The module named /var/lib/letta, a layout no definition may carry (ADR
0112); state is now a placed directory holding the bindings and secrets.
letta had no route, while the server it replaces is reached by its public
name (a workflow calls it there). It now contributes one for its `web`
endpoint; reach is the assignment's.
The server needs an OpenAI key for agents on OpenAI models, and nothing
gave it one: `openai-api-key` is an own-secret, accepted from the
operator (a key someone chose, not one the mesh can mint). The
server-password is accepted the same way where a server already has
clients. Both, and the database password inside LETTA_PG_URI, stay in the
server's environment: letta 0.6.x reads settings from the environment
only, and its startup.sh starts an embedded PostgreSQL unless
LETTA_PG_URI is set - the declared reason now says so.
The runtime's tools never authenticated: the client sent only a Bearer
token, and 0.6.x's --secure mode checks X-BARE-PASSWORD ("password <it>")
and answers 401 otherwise. The client now sends both. Its password comes
from the runtime config file (the key client.ts reads first) instead of an
env-file, so the runtime container no longer carries a secret in its
environment.
Image: the same 0.6.8 image, now pinned by the index digest ace runs
rather than its amd64 manifest.
Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set; tsc -p tsconfig.json in
the mesh-tools build image. Throwaway containers: a fresh 0.6.8 with its
embedded PG and two blocks made through the API; stopped, copied, dumped
from the copy; restored (schema letta + vector pre-made by the superuser,
--no-owner --role, search_path set on the database as the original had
it) into a grant-shaped database on the postgres module's pgvector image
(PG17); started in this shape: alembic finds nothing to do, both blocks
are there, a wrong password is refused with 401, and the patched client
lists agents. Test containers and data removed.
Mirror the postgres-consumer shape (keycloak/nextcloud): requires the
backing service(s), binds/secrets for the delivered credential, and a
server container that reads it from an interpolated env file.
- baserow: consumes postgres-database + redis-cache; tooled (dormant
until an account is configured, like gitea's token).
- letta: consumes postgres-database; tooled, live via a mesh-minted
server-password injected into both server and runtime.
- invoicing: consumes mongodb-database + s3-bucket; plain two-container
service (app + api), no tools.
Digests pinned for baserow and letta; invoicing keeps private-registry
tags (DIGEST-UNRESOLVED). redis-cache and mongodb-database consumer
shapes are inferred (no prior consumer in the catalog).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jschoubben