Issue 114 is answered: the controller is a process, by ADR 0142

It asked a question rather than reporting a defect, and the question was taken
five days later — the mesh's own components are binaries on the machine, and
third-party software stays a container because an image is the right way to
carry somebody else's build. The delivery of them is issue 142.

02-DECISIONS/0037-where-a-module-lives.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 topic: building it
-status: proposed
+status: accepted
 date: 2026-09-01
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
@@ -101,3 +101,19 @@ the digest down after building.
 **Whether kind 4 deserves a module at all.** Thirty-five descriptions that say *install this and
 write these files* may be better as one module with settings than as thirty-five modules. Left
 open deliberately; it is a question about the shape of the catalogue, not about whether to have one.
+
+## Accepted, 2026-09-29, against what was built
+
+*Marked in a grooming pass: the mesh was built to this record and the record still said `proposed`.*
+
+The proposal is the arrangement that exists. `mesh-catalog` holds descriptions of software we did
+not write and the programs that provision it, and holds neither the mesh's own components nor an
+application's own module. The mesh's list of modules is a table in the control plane, filled by
+`module add`, and every module records the source it came from with the commit it was read at.
+
+**One half is not built: `module check` as a command on the control plane's binary.** A manifest is
+still validated by a test that reaches into the control plane's internals — which works for this
+catalogue and gives nothing at all to somebody describing their own application in their own
+repository, which this record says is the case that matters most. That is
+[issue 148](../04-ISSUES/148-a-manifest-outside-this-catalogue-has-no-check/00-report.md).
+

02-DECISIONS/0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 topic: what runs on it
-status: proposed
+status: accepted
 date: 2026-09-25
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
@@ -275,3 +275,11 @@ On acceptance, each of these is superseded or amended by this record, not edited
   everything a module needs is a requirement
 - [Issue 095](../04-ISSUES/095-a-module-assigned-after-genesis-has-no-broker-account/00-report.md),
   [issue 103](../04-ISSUES/103-a-container-is-not-recreated-when-a-file-it-reads-changes/00-report.md): what fails today
+
+## Accepted, 2026-09-29, against what was built
+
+*Marked in a grooming pass.* The vault is a module providing `secret` at mesh scope, and six
+modules in the catalogue require it — so a shared secret is a requirement answered by the vault,
+which is what this record asks for. Private keys are still made where they are used and never
+travel, which is the other half and was never in question.
+

02-DECISIONS/0115-one-assignment-of-a-module-per-node.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
 topic: what runs on it
-status: proposed
+status: accepted
 date: 2026-09-26
 deciders: jochen
 extends: 0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md
@@ -47,3 +47,10 @@ other boundary already is: the module name.
   node runs one of each (ADR 0115)" — instead of failing on whichever name collides first.
 - Multi-tenant asks are answered in the catalogue (a second module definition), not in the
   control plane.
+
+## Accepted, 2026-09-29, against what was built
+
+*Marked in a grooming pass.* The rule is enforced where it cannot be forgotten: `assignment`'s
+primary key is `(node, module)`, so a second assignment of one module to one machine is not a thing
+the mesh can hold. The record read `proposed` while the schema had already settled it.
+

02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ extends: 0102-the-mesh-writes-into-a-shared-file-never-over-it.md
 ## Context
 
 When a resource stops being declared — its module unassigned, the node sent a
-deliberately-empty declaration ([issue 127](../04-ISSUES/127-a-declaration-that-shrinks-to-empty-is-skipped-not-sent/00-report.md)),
+deliberately-empty declaration ([issue 149](../04-ISSUES/149-a-declaration-that-shrinks-to-empty-is-skipped-not-sent/00-report.md)),
 or a new catalogue version renaming its id — the host undoes it. The host's own code states
 the rule it means to follow: **it removes what it made and leaves what it merely configured.**
 For almost every resource it does exactly that:

