Review round 2 of the registry milestone:
- security F2: the spend record leaves requests, which the tools write as the tool runner's account, for state spent,
named in the keeper's bus.state and declared read-only (the lead's 18:1x ruling: the tools read it, never write);
nats_requests lists the warrants spent from it;
- running F1: the fill pass also runs while the manifest-accepted consumer is bound again;
- health note 3: an event said on the seat's subject and refused by its history is kept with its one id and said again
on the history alone, never again with a new id;
- seams note 3, health note 4: words unsaid with a status that cannot be written raise the keeper's own condition
status-unwritten, cleared when it is written; the health names what a restart would lose.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
Review round 1 of the registry milestone (design 25 § 12.2, § 12.3, § 12.7):
- the fill pass runs from the start, while the first view is asked;
- recreate and drop wake on the operator channel's decided on the keeper's durable consumer, never a minute's tick;
- a warrant is spent by compare-and-set (acted.<ask id> in requests) before anything is deleted; a second request on it
is refused; a request whose ask ended unanswered is ended, said; the ask is raised before the request is handed;
- created is marked only once said; an event or a condition the bus did not take is kept, named by the health and
said again at the next fill pass with its one id, on the subjects left (the double publish);
- the health judges the first view past its bound and never skips an unread consumer backlog;
- an unrecordable hand act is said on the request; nats_requests reads what waits, what ended and each warrant spent,
and drops a waiting request by hand; a tool waits for its request's end on one watch of requests;
- the whole-module test reads the warrant from the router's record under a process connection.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
The bus module's tool hands the ask to the keeper through its own state
requests (design 25 § 12.2), as the caller the tool runner proved; the keeper
asks indexer_bus_state at once beside its backoff, applies what it answers,
records the hand act and writes back what it answered and at which revision.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
It reads the keeper's status from its own state asked, what the keeper holds,
and how many accepted verdicts wait on its consumer <node>_nats_keeper on
EVENTS from the monitoring endpoint, and answers HealthOf's judgement:
unhealthy, naming why, past the three-minute bound; the entries refused,
waiting and past the raise mark named beside.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
The bus module's tools hold no grant of the seat's acting verbs (design 25
§ 12.3): nats_create, nats_apply, nats_recreate and nats_drop write a request
into the keeper's own state requests, stamped with stdio.CallerOf (a name in
the arguments is never the caller), and read its end back. recreate and drop
raise the operator's ask first, its option binding exactly that act; the
keeper acts only on the router's warrant for it (Warrant.For, Option.Performs),
after a snapshot of the entry's streams (bussnap, moved from the snapshot
command with a streams filter), says recreated or dropped, and records every
act as a hand act through mesh-hand-acts. A drop removes an orphan alone.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
Served by the bus module's bundle from the keeper's own state asked and the
bus's monitoring endpoint (design 25 § 12.3): each entry's template, bus
names, settings asked and held and fill against its cap; check names each
object missing or differing; orphans what no accepted manifest asks for.
nats_history reads one entry's events, in order, from the bus module's own
stream BROKER_EVENTS on the tools' credential. The manifest test now holds
every tool and reading verb the manifest names to what the bundle serves.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
The keeper is a process of the tools bundle on its own account (own secret
broker-keeper, ADR 0436 §1): it hears the indexer's manifest-accepted, keeps
what it heard in its old state asked and the persons' requests in requests
(ADR 0595 §10), and says its nine events on its own stream broker-events,
30 days at 256 MiB (design 25 § 12.3, ADR 0620 §2). mesh-broker serves its
four reading verbs; its acting verbs are the keeper's own work. The server
gains a tcp check, which the keeper's tool check stands beside.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
mesh/check being carried to f2eb54820469 on be24f5ac387f | from e6de42630355, mesh-delivery 4154c3040cee, mesh-tools 01ee2ef39488
The running indexer's judge refuses the word, a refused manifest holds the bus's user list, and so the indexer build
that knows the word is never granted. The node-engine on main still finds these modules by its name list, and the
vault keeps no list, so no credential is lost; the word comes back once the new judge runs (issue 774).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KG7AfSdh6FP8VrBqCn
The controller ended by its unassignment, so its consumers, streams and
buckets may be removed as recorded hand acts (ADR 0590 §6). The nats tools'
account declares controller-leftovers in place of the lease write's two
words, and the removal test proves a consumer of EVENTS and a bucket's
stream go while EVENTS and its other consumers stay (issue 1126 B5).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
nats_bucket_expiry reads a bucket's stream, sets MaxAge (a duration, or none), reads it back, records a hand act
through mesh-hand-acts and says bucket-expiry-set, so the lease write can take the 15 seconds off the lease bucket and
the hand-back can restore them. Refuses a missing why and a name that is no bucket. Two new unit tests (stand-in
embedded server) in a module at 26 of 500; no test removed, none needed to stay in budget.
