jschoubben
77f3a4cea7
Every remaining cluster merged. Each was one design that had been split across
several records because it was worked out over days rather than at once.
the node host 8 -> 1 applies not decides, depends on nothing,
per operating system, root service, the
launcher, episodic, what a declaration is,
actions from the bundle only
a node and how it joins 4 -> 1 what a node is, joining, the link as
security boundary, the enrolment token
modules and the graph 7 -> 1 everything is a module, no domain modules,
three edges, provisioning, the core library
substrate and control 6 -> 1 the test, seven contexts, one control plane,
plane the authority is not a database, the named
products, the pinned bundle
connectivity 3 -> 1 a route is a grant, reachability declared,
filter rules
delivery 5 -> 1 reconciliation not a pipeline, artifacts,
the three silos, a failed step, the verdict
the lab 5 -> 1 (earlier)
how this repository 10 -> 1 (earlier)
works
Nothing was dropped. Each consolidated record carries the reasoning of the ones
it absorbs -- the measurements, the incidents, the alternatives rejected --
because that reasoning is the only reason to keep a record at all. What is gone
is the fragmentation: eight files to read to understand tier 0, when tier 0 is
one component.
The four superseded records went too. They existed to point at their
successors, and the successors now contain what they said.
The checker made this safe. Each merge left dangling links -- 38 files after
the host merge alone -- and it named every one. Nothing was found by reading,
and a manual pass would certainly have missed some, including references inside
AGENTS.md which every session loads.
3.8 KiB
layer, status, code, updated, decisions
| layer | status | code | updated | decisions | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| as-is | implemented |
|
2026-08-23 |
|
Configuration and secrets
Every value a module reads at runtime comes from a file on a node's disk. Every one of those files is generated.
The rule
A managed file is derived from the mesh database. A synchroniser rewrites it when the values behind it change. The write path is the mesh operation that owns the value; the file is an output (ADR 0004).
An edit to a managed file survives until the next synchronisation and is then overwritten silently, taking whatever it was fixing with it — bringing back the bug the edit had removed, with a delay, and with no error to connect the two events.
There is a way to ask whether a given file is managed. That question has to be asked, because the answer is not visible from the file.
What is managed
Generated environment files for each module, service definitions in each module's runtime directory, managed configuration files a module declares, and node-level settings. The list is not a category — it is whatever a synchroniser claims, which is why the question is asked of the tooling rather than answered from a rule.
How a value is decided
Values resolve by precedence, highest first:
- A database override — set deliberately, or written by a provisioner.
- The value already in the generated file — preserved for anything without an override.
- A generated value — a random secret, a template composed from other variables, or a value pulled from the node's own record.
- The manifest default.
Two consequences follow, and both are subtle enough to have caused confusion.
The second rule is what keeps a generated password stable across regenerations. It is not an oversight; without it every regeneration would issue a new secret and break whatever holds the old one.
The same rule means that changing a manifest's default does not change anything already using it. The existing file's value wins. The new default reaches only installations that never had one.
Removing a declaration is worse than changing it: the old override row and the file it produced are both left behind. Configuration is additive in practice, whatever the manifest says.
Secrets
Generated secrets are produced by the mesh, never authored. Provisioned credentials arrive as database overrides written by the provisioner and are marked as such, so they can be distinguished from a deliberate override and cleaned up when the grant is removed (ADR 0044).
Nothing in the repository contains a credential. The repository has no per-node content at all, which is what makes that guarantee structural rather than a matter of care.
Two known weaknesses, both recorded rather than resolved:
Generated environment files were world-readable. The mode passed at write time only applies when the file is created, so regeneration left the previous mode in place. The class of bug is worth remembering beyond the instance: a permission set at creation is not a permission maintained.
Rotation is not a mesh operation. Secrets can be generated and granted; there is no mechanism that rotates one and informs everything holding it. Where a rotation has been done, it has been done by hand, and doing it wrong has taken services down.
Node-level and mesh-level values
A node-level value applies to everything on one node. A mesh-level value applies everywhere and is read by every node — the broker's location is the canonical example, and a wrong one is how a mesh fails to form.
Neither is a file that anyone edits. Both are database records that produce files.