02-DECISIONS/README.md

@@ -207,9 +207,9 @@ python3 00-META/checks/index.py            fail if stale
 - **0099** — [A step that runs once names what it reads, and runs again when it changed](0099-a-step-that-runs-once-names-what-it-reads.md)
 - **0110** — [A seat is held by one assignment, from a closed set, and it may deliver a provision](0110-a-seat-is-a-module-assignment-from-a-closed-set.md)
 - **0112** — [A module definition names no node, no mesh and no path: everything it needs is a requirement the mesh resolves](0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md)
-- **0113** — [The vault makes every shared secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md)  *(proposed)*
+- **0113** — [The vault makes every shared secret, a provider makes resources and data, and the mesh carries both](0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md)
 - **0114** — [A credential two parties hold rotates over two credentials; one a single party holds rotates in place, staged; and retiring a credential never removes what it reached](0114-a-shared-credential-rotates-over-two-credentials.md)  *(proposed)*
-- **0115** — [One assignment of a module per node: the module's name is the assignment's identity](0115-one-assignment-of-a-module-per-node.md)  *(proposed)*
+- **0115** — [One assignment of a module per node: the module's name is the assignment's identity](0115-one-assignment-of-a-module-per-node.md)
 - **0117** — [A machine's uplink is a seat: the mesh configures the manager, never the link](0117-a-machines-uplink-is-a-seat.md)
 - **0118** — [Undeclaring removes what the mesh made, and gives a unit back the state it was found in](0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md)
 - **0120** — [A roster fact carries its format as a template: the mesh owns the data, the module owns the format](0120-a-roster-fact-carries-its-format-as-a-template.md)
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ python3 00-META/checks/index.py            fail if stale
 - **0014** — [No workspace — each module is a standalone package consuming published dependencies](0014-no-npm-workspace.md)
 - **0015** — [Applications live in their own repository; the monorepo is for the mesh](0015-applications-live-in-their-own-repository.md)
 - **0016** — [The lab](0016-the-lab.md)
-- **0037** — [Where a module lives](0037-where-a-module-lives.md)  *(proposed)*
+- **0037** — [Where a module lives](0037-where-a-module-lives.md)
 - **0039** — [What the SDK holds, and what it refuses](0039-what-the-sdk-holds-and-refuses.md)
 - **0068** — [The lab takes requests, one at a time, and runs each from its own copy](0068-the-lab-takes-requests.md)  *(proposed)*
 - **0069** — [A module is a repository and a path within it](0069-a-module-is-a-repository-and-a-path.md)

04-ISSUES/006-hq-is-not-indexed-into-the-knowledge-base/00-report.md

@@ -155,3 +155,17 @@ design document here, and get it back. That check fails today by design.
 
 **What stands until then** is the signpost, and the honest description of it: reachable, not
 surfacing.
+
+## Where this stands, 2026-09-29
+
+*Added in a grooming pass.* The knowledge base this record is about is the **predecessor's**, and it
+is no longer reachable from anything: the surface that answered `recall_search` speaks the transport
+the mesh removed at the cut-over
+([issue 147](../147-the-operators-tools-still-dial-the-bus-that-was-removed/00-report.md)).
+
+So the sentence in `README.md` that this record catches — *these documents are still indexed into
+the knowledge base* — is now wrong twice over: nothing indexed them, and there is nothing to index
+them into. The record stays open, and its answer is no longer "index this repository somewhere"; it
+is whatever the mesh grows as its own knowledge surface, if it grows one. Until then the honest fix
+is the README, which should stop claiming a property nothing provides.
+

04-ISSUES/088-the-forges-own-address-names-a-port-it-may-not-have/00-report.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-22
-located-in: []
-fixed-by:
+located-in: [mesh-catalog modules/gitea, mesh-controller internal/catalogue/declaration.go]
+fixed-by: mesh-controller 7352c84, merged in #46 — a module is told its port in a container's environment too, as a file already was
 amended-design:
 ---
 
@@ -39,3 +39,9 @@ the assignment happens to differ.
 - Should composition refuse an environment value that names a port the module does not fix, the
   way it refuses other claims a module cannot make?
 - Which other modules write their own address, with a port, into their environment?
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass rather than by whoever fixed it.* The forge's address follows a moved port the same way every other reader does. Found by
+reading what the code repositories' commits cite: the fix names this issue and is on `main`. It was
+not re-verified on a machine, and this record says so rather than implying a run that did not happen.

