An audit of the six code repositories found eleven open issues fixed on main
with commits and beds to show (025, 027, 033, 036, 037, 040, 045, 047, 050,
052, 053), three partly (007, 026, 035), nine not (020, 031, 041, 046, 049,
054, 064, 065, 066) and one whose fix would live outside those repos (006).
Resolved ones name their evidence; partly ones say what remains; 041 records
that the exposure has widened since it was reported.
The report covered ports the firewall cannot close. The matching fault is ports
it does close and should not: rules come from what modules declare, a migrating
mesh knows about almost nothing, and anything listening on the host is dropped.
No module declares an ssh port and the generator has no allowance for one. The
session that loads the rules survives on conntrack until it drops, and then the
machine is reached from a rescue console.
Rehearsed on three lab machines before doing it on an anchor: loading the mesh's
rules refuses an ordinary host port and leaves a published container port
reachable, same prober, same second.
It is deliberate — no forward chain, because dropping there would stop every
container — but traffic to a published port never reaches the input chain, so
the firewall is silent about it. The anchor publishes 38 such ports today, all
filtered by the system being replaced, so the cutover would open every one of
them while reporting a firewall that is up.
jschoubben