
regex is wrong for carrier-grade NAT (100.64/10 tests as public, so an endpoint
is written to an address nothing can reach), wrong for IPv6, and wrong for a
routable address behind a closed firewall. The lab needing TEST-NET-3 to
satisfy the regex is the same bug from the other side. Also kills hub election
by address prefix, which fails silently and makes renumbering an outage.
0051 -- the enrolment token carries where the mesh is and how to recognise it.
Closes two circles with one mechanism: verifying the mesh needed the CA, and
obtaining the CA meant trusting whoever handed it over; and a node had to reach
the mesh before it could resolve any mesh name. An address plus a fingerprint,
carried out of band, resolves both -- and closes the CA question 0049 deferred.
0052 -- a filter rule names its source. `scope:` is declared in five manifests,
is part of no rule type, and is referenced by no code, so those manifests
appear to restrict ports and restrict nothing. Removed rather than implemented;
the general fix is refusing unknown keys, which the host already does and
manifests do not.
Also corrects two claims in 0049 asserting wireguard was already handled.
Research 006 says both modules still reach upward; neither is.
ADR 0048 named ingress as an unclosed hole -- nothing said what terminates
TLS, how a public name reaches a container, or which tier owned it. Resolving
it needed no new concepts, which is why it survived: nobody had applied the
rules already written to it.
Ingress is not substrate. The control plane does not need a route to start,
and no node needs one to reach it -- the node dials out and has no listening
control surface. It grants itself a route afterwards, like a bucket.
A route is an instantiation edge under ADR 0044. The direction mirrors a
database -- the consumer supplies a target and receives a name rather than
credentials -- but it is the same edge.
The substantive finding is that exposure is three facts at two scopes: name
resolution and certificate issuance need to know which node is publicly
reachable, and only the proxy mapping is a single machine's business. That is
why it belongs to the connectivity context, and why Traefik doing all three on
the node is wrong.
Which matters beyond tidiness: research 006 counted traefik as one of two
modules opening a direct Postgres connection, reading nodes and mesh_ca. That
violates 0037, 0045 and 0039 at once, and is why every node permanently holds
a credential to the control plane's database. Deriving the config centrally and
delivering it as `file` resources removes it, costs zero new host vocabulary,
and closes the set 0039 identified -- wireguard was the other.
Left open deliberately: the mesh's internal CA is the other thing traefik
reads, and it belongs to the link's mutual authority, not to exposure.
Conflating the two is what made the gap hard to see.
Also fixes an inconsistency from the previous commit: 06 still claimed the
virtual host was raised from the bundle.
Proposed, not accepted -- for review.
jschoubben