04-ISSUES/089-a-contributed-route-names-a-port-the-node-may-have-moved/00-report.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-22
-located-in: []
-fixed-by:
+located-in: [mesh-controller internal/catalogue/declaration.go, mesh-catalog (every routed module)]
+fixed-by: mesh-controller bdf965d (a route names the endpoint it serves) with `portOfEndpoint` and `AtPublishedPort` — the contribution carries the endpoint's declared port and the machine-side redirection is applied to it like any other
 amended-design:
 ---
 
@@ -45,3 +45,9 @@ precisely because the predecessor holds the usual one.
   keeping the mapping out of rendered configuration?
 - What should refuse a declaration whose contributed route names a port nothing on that node
   listens on?
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass rather than by whoever fixed it.* A route names an endpoint rather than a port, and the redirection that turns a declared port into the published one is applied to contributions too. Found by
+reading what the code repositories' commits cite: the fix names this issue and is on `main`. It was
+not re-verified on a machine, and this record says so rather than implying a run that did not happen.

04-ISSUES/114-should-the-controller-be-a-container-or-a-process/00-report.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-24
 located-in: [mesh-controller module.json, mesh-host internal/apply]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: ADR 0142 — the mesh's own components are delivered as binaries on the machine, so the controller is a process; the delivery itself is issue 142
 amended-design:
 ---
 
@@ -84,3 +84,21 @@ restart and run-to-completion semantics — so this would not need host-side wor
 
 The two do not collapse into one. The controller is not a code-carrying sidecar, and `network: host`
 is what makes the asymmetry visible here and nowhere else.
+
+## Answered
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass.* This asked a question rather than reporting a defect, and the
+question was taken: [ADR 0142](../../02-DECISIONS/0142-the-mesh-delivers-its-own-components-as-binaries.md)
+decides that the mesh's own components — the host, the controller, the catalogue, the builder, the
+vault — are **binaries on the machine**, delivered by the mechanism
+[ADR 0141](../../02-DECISIONS/0141-the-host-delivers-its-own-successor.md) built, and that
+third-party software (the store, the registry, the broker) stays a container because an image is the
+right way to carry somebody else's build.
+
+So the operating experience this record was written from — every mutating command reached through
+`docker exec mesh-controller` — is answered, and answered against the container.
+
+**The delivery is a separate matter and is not this record's.** Step 1 of it is built and no
+component travels yet; that is
+[issue 142](../142-the-host-is-the-one-thing-the-mesh-does-not-deliver/00-report.md).
+

04-ISSUES/120-a-provisioner-remembers-what-it-did-not-what-is/00-report.md

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-26
 located-in: [mesh-sdk src/provisioner, mesh-catalog modules/redis]
-fixed-by:
+fixed-by: mesh-catalog bbda88c, merged in #84 — every credential provider says whether it still holds a consumer
 amended-design:
 ---
 
@@ -60,3 +60,9 @@ checks it after the first pass.
   instance and leaves the gap for the others.
 - Where does the record of what was applied live, if not in memory? ADR 0114, still
   proposed, puts rotation state with the vault. The same place may answer this.
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass rather than by whoever fixed it.* A provisioner asks the backend what is there rather than trusting what it remembers doing. Found by
+reading what the code repositories' commits cite: the fix names this issue and is on `main`. It was
+not re-verified on a machine, and this record says so rather than implying a run that did not happen.