(issue 774, 774/S6)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh/delivery-group group feat/774-l3-reland rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (b48c90fea31f): integration: mesh-self-ch…
mesh/check failed: integration: mesh-self-check/cmd/mesh-self-check.TestTheSelfCheckWholeRunsOnTheBus: the run answered {Run:doctor-1793351737-1 At:20…
One commit with exactly the tree of the reviewed head 35b4509c0a, on main 12c2574c9d, so two compiled programs added and removed on the branch leave no trace in history (issue 1577).
mesh/merge-gate head 98ca97fc5b3f merged into trunk dcf6e86d0236 — pass: builds nats, sent nowhere; merging this needs a person's bus upgrade; 1 wait(s) fo…
mesh/repo-check head 98ca97fc5b3f merged into trunk dcf6e86d0236 — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
mesh/check failed: ace: novox/mesh-catalog#442: checks/particulars/go.mod cannot be read to check its mesh-sdk pin: Gitea API /repos/novox/mesh-catalo…
The upgrade and restore steps told a person to docker exec the snapshot program; no mesh tool
did it. nats_snapshot_verify reads the newest bus.tar of the snapshots directory only.
mesh/merge-gate checking again: the gate refused `unknown` because the controller judged with a node-engine validator pinned before mesh-host #117; mesh-co…
mesh/repo-check checking again: the gate refused `unknown` because the controller judged with a node-engine validator pinned before mesh-host #117; mesh-co…
Every directory and archive resource carries `unknown`: move-out for a home folder whose program writes nothing there (the node-engine, delivered in mesh-host #117, moves the rest to ~/.local/state/mesh-moved/<module>/ with a list), module for ~/.ssh and ~/.claude, program elsewhere; `knows` keeps what a program or the operator relies on (powerlevel10k's compiled files, i3's scripts and the asus/g14 drop-ins, dunst's slack rule, betterbird's records, node-env's forge credential, issue 1033). Two shared folders are no longer declared. Each module's README says it. checks/owned holds every manifest to it; checks/sshdir stays while main's merge check runs it (issue 1035). Tests that pin a manifest follow the new key only. Reviewed in three rounds.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds nats, sent nowhere; a bus step; 1 wait(s) for a person; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compo…
With a gate on the first machine and a rollback after it, a module's build rolls out by
default. The ones kept back say why: the network path a rollback could not cross, the
providers every consumer on a machine drops with, and the stores holding the photos.
A merge's deleted files are announced, so a module whose manifest went is forgotten
rather than asked to build (the public-acme plan failure).
The restic holder copied JetStream's store while the server wrote it; such a
copy may not restore. The nats image now carries mesh-nats-snapshot, run by
the declared dump under the module's own bus account (snapshot API only):
every stream one at a time, flow-controlled, into one tar with a manifest of
counts, sequences and checksums. Restore builds a new store beside the live
one with the bus's own server; a person swaps it in. Proven against
throwaway nats 2.11 servers being written to during the snapshot.
Backup lines are derived from each module's data section instead of written by hand; the holder
measures declared items, reads the array under them, and deletes a retired item only after a last
restore point; the Go providers say each held consumer's size so an empty replacement is seen.
On 2.10.29 such a consumer was moved past a message now and then without
handing it over; the controller's events consumer has seven filters, and a
merge on the stream never reached it. The test reproduces the skip on 2.10.29
and keeps the image's release equal to the server it tests.
A Go bundle the runtime launches beside the nats module's server. It reads
the server's monitoring API and the composed user list — never a password
hash — and changes nothing. Reached directly when the endpoint is published,
through the container otherwise: its configuration binds monitoring to the
container's own loopback, so the published port answers nothing today.
