claude-code: remove the guard on the agent's shell
The operator asked for the shell guard to go (2026-11-20): the plugin no longer carries a PreToolUse hook or guard.json, the binary no longer has a guard verb, and the claude_code_guard tool, its record and the refusal-ranked order of the instead-of table are gone. The SessionStart and Stop hooks of the wait list stay, run by the same binary at the same path, which is also the home-fs helper's. The rendered rule against ssh to a mesh machine stays as the session's own and no longer claims a guard enforces it; claude-agent no longer passes the guard's override.
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@@ -28,8 +28,7 @@ And, for where the agent runs as an account of its own (hq ADR 0266):
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rule and can read no secret the mesh placed for another account. A way found is this module's condition,
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and the controller's self-check says it urgently.
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- `/usr/local/bin/claude-agent`, root's, `0755`: starts the agent as that account — `claude` itself when run
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as it, otherwise `sudo -iu <account> claude` through the operator's own sudo, carrying the guard's
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override only when it is set in the operator's shell.
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as it, otherwise `sudo -iu <account> claude` through the operator's own sudo.
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- `/etc/claude-code/agent-account`, root's, `0644`: the name of that account, the machine fact
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`agent-account`, for the shell to read — the controller fills no machine fact into shell code.
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- **`claude` in the operator's interactive zsh is `claude-agent`** where the machine names an agent account:
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@@ -48,7 +47,7 @@ whenever the node's tool runtime collects the module's tools:
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| `managed-mcp.json` | the tool servers every session loads: the mesh's console as `mesh` (with a `timeout` of 660000 ms, mesh_wait's longest wait and a minute, so the agent's one-minute default does not cut a wait, issue 1871), and the servers set in this module's `mcp_servers` setting. **Exclusive**: a server not listed here does not load — not one added with `claude mcp add`, not a project's `.mcp.json`, not a plugin's |
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| `managed-settings.json` | the keys set in this module's `managed_settings` setting — at the controller's terminal alone (hq issue 340) — under the mesh's own keys: the repositories' attribution convention, the claude.ai connectors kept beside the managed servers, the key-helper while the node holds an API-key licence, git's credential file while the node holds the forge's read credential (below), and the two that name the `nox-mesh` marketplace and enable its plugin, and `CLAUDE_CODE_MCP_TOOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT` (660000) in `env` beside the operator's own, the mesh's key winning |
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| `CLAUDE.md` | how a session on this mesh works, this node's name and role, the conventions, the **"instead of" table** — then the instruction sections registered for every node and for this one |
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| `marketplace/` | the `nox-mesh` plugin (hq ADR 0216): the skills, subagents, commands and output styles registered for every node and for this one, offered in a session as `nox-mesh:<name>` — and the **guard on the agent's shell** (`guard/`), the mesh's own hook and the plugin's only one (hq issue 340). Replaced whole, staged beside and swapped in |
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| `marketplace/` | the `nox-mesh` plugin (hq ADR 0216): the skills, subagents, commands and output styles registered for every node and for this one, offered in a session as `nox-mesh:<name>` — and this module's binary (`guard/guard`, its path kept so the home-fs helper's path does not move) run by the mesh's own SessionStart and Stop hooks, the plugin's only hooks (hq issue 340, ADR 0489). No PreToolUse hook: the guard on the agent's shell is removed (the operator, 2026-11-20). Replaced whole, staged beside and swapped in |
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Under the operator's home: `~/.claude/.credentials.json`, only when the licence manager hands this node a
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subscription token; and what is registered at the **home** scope for this node — a skill, subagent,
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@@ -126,31 +125,15 @@ The agent kept reaching for `ssh <machine> journalctl` while the service manager
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answered this is not placed) — at start, every ten minutes and on `claude_code_render`, keeps it in its
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state (`mesh-tools.json`), and renders it into `CLAUDE.md` as one row per seat or module: `<node>/<seat>.` and
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each verb with the commands it replaces. Generated, never written by hand: a verb that gains `replaces` is in
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the next render. Ordered by what the guard here refused most, then the machines' seats, the modules, the
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the next render. Ordered by the machines' seats, the modules, the
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mesh's seats; at most sixteen rows, the rest one `mesh_search` away.
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- **The guard.** A PreToolUse hook on every tool, judging `Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `MultiEdit` and `NotebookEdit` and letting the rest through (but see the account rule below): this module's own
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binary (`claude-code guard`), copied root's into the plugin with what it judges with (`guard.json`: the
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machines by name, domain and address, and the replaced commands), run by its path under `/etc/claude-code` so
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the session cannot change it. It refuses `ssh`, `scp`, `sftp`, `rsync`, `mosh` and `autossh` to a mesh machine
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(any `*.internal` name, a machine's name or a name under its domains, one of its addresses, as `ssh -G` reads
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the destination; a jump through one too), writing `/etc/hosts` or `/etc/resolv.conf`, and `HOSTALIASES` —
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naming the verb that does the job on that machine when one says it replaces the command, and otherwise that a
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missing tool is created in the module that owns it, never worked around. **Stated, not silent:** an ssh login
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as `git` is the forge's account, which runs nothing but git, and passes; a git remote is never an ssh command
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line anyway.
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- **The operator's override**: `MESH_GUARD_OVERRIDE=<why>`, exported in the operator's own shell before the
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session starts. It is read from the session's environment as the kernel kept it at exec
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(`/proc/<pid>/environ` of the agent's process), so nothing a session does — a command's `export`, a
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settings `env` key — can set it, and a command naming it is refused outright. Every override and every
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refusal is a line in the module's `guard.log`; an override that cannot be recorded is not honoured.
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`claude_code_guard` shows the rules, the data and the record.
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It is a guard against the habit, not a sandbox: a command written to hide what it runs can hide it, and the
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record is how a habit that found a way round is seen.
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The rule under the table (never `ssh` to a mesh machine, never edit `/etc/hosts` or set `HOSTALIASES` for a
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mesh name) is the session's own: nothing on the agent's shell enforces it since the guard was removed (the
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operator, 2026-11-20).
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## Tools
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`claude_code_status`, `claude_code_render`, `claude_code_guard`, `claude_code_pull` (asks the vault for this node's
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`claude_code_status`, `claude_code_render`, `claude_code_pull` (asks the vault for this node's
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licence token now), `claude_code_grant` (for the licence manager), `claude_code_mcp_list`, `claude_code_mcp_unregister` (this node by default; `nodes: "all"` or a list for
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more).
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@@ -339,14 +322,6 @@ applied only while the agent's account holds it — and what this module placed
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goes: the access-token-only credentials file (one holding a refresh token is a login the person made, and
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stays, said), the home-scope items unless changed by hand, the key kept in the state.
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**The guard there refuses every tool call of a session that does not run as the agent's account** —
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shell, file edits, reads and the mesh's tools alike — and no override lifts it: the operator's account may become root, and an
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agent started in it by habit must do nothing. Its record goes to the machine's journal
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(`journalctl -t mesh-claude-code-guard`), which the session's account may add to and not change;
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`claude_code_guard` reads it there, keeping only the lines the journal says the guard's own binary wrote. That
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is not proof: the account can run the guard's binary itself and add lines in the guard's words. What it
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cannot do is remove one.
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**An API key is taken only from the agent's own home.** `claude_code_add_api_key` reads a file and removes it,
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and the runtime runs as the operator: a path anywhere would hand whoever calls it the runtime's credential or
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the operator's keys. So the file must lie under the home of the account the agent runs as, reached through no
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