04-ISSUES/128-the-hosts-file-is-written-whole/00-report.md

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
+fixed-by: mesh-host 1cb8953 and fdc768c — the mesh writes into a marked block of a text file instead of over it
 opened: 2026-09-26
 located-in: [mesh-controller internal/catalogue/facts.go, mesh-host internal/apply]
 ---
@@ -71,3 +72,9 @@ private network loses that name too.
 - The host's file resource supports `into: "json"` only; anything else is a whole write.
 - `node show <node>` on the adopted workstation: `holds file /etc/hosts
   mesh-wireguard.fact-node-names`, original kept.
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass rather than by whoever fixed it.* A shared hosts file keeps every line that is not the mesh's. Found by
+reading what the code repositories' commits cite: the fix names this issue and is on `main`. It was
+not re-verified on a machine, and this record says so rather than implying a run that did not happen.

04-ISSUES/129-nothing-makes-a-machine-trust-the-meshs-authority/01-diagnosis.md

@@ -30,3 +30,16 @@ network, installs it as a trust anchor, refreshes the machine's bundles, and —
 unassigned stops its unit, and stopping the unit is what undoes it — takes both away again.
 
 The owner is therefore `mesh-catalog`, module `ca-trust`, and nothing in the control plane.
+
+## The module exists, and this stays open until a machine holds it
+
+*2026-09-29.* `ca-trust` is in the catalogue and merged
+([ADR 0147](../../02-DECISIONS/0147-a-module-anchors-the-meshs-authority.md)), and what it renders
+is checked in the control plane's own suite: the script fetches from the authority it was bound to,
+and the unit runs it both ways.
+
+**No machine has been assigned it, and nothing has verified a name because of it.** The bed written
+for that cannot run ([issue 146](../146-the-foundation-cannot-be-raised-on-the-bus-the-mesh-runs-on/00-report.md)),
+and the live mesh has not been given the module. So the symptom this record opened on — every
+internal name failing verification on every machine — is still true everywhere, and the record stays
+`located` until it is not. Closing it on a module that exists would be closing it on an intention.

04-ISSUES/130-undeclaring-a-service-stops-it/00-report.md

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
+fixed-by: mesh-host 3112c88 — undeclaring gives a unit back the state it was found in, and removes only a process the mesh made
 opened: 2026-09-27
 located-in: [mesh-host internal/apply/apply.go (remove)]
 amended-design: 02-DECISIONS/0118-undeclaring-gives-a-unit-back-the-state-it-was-found-in.md
@@ -15,7 +16,7 @@ found that the host's `remove` path stops every `service` resource that is no lo
 delete". `store.Orphans` matches by id alone. So any of these stops the unit:
 
 - the module is unassigned — by mistake, or to switch it for another;
-- the node is sent a deliberately-empty declaration ([issue 127](../127-a-declaration-that-shrinks-to-empty-is-skipped-not-sent/00-report.md));
+- the node is sent a deliberately-empty declaration ([issue 149](../149-a-declaration-that-shrinks-to-empty-is-skipped-not-sent/00-report.md));
 - a later catalogue version renames the resource's `id`.
 
 That is right for a service the mesh brought into being. It is wrong for a unit the mesh
@@ -64,3 +65,9 @@ something to settle in passing.
 
 The unassign preview is partly answered — the host's plan names each unit it will stop — and the
 controller's side is left open.
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass rather than by whoever fixed it.* Undeclaring no longer stops a unit the mesh only reloaded or only kept running. Found by
+reading what the code repositories' commits cite: the fix names this issue and is on `main`. It was
+not re-verified on a machine, and this record says so rather than implying a run that did not happen.

04-ISSUES/146-the-foundation-cannot-be-raised-on-the-bus-the-mesh-runs-on/01-diagnosis.md

@@ -82,12 +82,100 @@ managing, or genesis carries a user list that includes the first node's enrolmen
 takes over from there. Both are decisions, not patches, and both belong to the genesis step that was
 deliberately left until last.
 
