ADR 0048 named ingress as an unclosed hole -- nothing said what terminates
TLS, how a public name reaches a container, or which tier owned it. Resolving
it needed no new concepts, which is why it survived: nobody had applied the
rules already written to it.
Ingress is not substrate. The control plane does not need a route to start,
and no node needs one to reach it -- the node dials out and has no listening
control surface. It grants itself a route afterwards, like a bucket.
A route is an instantiation edge under ADR 0044. The direction mirrors a
database -- the consumer supplies a target and receives a name rather than
credentials -- but it is the same edge.
The substantive finding is that exposure is three facts at two scopes: name
resolution and certificate issuance need to know which node is publicly
reachable, and only the proxy mapping is a single machine's business. That is
why it belongs to the connectivity context, and why Traefik doing all three on
the node is wrong.
Which matters beyond tidiness: research 006 counted traefik as one of two
modules opening a direct Postgres connection, reading nodes and mesh_ca. That
violates 0037, 0045 and 0039 at once, and is why every node permanently holds
a credential to the control plane's database. Deriving the config centrally and
delivering it as `file` resources removes it, costs zero new host vocabulary,
and closes the set 0039 identified -- wireguard was the other.
Left open deliberately: the mesh's internal CA is the other thing traefik
reads, and it belongs to the link's mutual authority, not to exposure.
Conflating the two is what made the gap hard to see.
Also fixes an inconsistency from the previous commit: 06 still claimed the
virtual host was raised from the bundle.
Proposed, not accepted -- for review.
