Six modules take their secrets from files; the rest say precisely why not

From the survey of every env-file secret (ADR 0086, issue 041): amqp-ping,
minio, mongodb and grafana use the _FILE twin their software honours;
mesh-catalog and model-usage read DATABASE_URL_FILE (a file the mesh
templates, mounted where only the runtime reads it); grafana's secret files
belong to its own account. Two dead deliveries removed: a line nothing read
in amqp-email-forwarder, and mailu's secret.env on four containers that
never read it. The 25 exceptions that remain carry the surveyed reason —
convertible and awaiting a bed, convertible through a generated config file,
the application's own code, or not convertible.

modules/letta/module.json

@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
       "ports": [
         "8283"
       ],
-      "secrets-in-environment": "the runtime reads its settings from the environment; converting is the per-module work of issue 041"
+      "secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted"
     },
     {
       "id": "runtime-config",
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@
         "runtime-config"
       ],
       "artifact": "runtime",
-      "secrets-in-environment": "the runtime reads its settings from the environment; converting is the per-module work of issue 041"
+      "secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted"
     }
   ],
   "build": {