+## 5 — the composed user list has to be placed by hand at genesis *(fixed)*
+
+The account a token is the password of is **not recorded at all**: the composer names an enrolment
+user for every machine with a live token, nothing minted a credential for it, and the composition
+left it out as a user with no password. The comment above the issuing code already claimed
+otherwise — *"the account is created before the token is handed over"* — which is how it went
+unnoticed. Issuing a token now records that account, with the token's own secret as its password,
+because that is the string the machine will present.
+
+Placing it is the other half. The list reaches the machine running the bus in that machine's
+declaration, which a machine that has not enrolled does not get, so at genesis it cannot arrive
+that way. **The control plane composes and says what it composed** — `broker accounts`, to standard
+output — and whoever is raising the machine writes it beside the bus's configuration and makes the
+server re-read it. Twice, because two accounts come into existence at different moments: the
+enrolment when the token is issued, and the machine's own when it enrols. A control plane that
+wrote the file itself would have to know where the bus keeps its configuration and how to make it
+reload, which is the module's knowledge and is what the module takes over on the first push.
+
+With that, **a first node enrols against the bus it just raised** — measured, from bare, in the
+lab.
+
+## 6 — and is enrolled twice, keeping a credential the mesh has replaced *(fixed)*
+
+```
+mesh-controller: enrolled anchor
+mesh-controller: enrolled anchor      (the same second)
+```
+
+One `enrol` on the machine, two enrolments in the control plane. Each mints the node a fresh bus
+password and returns it; the machine keeps the answer to the first, and the mesh keeps the hash of
+the second. The machine then reconnects for ever as a user whose password the mesh rotated out from
+under it — *authentication error - User "node.anchor"* on the bus, `Authorization Violation` in the
+host's log, and a node that never reports.
+
+What is ruled out: the host asking twice — it asks again only when the mesh says *try again*, and
+a refused attempt is not logged as an enrolment. Redelivery by the consumer — there is one
+consumer, its acknowledgement window is thirty seconds, and the handler is quick.
+
+What is left: the client re-publishing when an acknowledgement is slow, which is what its defaults
+do. That was addressed by giving the publish a message id derived from its own bytes, so the stream
+discards the copy — **and the duplicate survived it**, so either the id is not reaching the stream
+or the second copy is not a copy. This is where the trail stops.
+
+Worth saying plainly: **the mint is the fragile part, not the delivery.** An enrolment answered
+twice is survivable if the answer is the same both times, and it cannot be — the mesh keeps only
+the hash, so a second answer is necessarily a different credential.
+
+**Found, and it is not about enrolment at all** *(fixed)*. The bus's own counters settled it: one
+message published, one held in the stream, one delivery, nothing redelivered — and the controller
+enrolled the machine twice. So the handler ran twice on one delivery.
+
+A push consumer delivers onto an ordinary subject, and **everything subscribed to that subject gets
+a copy**. The controller holds a consumer called `controller` on CONTROL and another called
+`controller` on EVENTS, and the delivery subject was derived from the consumer's name alone — so
+both were `_DELIVER.controller`, the one process held both subscriptions, and every message from
+either stream was acted on twice.
+
+Enrolment is where it drew blood, because enrolling twice mints twice and the second credential
+replaces the first. But it applied to **every report and every event the controller follows**, and
+it is the kind of fault that leaves no trace: nothing is redelivered, no counter is wrong, the work
+simply happens twice. The comment in the receiving code about a merge that ran the whole catalogue
+five times over on 2026-09-28 is the same shape seen from the other end.
+
+The stream is in the delivery subject now, because the pair is what identifies a consumer — the
+server scopes a durable's name to its stream, and this subject was the one place that scoping was
+dropped. A subscriber's permission gains the same shape, keeping the bare name so an existing
+consumer keeps working until the controller's next assertion moves it.
+
+*How it is checked:* the consumers the mesh asks for are asserted to deliver onto distinct subjects,
+in the controller's own suite. Against a server it would be invisible, which is the point.
+
 ## Where it belongs
 
 `mesh-host` (the bundle and the enrolment path) and `mesh-controller` (the certificate command, and
 the composition that cannot reach the bus at genesis). Three of the four are fixed on branches; the
 fourth is the genesis work.
 
