Converging the control node closed every path by which a module reached another by
the machine's own name, and it ran for eleven hours while the mesh answered 'all
doing what they were told, all heard from, running what the mesh would send them,
and every module current with its source'.
6,154 database failures in one module's log, beginning at the minute of the flip.
The service accepted TCP and never answered HTTP. Every check the mesh makes
passed, because every check the mesh makes is about the relationship between the
mesh and a machine — applied, current, containers running. None asks whether a
module can reach what it requires, though the mesh composes every grant and so
knows exactly who requires what.
The filter fault is fixed. The eleven hours are the measurement, not the bug.
Also records on 144 that 'more closed than the mesh believes' was harmless only
for what is reached from outside, and an outage for what is reached from within.
Both found by converging the control node — the first machine with a firewall to
flip, since the two before it had none.
143: the preview and the flip both say the found firewall is disabled. The node
reported converged, 372 resources applied, nothing failed, and ufw is still
enabled and active. A converged node's declaration carries no resource that would
disable it; the sentence is printed by the command and nothing implements it.
144: ufw was never what filtered the traffic that mattered there. Fifty forwarded
openings converged through it had matched zero packets, while a chain the
predecessor installed in the container runtime's pre-accept hook did the work —
in memory only, recreated by nothing. The mesh's filter now covers that path, so
the machine no longer depends on it, but the chain remains and is the only thing
refusing the bus and the registry, which the design requires reachable from
anywhere so a machine can enrol before it has a private address.
jschoubben