Convert four hal modules: lidarr, mongodb, mssql, mosquitto
Mirrors the proven catalog patterns field-for-field: - lidarr -> the Servarr twin of radarr/sonarr (API v1, artist content); no provisioner (it is a consumer app). - mongodb -> postgres shape: mongodb-database provider, provisioner mints a per-consumer db+user (ADR 0053), client shells to mongosh (no npm driver, the psql convention). - mssql -> postgres shape: mssql-database provider, sqlcmd client. - mosquitto -> redis shape: mqtt-topic provider via the Dynamic Security plugin, deliberately avoiding hal's password_file (that file is nox issue 011 exactly); provisioner mints a per-consumer MQTT client+role. All four typecheck (strict, NodeNext) against the built @novox/mesh-sdk, and their service images are digest-pinned to resolved registry digests. The mesh-runtime-<mod> images keep the all-zeros placeholder the pipeline pins, as postgres/redis do, and must bundle each module's CLI (mongosh/sqlcmd/ mosquitto_ctrl) as mesh-runtime-postgres bundles psql. Not yet lab-verified: each module lists in-code what an integration test must prove (auth model, provisioner reconcile, mosquitto dynsec bootstrap ordering). Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
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// mosquitto's admin client — mosquitto's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0044). Both
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// this module's tools and its provisioner import it, and nothing outside mosquitto does.
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//
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// Client, role and ACL administration is driven through `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec`, not a hand-rolled
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// MQTT stack: the module may take NO npm dependency beyond @novox/mesh-sdk, and mosquitto ships the
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// exact admin client for its Dynamic Security plugin — so it shells out to it, the same way postgres
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// drives itself through `psql`, minio through `mc` and mailu through `doveadm`. One boundary,
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// `ctl()`, and every method is built on it.
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//
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// Why the Dynamic Security plugin and not `password_file`: dynsec creates and revokes clients while
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// the broker runs, over an admin connection, with no broker restart and no file the host rewrites —
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// the true analog of redis's runtime ACL users. A `password_file` would have to be re-read on a
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// SIGHUP the runtime cannot cleanly send across containers, and — declared as a managed file — would
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// be rewritten by the host on every reconcile, wiping every provisioned user (novox/nox issue 011).
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// The one cost dynsec carries is the bootstrap file; see initBootstrapFile() and the module README.
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
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import { promisify } from "node:util";
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const run = promisify(execFile);
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export interface MqttConn {
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readonly host: string;
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readonly port: number;
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/** The Dynamic Security admin client the runtime authenticates as. */
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readonly adminUser: string;
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readonly adminPassword: string;
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}
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export class MosquittoClient {
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constructor(private readonly conn: MqttConn) {}
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/**
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* Build from the module's resolved environment. Reads MESH_MQTT_* first (the documented names),
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* falling back to the MESH_PROVISION_* keys the manifest already sets on the provisioner
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* container. Throws if it cannot find a host and an admin password — the right failure, because
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* without them nothing it does can work.
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*/
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static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): MosquittoClient {
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const endpoint = env.MESH_PROVISION_MQTT ?? ""; // "host:port"
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const host = env.MESH_MQTT_HOST ?? (endpoint ? endpoint.split(":")[0] : undefined);
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const port =
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Number(env.MESH_MQTT_PORT ?? (endpoint.includes(":") ? endpoint.split(":")[1] : "") ?? "1883") || 1883;
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const adminUser = env.MESH_MQTT_ADMIN_USER ?? env.MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER ?? "mesh-admin";
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const adminPassword = env.MESH_MQTT_PASSWORD ?? readSecretFile(env.MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE);
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if (!host || !adminPassword) {
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throw new Error(
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"mosquitto host or admin password is not set — mosquitto's own code cannot reach the broker",
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);
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}
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return new MosquittoClient({ host, port, adminUser, adminPassword: adminPassword ?? "" });
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}
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get host(): string {
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return this.conn.host;
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}
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get port(): number {
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return this.conn.port;
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}
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/**
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* Run one `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec <args>` command against the broker as the admin client and return
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* its stdout. Connects over MQTT with the verified connect flags `-h`/`-p`/`-u`/`-P`. A non-zero
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* exit rejects — a failed command is an error here, not a success with a warning.