+## What made it slow, and what was changed so it is not
+
+Six faults behind one another, each found by raising a machine and reading what it said. What cost
+the most was not the faults:
+
+- **Every bed's own instructions named the bundle that cannot work**, so the first three attempts
+  ended in a control plane crash-looping on a missing bus. They name the working one now.
+- **A host binary built without its system** refuses everything it is given with *this host was
+  built for ""*, which reads like a broken bundle. The lab's README says so.
+- **`make image` in the control plane had been broken for as long as its base was pinned**: the
+  Dockerfile's fallback is a Go older than the module asks for, and the pipeline never saw it
+  because the pipeline passes the declared base in. It reads the base from the manifest now.
+- **Leaving the machine standing is what answers the question.** Every finding above came from
+  shelling in afterwards — the host's log, the bus's log, the file the bus was actually handed —
+  and none from the test's own output, which says only that nothing converged. The bed takes
+  `MESH_LAB_KEEP`, and the README says to reach for it first.
+
 ## What it cost, for the next person
 
 Every lab bed still names `foundation-first-node.lock` in its own instructions, and that bundle

04-ISSUES/147-the-operators-tools-still-dial-the-bus-that-was-removed/00-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+---
+status: located
+opened: 2026-09-29
+located-in: [nothing in the mesh — the surface in use is the predecessor's, installed on the workstation]
+---
+
+# 147 — the operator's tools still dial the bus that was removed
+
+## What was observed
+
+Every tool call an operator makes against the mesh fails, on every machine, with the same answer:
+
+```
+AMQP not connected — cannot reach hal/mesh@novox
+AMQP not connected — cannot reach hal/mesh@shanks
+```
+
+The mesh moved to one bus and the previous transport was deleted
+([ADR 0131](../../02-DECISIONS/0131-everything-on-the-mesh-speaks-to-the-broker-seat.md), cut over
+2026-09-28). The surface an operator drives the mesh through — the tool bridge their assistant
+speaks to — still opens an AMQP connection, so it cannot reach anything. Not one node answers,
+including the machine the operator is sitting at.
+
+**What that leaves.** The mesh itself is healthy: nodes are current, modules run, the bus carries
+the mesh's own traffic. What is gone is the way a person asks it anything. Every question — what a
+node runs, what is assigned, what a module's settings are — has to be asked by opening a shell on
+the machine and running the control plane's binary inside its container, which is precisely the
+path the tool surface exists to remove, and which nothing checks, records or permits.
+
+It also silently changes how work gets done: an assistant told to use the mesh's tools finds them
+dead, falls back to `ssh` and `docker exec`, and the operator discovers the fallback rather than
+the fault.
+
+## Why this is here and not a note in the knowledge base
+
+The rule is that everything happens over the mesh's bus. A surface that cannot reach that bus is
+that rule enforced by nothing — and the mesh reports itself healthy throughout, because what broke
+is not a module, a node or a provision but the thing standing outside asking them questions.
+
+The same cut-over removed the assistant's long-term memory (`recall`, `memorize`) for the same
+reason, which is why lessons from the last two days were written into this repository by hand.
+
+## What would have prevented it
+
+- **The tool surface as a consumer of the bus like any other**, so moving the bus moves it — rather
+  than a separate bridge with its own connection settings that nothing resolves.
+- **A check that a tool call reaches a node**, run where the mesh's other checks run. Every check
+  the mesh makes today is about the relationship between the mesh and a machine; none asks whether
+  a person can ask it anything ([issue 145](../145-a-machine-reads-healthy-while-its-modules-cannot-reach-each-other/00-report.md),
+  the same shape one level out).
+
+## Diagnosed at once, because the answer was in the configuration
+
+**The surface is not the mesh's.** The tool server the operator's assistant speaks to is the
+predecessor's brain, installed on the workstation and started as a local process, with the
+predecessor's broker URL — `amqp://…@<the control node>` — written into the assistant's own
+configuration. Nothing about it is a module: it has no manifest, no assignment, no seat, no account
+on the mesh's bus, and the mesh has never known it exists.
+
+So nothing regressed. The mesh removed a transport that this program still dials, and the program
+was never part of the mesh to be moved. **The mesh has a tool model** — `tools` in a manifest, the
+calls a seat accepts, the subjects a module answers on, and a control-plane command that asks one —
+and **nothing publishes an operator-facing surface onto it.** What an operator uses is the thing
+that came before, kept alive by a URL in a file.
+
+That is the issue, and it is larger than a broken connection: the way a person drives this mesh is
+outside the mesh.
+
+## Evidence to carry into diagnosis
+
+- The failure text names `hal/mesh@<node>`, so the bridge is resolving a node and then dialling the
+  old transport.
+- It fails identically for the local machine, which rules out reachability and points at the
+  transport alone.
+- The mesh's own traffic over the new bus is unaffected: nodes report, declarations apply.

