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+---
+status: open
+opened: 2026-09-14
+located-in: []
+fixed-by:
+amended-design:
+---
+
+# 047 — The firewall does not cover published container ports
+
+## Symptom
+
+A machine running the mesh's firewall drops what it should drop and leaves every container port
+published on all addresses open to anything that can reach the machine.
+
+Rehearsed in the lab on three machines, one probing another, with a single change between the two
+measurements:
+
+| | ordinary port on the host | container port published on `0.0.0.0` |
+|---|---|---|
+| before the mesh's rules | reachable | reachable |
+| after the mesh's rules | **refused** | **still reachable** |
+
+Same prober, same ports, same second. The first column is the firewall working. The second is the
+question.
+
+## Why this is the way it is
+
+It is deliberate, and the reasoning is written where the rules are generated: the mesh's table hooks
+`input` and `output` and **no forward chain**, because what a machine forwards is the container
+runtime's business — the runtime writes rules for the bridges it creates, and a second table
+dropping in `forward` would drop container traffic the runtime explicitly allowed, stopping every
+container on the node including the control plane.
+
+That reasoning is sound. The conclusion drawn from it is not the only one available, because traffic
+to a published port does not traverse `input` at all: it is redirected and then forwarded. So a
+default-drop `input` chain says nothing whatsoever about it, and the firewall is silent on the ports
+most likely to matter.
+
+## Why it matters, measured rather than argued
+
+The anchor this mesh will be installed onto publishes **38 distinct container ports on all
+addresses** — a document store, three cache sentinels, mail transfer and retrieval, the forge's own
+SSH, and thirty more.
+
+Today those are filtered, by the system being replaced, which does it with rules that hook exactly
+the path this one leaves alone. So the cutover from the old firewall to this one **opens all
+thirty-eight at once, silently, on a machine with a public address**, while every check reports a
+firewall that is up and dropping by default.
+
+That is the worst shape a security fault can take: the mechanism is present, it reports success, and
+the thing it is believed to be doing is not the thing it does.
+
+## How it would be checked
+
+Two probes from another machine, against a port on the host and a published container port, before
+and after the rules are loaded. Both must change together. The lab can do this — it is how the table
+above was produced — and nothing does it today.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Can the mesh filter forwarded traffic without owning the whole `forward` chain? A table that
+  accepts by default and drops only what the mesh knows about would not stop the runtime's traffic,
+  and hooking `forward` at all is the thing the current comment rejects.
+- Should a module's declared reach apply to its published ports? A module that says it listens to
+  the mesh only, and is then reachable from everywhere because its port is published, is not doing
+  what its manifest says.
+- Is the answer instead that the mesh should not publish on all addresses? A port bound to the
+  private network needs no filtering, and most of these want exactly that.