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*
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* The admin password rides on argv (`-P`): mosquitto_ctrl 2.x exposes no password env var and no
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* password file for a broker connection — its only non-interactive mechanism is `-P`, its only
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* other mechanism an interactive prompt. This is a real mosquitto limitation, not a choice; unlike
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* psql's PGPASSWORD there is nothing cleaner to reach for. The exposure is momentary and confined
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* to this single-purpose runtime container; see the module README.
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*/
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async ctl(...args: string[]): Promise<string> {
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const base = [
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"-h", this.conn.host,
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"-p", String(this.conn.port),
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"-u", this.conn.adminUser,
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"-P", this.conn.adminPassword,
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];
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const { stdout } = await run("mosquitto_ctrl", [...base, "dynsec", ...args], {
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maxBuffer: 16 << 20,
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});
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return stdout;
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}
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/** Whether a dynsec client with this username already exists. */
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async clientExists(username: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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await this.ctl("getClient", username);
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return true;
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} catch {
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return false;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Create (or reset to a known state) a client scoped to one topic namespace, idempotently. The
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* client is confined to `<prefix>/#` by a same-named role: it may publish to, subscribe to and
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* receive on exactly its own subtree and nothing else — the MQTT analog of redis's keyspace-scoped
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* ACL user. Called again for an existing client, it resets the password and re-asserts the ACLs.
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*/
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async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, topicPrefix: string): Promise<void> {
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const role = username; // one role per client, named for it
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const pattern = `${topicPrefix}/#`;
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if (await this.clientExists(username)) {
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await this.ctl("setClientPassword", username, password);
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} else {
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await this.ctl("createClient", username, "-p", password);
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}
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// A role carrying exactly this client's topic ACLs. createRole fails if it already exists; that
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// is fine — the setRoleACL calls below assert the intended state either way.
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await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("createRole", role));
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for (const acl of ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"]) {
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// allow (1) this client to send to, receive on, and subscribe under its own subtree.
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await this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl, pattern, "allow");
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}
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await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addClientRole", username, role));
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}
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/** Remove a client and the per-client role created for it, idempotently. */
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async deleteScopedClient(username: string): Promise<void> {
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await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteClient", username));
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await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteRole", username));
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}
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/** The dynsec client list, parsed from `listClients`. */
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async listClients(): Promise<string[]> {
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const out = await this.ctl("listClients");
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return out
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.split(/\r?\n/)
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.map((l) => l.trim())
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.filter((l) => l.length > 0);
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}
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/**
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* Write the Dynamic Security bootstrap file offline, creating the admin client the plugin loads at
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* broker startup. This is a one-time seed, NOT part of the reconcile loop: run once before the
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* broker first starts, against the same path the broker's `plugin_opt_config_file` names. It must
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* never be a host-reconciled managed file — see the module README and novox/nox issue 011.
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*/
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async initBootstrapFile(configFile: string): Promise<void> {
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// `dynsec init <file> <admin-username> [admin-password]` is an offline file operation — it does
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// not connect to the broker. The password is a positional argument (omitting it prompts).
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await run("mosquitto_ctrl", ["dynsec", "init", configFile, this.conn.adminUser, this.conn.adminPassword], {
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maxBuffer: 16 << 20,
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});
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}
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}
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/** Generate a URL-safe password with no argv- or MQTT-hostile characters. */
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export function generatePassword(): string {
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return randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
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}
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/** Swallow a "already exists" failure so create paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
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async function ignoreExisting(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await p;
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} catch (err) {
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if (!/exist/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
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}
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}
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/** Swallow a "not found" failure so delete paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
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async function ignoreMissing(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await p;
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} catch (err) {
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if (!/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
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}
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}
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function readSecretFile(path: string | undefined): string | undefined {
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if (!path) return undefined;
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try {
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return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
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} catch {
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return undefined;
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}
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}
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