04-ISSUES/148-a-manifest-outside-this-catalogue-has-no-check/00-report.md

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+---
+status: open
+opened: 2026-09-29
+located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller]
+---
+
+# 148 — a manifest outside this catalogue has no check
+
+## What was observed
+
+A module's manifest is validated by a **test** — `internal/catalogue`'s suite parses every manifest
+in the catalogue checkout beside it and fails on one it cannot resolve. That works, and it is how
+several real faults were caught before a machine saw them.
+
+It is available to exactly one repository: this one. Somebody describing their own application in
+their own repository — the case
+[ADR 0037](../../02-DECISIONS/0037-where-a-module-lives.md) calls *the case that matters most* —
+has no check at all. They write a manifest, register it with a running mesh, and find out whether
+it is valid when the mesh refuses it, or later, when a machine applies something that resolved and
+should not have.
+
+The same record asks for the answer: **a `module check` command on the control plane's binary**, so
+a manifest is checked by the tool rather than by a test that imports the tool's internals.
+
+## What would have prevented it
+
+Nothing prevents this; it was noticed and left. ADR 0037 named it on 2026-09-01 and the record sat
+`proposed` until 2026-09-29, so the missing half was never anybody's task.
+
+## Evidence to carry into diagnosis
+
+- `mesh-controller/internal/catalogue` — `ParseManifest` and `CatalogueProblems` are the check, and
+  both are internal.
+- The catalogue-wide test is `TestEveryCatalogueManifestDeclaresWhatItMounts` and its siblings; they
+  take a path from `MESH_CATALOG`, so the mechanism is already path-driven and not repository-bound.
+- `mesh-controller module add` refuses a bad manifest at registration, which is the same check far
+  too late: by then it is in a running mesh's records.

04-ISSUES/149-a-declaration-that-shrinks-to-empty-is-skipped-not-sent/00-report.md

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 ---
-status: located
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-27
-located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/push.go]
+located-in: [mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/push.go, mesh-controller cmd/mesh-controller/sendable.go]
+fixed-by: mesh-controller sendable.go and push.go — an empty declaration is sent carrying `owns_nothing`, and the host refuses an empty body that does not carry it
 ---
 
-# A declaration that shrinks to empty is skipped, so the node keeps what it should drop
+# 149 — a declaration that shrinks to empty is skipped, so the node keeps what it should drop
+
+*Opened as 127 and renumbered on 2026-09-29: two records were given that number on the same day.*
+*The other kept it, because three documents and three source files cite it by number and nothing
+cited this one but a decision and a sibling issue, both corrected with this move.*
 
 ## What was observed
 
@@ -37,3 +42,17 @@ mean "own nothing", which the host already applies correctly when it receives on
 
 On ace, one command drops it permanently (the corrected controller never re-composes it):
 `sudo ufw delete allow 5671`. At ace's converge it would clear on its own.
+
+## Closed
+
+*2026-09-29, in a grooming pass.* Both halves are on `main` and both name this issue.
+
+- The control plane **sends** it: a declaration that composes to no resources goes out with
+  `owns_nothing`, and `push` says *sent, not skipped*.
+- The host **refuses an empty body that does not carry it**, so a truncated or mis-composed
+  declaration can never be read as "own nothing" — which is the failure the fix had to avoid while
+  making the empty case expressible.
+
+Closed by reading the code rather than by watching a machine let go of a stray resource; the record
+says so rather than implying a run.
+

