jochen
d497b37e43
The symptom arrived diagnosed as "the registry disabled anonymous pulls for the whole vendor namespace". It did not hold: sibling repositories in that namespace pull normally, the "$disabled" token field appears on every repository including working ones and describes signing rather than access, and "actions": [] with a 401 is byte-identical to what an invented repository name returns. Both registries' own APIs establish deletion instead. Recorded because the correction is the expensive part to rediscover, and because the instance was harmless while the standing condition is not: no node that does not already hold the images can ever provision the module again, and nothing detects that until one tries. Research 015 scopes the replacement. It is not a redesign — the foundation design already commits to S3 the protocol rather than the product, and the object store is an ordinary module, so this instantiates an existing principle. The live OIDC wiring is the requirement that gates the choice, and it is checked first.
5.6 KiB
113 — Diagnosis
2026-09-24 — the trail
The symptom arrived already carrying a diagnosis: the registry has disabled anonymous pulls for the entire vendor namespace. Everything below was an attempt to confirm that, and it did not survive.
Step 1 — the token is not the test
The reported evidence was the anonymous pull token's contents: "actions": [] and "$disabled".
A token is an intermediate artifact. The test is whether a manifest can actually be fetched with
it, so the first step was to request one:
GET /v2/minio/minio/manifests/<pinned tag> -> 401 UNAUTHORIZED
That confirmed the failure but said nothing about its scope or cause.
Step 2 — a control ruled out the stated cause
The same request flow, in the same minute, against other repositories:
| repository | token actions | manifest |
|---|---|---|
| the vendor's server | [] |
401 |
| the vendor's client | [] |
401 |
| the vendor's operator | ['pull'] |
200 |
| the vendor's console | ['pull'] |
200 |
| the vendor's sidecar proxy | ['pull'] |
200 |
| an unrelated public project | ['pull'] |
200 |
A namespace-wide policy is ruled out. Two repositories fail; their siblings in the same namespace pull normally.
Step 3 — both pieces of the original evidence were red herrings
"$disabled"is present on every repository on that registry, including all of the successful ones above. It belongs to the signing context, not to authorisation. It carries no information about this failure at all."actions": []with a401is indistinguishable from a repository that does not exist. A deliberately invented repository name in the vendor's namespace returned a byte-identical response — empty actions,401. The signal cannot separate access revoked from not there, so it cannot support the conclusion it was used for.
That second point turned the question from who revoked access to is it still there.
Step 4 — the registries' own APIs establish deletion
Asked directly, rather than through the pull path:
- Primary registry: its repository API answers 404 for the server repository, and 200 for a sibling in the same namespace. The repository is gone, not private.
- Secondary registry: a listing of the vendor's namespace returns 68 public repositories. The server and the client are absent from the list. Present are the operator, console, sidecar proxy, benchmarking and key-management images — and a large, newer set belonging to the vendor's commercially licensed line.
Step 5 — upstream confirms, and dates it
The vendor deleted the community server and client from the primary registry on 2026-09-11. This was the last step of a staged withdrawal: free image publishing stopped in October 2025, the community console UI was removed mid-2025, and the open-source repository was archived in February 2026. The secondary registry was where the ecosystem repointed as a stopgap; it has since lost the two repositories as well.
Conclusion: the images were withdrawn, not restricted. No credential can answer this, because there is nothing left to authenticate against. A different image source is the only remedy.
Why the mesh kept working, checked rather than assumed
The claim that the module "genuinely isn't ready for cutover" was tested and is false for the node in question.
- The node holds the pinned server image, the client, and the load-balancer image the module composes with — all pulled years before the withdrawal.
- The module's resolved version variable on that node matches the cached tag exactly, so the composition references an image that is present.
- The composition declares no pull policy, so a present tag is used as-is.
- The deploy stage pulls best-effort, then asserts only that every declared image resolves locally. A pull error becomes a logged warning when all images are present.
- The start path restarts the unit and does not pull. The one
--pull alwaysin the tree sits inside a generated guide describing the superseded approach, not in the code that writes units.
So a deploy of this module on that node succeeds today.
Claims in the original report that could not be substantiated
Recorded because they were specific and load-bearing, and acting on them would have wasted time.
| Claim | Finding |
|---|---|
The module's manifest is a module.json, pinning the server image by digest at line 83 |
There is no module.json anywhere in the monorepo. The manifest is YAML and pins a tag. No digest pin exists. |
| The module's own runtime artifact is a placeholder with an all-zero digest | Zero occurrences of that image name or of an all-zero digest anywhere in the tree. The module declares no runtime or sidecar artifact. |
| A dated readiness document records six modules with placeholder digests | No such file exists. |
| The server image is cached locally at an older release than the module pins | The cached tag is exactly the pinned one, not an older release. |
None of these change the real finding, which stands: the images are gone upstream.
What is located, and what is not
Located: the module in the monorepo's catalogue — it pins, by tag, an image that no longer exists anywhere public.
Not located, and deliberately left open: the general condition. The mesh has no mirror of the third-party images its modules depend on and no check that a module is obtainable by a node holding nothing. That is a design gap rather than a defect in this module, and it is stated as an open question on the report rather than answered here.