Commit Graph
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jochen e387c4bd0e Apply review: two credentials, staged admin rotation, a ninth provider
The fact-check found mailu, whose user is its mailbox, so 0114 rotates
over two credentials rather than two logins, the adapter choosing what a
credential is. Also: minio keeps non-empty buckets; five backends take
their admin credential only at first init, so single-party rotation is
staged; postgres ownership moves to a non-login role; the harness keys by
consumer; rotation state lives with the vault. Consistency fixes across
0110-0113, 26 and 27; issue 103 resolved by mesh-host PR #22.
2026-09-26 00:38:06 +02:00
jochen 43f63ed41c ADR 0114: a two-party credential rotates over two logins
Graduates research 016. Retiring a login is separated from removing a
consumer, which closes a data-loss path in five providers; single-party
secrets rotate in place; the number of parties decides, not the provider.
2026-09-26 00:22:21 +02:00
jochen 942ebe350f Research 016: survey how each provider can rotate a credential
Overlap as drafted in 0113 would have deleted consumer data: seven of
eight providers name the resource after the login and five drop it on
remove. Rotation is now undecided in 0113 and to-be 27, pending the
survey. Also: a requirement naming a seat resolves to its holder, a
person chooses among remaining candidates at assignment, the controller's
secrets are requirements of its definition, genesis seals to the
control-node key, and moving the vault or broker is break-glass.
2026-09-26 00:14:23 +02:00
jochen 805df3f81e ADR 0113 and to-be 27: rotation overlaps old and new credentials
Decided with the author. A credential is never changed in place: each consumer has two logins, both
derived by the mesh, and uses one at a time. An applier adds the new login beside the old through the
adapter's existing create, and confirms both work; only then are readers released to the new one and
restarted by derivation; only when every reader has confirmed is the old login retired through the
existing remove.

It closes the three cases review found in applier-first rotation: an offline reader keeps working on
the old login until it returns; a bus account's owner keeps its bus until it has moved; a provisioner
restarted mid-rotation is still delivered both values. Nobody is ever without a credential that works,
which replaces to-be 13's all-or-nothing rule with a stronger one.

No consumer module changes. The alternation is the provider loop's. A provider's adapter gains one duty,
giving both logins the same rights over the consumer's data — in postgres, membership of one role that
owns it. The mesh derives two logins per consumer, both within ADR 0049's limit, which 0113 now names
among what it amends. Every rule has a check: overlap, offline reader, bus account, restarted
provisioner, equal rights, login length, and confirmation only once the old login is gone.
2026-09-25 23:50:20 +02:00
jochen 4a1b218706 Seats held by assignments, one assignment per module per node, and 0113's bottom of the stack
Decided with the author:
- A seat is held by one assignment, not claimed by a definition. A definition says which seats a module
  can hold; an assignment says which it does. The store module can run on every node and one assignment
  holds mesh-store; moving a role changes an assignment, never a definition. The foundation's seats name
  what the mesh itself uses and route no consumer — database and amqp consumers use co-location, the
  holder included. This replaces the wrong rationale that the foundation's store is "provider to nobody",
  which contradicted ADR 0078 and to-be 21. 0079's one-postgres rule becomes one mesh-store holder.
- A module is assigned at most once to a node. The instance identity in 0112 and 27 is withdrawn, and the
  login-length problem with it.

Review fixes to 0113:
- The bottom of the stack: the vault is installed as soon as the shared runtime base exists, and genesis
  generates everything needed until then — including the permanent controller's, the control-node
  agent's, the builder's and the broker provisioner's bus accounts, and the controller's store login.
  Genesis creates those accounts until the broker's provisioner runs and adopts them.
- Genesis's values are delivered recorded as the mesh's own, so 0092's never-replace rule for operator
  values does not make them unrotatable.
- Backend-issued secrets (a forge's once-only API token) enter through the vault. Non-module parties
  (the controller's logins, node agents' accounts) are answered the same way, the controller asking on
  their behalf; an enrolment token reaches the controller only as what verifies it.
- A secret with no provisioner to apply it is marked not rotatable by the mesh and refused, instead of
  a restart reported as done. Unused password generators in six provider clients are removed, and a
  catalogue scan checks no module mints.
- Rotation's lock-out cases (offline reader, bus account owner, restarted provisioner) are recorded as
  open, with overlap and re-confirm-with-safeguards as the two answers, to be chosen before acceptance.