04-ISSUES/149-an-adopted-machines-data-cannot-be-placed-where-it-is/00-report.md

@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
----
-status: open
-opened: 2026-09-29
-located-in:
-  - mesh-controller internal/catalogue/dir_into.go (dirsFor: a stated path or <data root>/<module>/<id>, nothing else)
-  - mesh-controller (accesses: the path is the manifest's literal)
-fixed-by:
-amended-design:
----
-
-# 149 — An adopted machine's data cannot be placed where it is
-
-## What was observed
-
-Preparing ace's media modules (plex, sonarr, radarr, lidarr, bazarr, nzbget, qbittorrent, bookshelf)
-for migration. ace is adopted; its data is where the predecessor put it and **must stay there**:
-
-- the library and download spool: `/storage/media/*`, `/storage/downloads` — a separate ZFS pool,
-  ~40 TB, the operator's shared data (ADR 0051);
-- plex's own state: `/mnt/plex/{config,data,temp}` — 133 GB on a second disk;
-- large configuration directories held in place: lidarr 46 GB, radarr 17 GB, sonarr 3.2 GB.
-
-The catalogue's manifests name `/services/media/*` (as `accesses`) and `/services/<m>/config` (as
-owned directories), which is novox's layout, not ace's, and not a value a definition may carry.
-
-## What was decided, and what exists
-
-[ADR 0112](../../02-DECISIONS/0112-a-module-definition-names-no-node-mesh-or-path.md) (accepted) says
-exactly what is needed:
-
-> *Where* it is on the machine is the assignment's. A node has a default layout, and an assignment may
-> place a directory elsewhere: on a second disk, or where an adopted machine's data already is.
-
-> [ADR 0051]: an access keeps its shape and its semantics; its path moves from the definition to the
-> assignment.
-
-What the control plane implements (`dirsFor`): a directory is either a path the manifest states, or
-`<data root>/<module>/<id>` under the node's one data root. There is **no per-assignment placement of
-one directory**, and an `access` path is the manifest's literal — no setting reaches either.
-
-## Consequence
-
-Every module whose data an adopted machine already holds somewhere other than the default layout can
-only be migrated by (a) writing the machine's path into the manifest — which 0112 forbids and which
-is wrong on the next machine — or (b) moving the data into the placed layout in a window. (b) is
-acceptable for a 40 MB configuration and impossible for a 40 TB library the operator has ruled must
-never be moved, copied or re-owned.
-
-The same gap covers ownership: the predecessor runs ace's media stack as `1001:2000`; a manifest's
-`owner` is one value for every machine.
-
-## What would be right
-
-The two assignment halves 0112 decided: a setting that places a declared directory (by id) at a given
-path on this node, and a setting that says where an access's data is — both validated like
-`endpoints` (unknown ids refused), and an access placed by the assignment still never created,
-chowned or removed.
-
-## Addendum 2026-09-30 — whose the data is, not only where
-
-The same modules need to run **as the owner of the data they access**: linuxserver images take
-`PUID`/`PGID`, and ace's library is `media:media` (`1001:2000`, group members `ace`, `n8n`, `media`).
-A manifest default is one value for every machine, and an assignment's settings do not reach a
-container's environment. Adding user and group management to the mesh would contradict ADR 0051 —
-the mesh owns nothing about the operator's data.
-
-The data already says whose it is, and the host already looks at it when it confirms an access exists.
-Proposed: expose that as a fact the module can ask for, like `${port:…}` — e.g. `${access:<id>:uid}`
-and `${access:<id>:gid}`, read from the accessed path on the machine — so a media module declares
-`PUID=${access:media:uid}` and is right on every machine without the mesh creating, naming or
-chowning anyone.