Ten definitions name each access by id; the path stays as the default an assignment may replace,
and the host side of every mount says ${access:<id>}. Resolved with no placement, every definition
names exactly the paths it named before (TestPlacedDirectoriesKeepTheirPaths, extended). On an
adopted machine the assignment now says `accesses: {<id>: <path>}` and the mount follows.
Needs the controller that knows an access id (mesh-controller #176); the running one refuses the
field at registration.
75 endpoints across 50 modules, named from what each one is for rather than by a
rule: mail's seven protocol ports are smtp, imaps, submission and the rest; unifi's
nine are inform, stun, discovery, the two portal ports and syslog; minio's two are
s3 and console; the resolver's two are dns-udp and dns-tcp.
And 35 route contributions name the endpoint they serve instead of repeating its
port. A route and a listen both carried a port and nothing said they were the same
thing; now one of them does. gitea's path-level deny rule names neither, because it
is a rule about a name rather than an endpoint.
novox/hq ADR 0138. The words shipped a release ahead in mesh-controller #138 and
#139, and the control plane running today is built from that merge — checked before
this was written, because an unknown manifest key is refused and a catalogue using
one against an older control plane would stop resolving.
The mesh's broker certificate is the operator's, kept outside any module and
mounted read-only by whatever serves the bus; the controller declares that
access and now so does nats, the same way. A mount nothing declares is refused
at registration (ADR 0030), which is how this was found.
The module mounted a TLS directory nothing fills, so the server could not start
on a mesh that was not raised by the genesis template. The mesh already has a
broker certificate every machine pins by fingerprint and the controller trusts;
serving the new bus with it means no pin changes when a machine moves and there
is no second certificate to be wrong about. No ca_file: the directory has none,
and a pinning client checks the leaf and nothing else.
The recipe started FROM the upstream server's digest directly, and the build machine
refuses that: every base is declared under build.on and copied into the mesh's own
store before a build, so a build never reaches out to a registry the mesh does not
run (novox/hq ADR 0097). Found the first time the module was built on a real mesh.
Same digest, now declared as NATS_BASE and arriving as a build argument; the
Dockerfile says where it comes from and why the digest is the index's.
The split the controller now makes, from this side. The module's own
configuration — ports, TLS, JetStream — is a declared file resource, because those
are properties of this container and change when its image does. `bus-users` names
where the mesh writes every account and permission, in the same directory, and the
module's configuration includes it.
**Both files in one directory because they have to be.** An absolute include path
is resolved relative to the including file's directory: nats-server given
`include /etc/nats/accounts.conf` from /etc/nats-server/nats.conf looks for
/etc/nats-server/etc/nats/accounts.conf and refuses to start. Verified against the
server, and recorded in the configuration itself where somebody moving a file will
read it.
**`verify: true` is gone, and it was refusing every connection in the mesh.** It
makes the server demand a client certificate; a host pins this server's exact
certificate and authenticates with the password the mesh minted, and presents none.
Found by building this image and connecting to it as a host would.
The entrypoint now waits for both files and watches the mesh's half: the module's
own does not change without a new declaration, and that recreates the container
anyway. Verified end to end against this image — the mesh's user list rewritten,
the module noticing and reloading the server itself with no signal from outside,
and the connection the mesh already had still working afterwards.
Step 1.1 and 1.2 of novox/hq ADR 0116. The server is a built artifact rather
than the upstream image directly, because it needs an entrypoint of its own:
the host can only recreate a container, and recreating the bus for every
permission change drops every connection and every in-flight ack. nats-server
reloads on SIGHUP by itself, so the config is mounted as a directory (not
digest-tracked, hq issue 103) and the entrypoint watches the one file.
Verified against the real server, not assumed: a user added to the config
connects, a revoked one is refused, both within one poll interval, with the
container's PID and restart count unchanged and "Reloaded: accounts" in its
log.
Two corrections found by checking rather than reading:
- the seat delivers nothing now (hq ADR 0117), and the controller's parser
refused the manifest until it did — "nats claims mesh-broker, whose holder
answers for amqp, and nats does not provide amqp"
- pinned to the multi-arch index digest; the first pin was the amd64
manifest, which builds here and fails on any other architecture
jschoubben
mesh-tools
jochen
mesh-admin