take-over waits on a hash for every user of the loaded list, and the vault holds no value for the controller's own
account, the node accounts and the enrolled devices. The bus node's engine now hands every loaded user's hash in the
bus module's have, sealed to the vault's key (mesh-host and mesh-sdk on the same branch). The vault answers its key in
node-key, reads the haves (manifest reads node-engine.have, granted from the manifest, no controller change), watches
the bus module's have, opens the handing with its own key, and writes each user it holds no value for into
bus-accounts marked adopted, with the list and node it came from, saying account-hashed. It never touches a user whose
covered account it holds or whose key is its own hash, writes an adopted key again only for another hash, and refuses
a handing from any node the assignments do not name as holding the bus module.
Tools: account_adopt adopts now from the have as the watch does; secret_own, unnarrowed by module, lists the adopted
accounts and the last adoption.
The controller still mints each covered account and hands it to the vault (ADR 0374); ADR 0547 clause 9 has the vault
write the bcrypt hash of what it holds into its own state, readable by the grants part, and say account-hashed. It
hashes on keep, at start every held account with no key of its generation, and again by hand (account_hash); a refused
write is owed and written at the next pass. secret_own says per bus account whether this generation's hash is written.
Issue: 1945
mesh/merge-gate checking again: the gate refused `unknown` because the controller judged with a node-engine validator pinned before mesh-host #117; mesh-co…
mesh/repo-check checking again: the gate refused `unknown` because the controller judged with a node-engine validator pinned before mesh-host #117; mesh-co…
Every directory and archive resource carries `unknown`: move-out for a home folder whose program writes nothing there (the node-engine, delivered in mesh-host #117, moves the rest to ~/.local/state/mesh-moved/<module>/ with a list), module for ~/.ssh and ~/.claude, program elsewhere; `knows` keeps what a program or the operator relies on (powerlevel10k's compiled files, i3's scripts and the asus/g14 drop-ins, dunst's slack rule, betterbird's records, node-env's forge credential, issue 1033). Two shared folders are no longer declared. Each module's README says it. checks/owned holds every manifest to it; checks/sshdir stays while main's merge check runs it (issue 1035). Tests that pin a manifest follow the new key only. Reviewed in three rounds.
Backup lines are derived from each module's data section instead of written by hand; the holder
measures declared items, reads the array under them, and deletes a retired item only after a last
restore point; the Go providers say each held consumer's size so an empty replacement is seen.
Consumers were held to an S3 access key's 20 characters whatever they
required. Each provider now says what its backend keeps: minio 20,
PostgreSQL and MongoDB and DNS 63, Gitea 40, a mailbox 64, SQL Server 128,
Keycloak 255, unbounded where the store has no limit, and none for the
resolver and route provisions, which keep no name of their consumers.
Needs the controller that reads the field (mesh-controller, ADR 0225).
ADR 0214 / to-be 43. restic keeps one repository per machine and takes a nightly snapshot per
module — 14 daily, 8 weekly, 6 monthly — and restores beside the live data, never over it. postgres,
mssql and mongodb contribute a consistent dump; minio, influxdb, the vault, mailu, gitea and
nextcloud the directories that hold their data.
The mesh-vault container goes with its Dockerfile, build bases, bus credential and state directory; its env was already host paths, so it becomes the bundle's words unchanged.
The uplink branch was split from the vault's with the vault's files reset to a main that did not yet
hold #205; merging it afterwards took the older vault definition along (no claim, the refused event
names), and the vault could not be built. Restored to #205's state.
A module publishes under its own name only; secret.provisioned read as another module's event and the
builder refused the vault's definition today, so the seat claim could not be built. The three events lose
the prefix; nothing outside the vault listens for the old names.
The vault's claim makes a second provider of secret a second claimant, refused by name. The three
uplink definitions declare uplink-networkmanager, uplink-systemd-networkd and uplink-dhcpcd, which the
host reports for the manager it finds active, so the holder for a manager the machine does not run
is refused the way any missing capability is. Merges after the controller holds the seat and the host
reports the capability.
48 definitions stop naming /var/lib/mesh/<module>: the directory says `place: "mesh"`, the two
subdirectories beneath it (gitea's runtime state, anthropic-manager's output) state their path
beneath it, and every credential, binding, merged file and mount names it as ${dir:mesh-state}.
Resolved on the default root, every definition names exactly the paths it named before —
TestPlacedDirectoriesKeepTheirPaths in mesh-controller, run over both checkouts. Needs the
controller that knows the word (mesh-controller, same branch) one release ahead.
Twenty-eight modules' data directories are placed: the root as place ".", a sub-directory named by
its id, and every host-side reference — binds, secrets, own secrets, grants, receives, file paths,
mounts, env-files — as ${dir:<id>}. Resolved on the default root every path is the one the manifest
named before, which the controller's TestPlacedDirectoriesKeepTheirPaths proves over both checkouts;
so no data moves and no machine sees a change. Five directories whose id is not their last segment
keep their path as a placement (novox/hq issue 119, ADR 0112, design 27).
Every module named its events the way the old bus spelled a routing key —
`module.<module>.<verb>`. Design 29 says a module names an event locally and the
mesh works out where it lands, so all 37 were stale against a rule already
decided. On the new bus that derives into a namespace belonging to a module
called "module", so no cross-module subscription in the mesh matched anything:
nothing failed, nothing reacted (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/127).
36 manifests converted, and 43 files of module code with them. The code mattered
as much as the manifests: the runtime builds the subject from what `emit()` is
handed, so a converted manifest with unconverted code would have had the
permission and the subject disagree.
Three things the new check found on the way:
- `photos` emitted an event its manifest never declared, which the new bus refuses
outright. Declared.
- `showcase` waited for an event nothing emits, so its demo could never be
triggered — only `showcase` may publish under its own name. It emits both halves
now.
- `distribution` declared an event named after a different module. It emits
`image.pushed` under its own name. An event about a *role* belongs on the seat,
where the name outlives whoever holds it, but the sdk has no way to publish on a
seat yet, so that stays recorded rather than declared.
The audit logger's "everything" pattern is `**` rather than the old bus's `#`.
mesh-vault provides `secret` (novox/hq ADR 0085, design 24). The value is
the pair credential the controller mints — the vault holds no copy, only a
ledger of who holds one, its fingerprint and every rotation, and two tools that
answer by fingerprint and never by value. Rotation is `rotate secret`,
unchanged machinery pointed at a secret with an owner (design 13). Named in the
mesh's own namespace, beside mesh-controller and mesh-catalog, because it is
the mesh's own code rather than wrapped software.
redis is the first consumer: its own password stops being an own-secret nothing
could rotate and becomes a `secret` it requires, read from the same file into
the same hole. The server now restarts on its config, or it would keep the
password it started with through every rotation (playbook 06).
jschoubben
mesh-tools
jochen