0110, 0111 and 26 are marked proposed: they changed in meaning and are under review, and an accepted
record must not rest on proposed ones. To-be 23 and the glossary are restored to main; they change when
these records are accepted.
2026-09-25 23:47:26 +02:00
jochen 1b5f2c2c1a ADR 0113 and to-be 27: address the review of the vault rework
Two decisions taken with the author:
- Genesis delivers and the vault adopts. The vault cannot run first — it is built on the runtime base
  the installation makes after the store, broker and controller, and it learns its work over the bus.
  Genesis generates the foundation's first shared secrets, seals them to the operator key, and
  delivers them to the vault through the path an operator's value takes; from then on the vault holds
  and rotates them. This answers ADR 0085's own reason for rejecting vault-only minting, which 0113
  now names instead of stepping around.
- Rotation re-confirms on every pass. An applier repeats its confirmation until acknowledged, so a lost
  message costs one pass; an applier that stops after applying locks readers out until its supervised
  restart, and that window is stated and shown, not claimed away.

Fixes:
- Scope: a shared secret is made by the vault; a private key (node sealing keys, the operator's key,
  the certificate authority) is made where it is used. The inventory adds the makers the first version
  missed: node and builder broker passwords, and enrolment tokens.
- Broker accounts are created by the broker's provisioner, not the controller, so the controller never
  holds their plaintext; mesh-broker delivers amqp again — one broker per mesh — and only mesh-store
  delivers nothing.
- secret is a reserved provision: only the mesh-vault holder may provide it, and no pin routes around it.
- A secret's contract says whether a recipient applies it or reads it at start; appliers are never
  restarted for it, init-only secrets are applied, and confirmation is to-be 13's standard.
- Operator secrets are one rule everywhere: a secret requirement answered by the vault (0112 no longer
  says otherwise). A data provider's adapter may return fields; the data-return check names a lab consumer.
- 'Holder' now means a seat's holder only; a secret has recipients.
2026-09-25 23:27:58 +02:00
jochen fa2c09a2c5 ADR 0113 and to-be 27: the vault makes every secret — provisioning all the way down
A secret comes into being seven ways today: provider credentials, own secrets (54 modules), broker
accounts through a command that is easy to forget, a vault that only records what the controller
mints (6 modules), operator values, licences, and root secrets. The vault was built to end own secrets
and did not; the old path was never retired.

0113 is rewritten as a waterfall. The vault makes every secret and nothing else does. A provider that
needs a secret for a consumer requires it from the vault, declared once in its provision's contract
and expanded per consumer by resolution; the vault delivers it to both holders, each sealed to its own
node, so a provider's code is unchanged. Own secrets, broker passwords, operator values and licence
credentials take the same path. Genesis is not an exception: it raises the vault first and asks it,
so there is one way a secret is made from the first one on. The vault can sit at the bottom because it
requires nothing but a broker account.

One shared mint function in the SDK was considered and rejected: generation becomes uniform but custody
stays spread over every provider's machine, and each SDK language needs its own implementation.

Rotation is asked of the vault and is provider-first: the value goes to the holder that accepts it,
which confirms, before the holder that presents it gets it, so the lockout window shrinks to the
consumer's own restart, and an unconfirmed provider holds the rotation rather than half-doing it. The
host derives which processes to restart or recreate from the requirement a definition reads, so no
definition declares restart-on for a secret. A rotation shows unconfirmed until each consumer restarted
and passed its health check. Issue 103 becomes a prerequisite.

The file is renamed to match what it now decides. 0112 follows.
2026-09-25 23:10:52 +02:00