A module's identity is the software it is (ADR 0040). Two were named after the
job instead, and the job already had a name.
firewall installs the nftables package and runs nftables.service. The seat it
claims is the-packet-filter, which is correctly named for the role. Calling the
module firewall named neither the software nor the provision, and promised that
any firewall could sit there — the false genericity the naming rule forbids.
registry runs Distribution, the OCI reference implementation, and provides
artifact-store. So registry was a third name for a thing that already had two,
which is how one word ended up meaning the module, the software and the concept
in the same paragraph.
The capability stays firewall, and correctly: a capability IS a functionality, so
a node having one and fail2ban requiring one are both right. Only the module
moves.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Over-corrected: taking the port out of listens as well as serves made the module
declare it listens on nothing, and the parser said so.
ADR 0038 splits it. A module names the port its own software listens on, because
that is a fact about the software and it knows it. The mesh assigns the
machine-side number, because only the mesh knows what else is on the machine, and
it is the mesh that fills the assigned number into serves so a consumer is told
one number rather than three that agree by luck.
So what was wrong was writing a port into serves, not into listens.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Written so the module system has something that proves itself rather than a claim
about what it supports, and guarded by a test in the catalogue's own suite so it
cannot quietly stop exercising things.
Nine of the host's eleven resource kinds, all three artifact kinds including the
one that compiles, all three ways a module's code can run, and all four things
that code can be: tools, an event consumer, a provisioner, and processes.
Two absences that are findings rather than gaps. `action` is refused to modules
outright — the link may not carry a command to run (ADR 0005), so a module that
needs something done ships a program that reconciles, which is what a run-once
process is. `service` puts an EXISTING unit into a state and installs none, which
is right for software shipping its own; code the mesh built has no unit until the
mesh writes one, and that is a process.
And it no longer picks its own port. ADR 0038 says a module cannot know what else
is on the machine it was assigned to, and names exactly the trap this fell into:
the number written three times — listens, serves, a container's ports — agreeing
only because one person wrote all three, with nothing checking. So it says what
it needs and the mesh assigns the number.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
A replayed build is registered exactly as any other and announced to nobody. A
module that moved months ago is not something anything should act on now:
emitting `upgraded` would have the control plane decide about a rollout, and
`rebuild-needed` would ask for builds of things already current.
Asked on every start rather than only the first, because a catalogue cannot tell
whether it has a gap — and the answer is idempotent, so asking when there is none
costs a message. Asked after subscribing, so a build arriving during the replay
is not lost between the two.
Closes novox/hq 04-ISSUES/050 with mesh-control.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Naming it from the binding was right and arrived too early. The moment the
machine had a name, the builder pushed to <node>.internal:5000 and the runtime
refused it: "http: server gave HTTP response to HTTPS client". The registry
serves plaintext, and anything that is not loopback is required to be HTTPS.
So there are two phases, and this is the first. Before the mesh has a certificate
authority of its own, loopback is the only trusted path that is honest — it is
trusted because it cannot leave the machine, not because anyone checked
anything. The mesh-reachable name belongs to the second phase, with TLS from the
mesh's own CA, and the binding expression returns then.
Not a revert of the reasoning: novox/hq issue 048 stays open and this is why. The
same one-line change lands again once a certificate module is running.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Its runtime is a tool host: it connects to the mesh's broker before it does
anything else. The module declares own-secrets.broker, and then its container
neither mounts that file nor names it, so the runtime started and said there was
no broker to reach, forever, in a restart loop.
lavinmq's runtime container does both, and is the shape this follows.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
The mesh refused to place it — two of its three containers named
mesh-runtime-lavinmq@sha256:000…0, "a placeholder digest, which is never a real
image". That refusal was right, and the belief behind the placeholder was that
lavinmq needs no building because its broker is an upstream image.
The broker is upstream. The module is not the broker. It carries a run-once
bootstrap that writes the broker's configuration before it first starts, a
provisioner that grants each consumer its own vhost and user, a set of tools and
an event consumer — all of it this module's own TypeScript, and none of it
producible by naming somebody else's image.
So it gets what every module with code of its own gets: a Dockerfile standing on
the shared toolchain and runtime bases, a build block naming them, and containers
that name the artifact rather than a digest nothing can produce. Same recipe as
postgres, which is the converted module closest in shape — it has a provisioner
too.
Noted and deliberately not changed: postgres runs its provisioner from its
container's args, and lavinmq's equivalent container names none, so on this
manifest the provisioner is never started. That may be why, or may be a second
fault; it is left alone so the next run says which.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
The builder's environment said MESH_REGISTRY=127.0.0.1:${bound:artifact-store:port}
— the port taken from the binding, the host pinned to loopback. So every artifact
the mesh builds was recorded under an address that means something only on the
machine holding the registry, and nothing else in the mesh could resolve it.
Loopback is correct for exactly one reader and the builder is not special: it
already requires artifact-store, and the binding states where the provider is on
the private network. It now uses both halves of what it was given.
Invisible with one machine, which is the only shape this had been proven in. The
registry module declares that every machine pulls from it and opens its port to
the mesh for that reason, so the reference it is handed has to be one a second
machine can use.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
The first module moved onto the new build process. It named a placeholder digest
nothing could produce, so it only ever worked where somebody had pre-built its
image by hand. It names the two shared bases instead, and the mesh builds it.
Chosen first deliberately: it requires nothing, nothing requires it, and an
audit trail of every event on the mesh is the thing most worth having while
modules are being moved one at a time.
Each named a digest produced inside a lab that no longer exists, so none of them
could be built anywhere else. They say which module they stand on now, and there
is deliberately no default — a build nobody told stops at the declaration rather
than at a reference that resolves to nothing.
A line in postgres's recipe and a one-line file in amqp-ping, both added to
move a commit and watch the mesh notice. The proofs worked; neither was meant
to stay. MESH_MODULE is set from the sealed credential at run time anyway, so
baking it in was dead weight as well as noise.
A comment changed in a build recipe is a new commit and a byte-identical image.
Comparing commits called every module standing on it stale, so the mesh would
have rebuilt itself entirely to arrive back exactly where it started — and
listed each dependent once per commit that had produced the same image.
The base was a digest typed in by hand, for an image nothing in the mesh could
produce — so the graph held edges pointing at it with no version on the far end,
and the one change that reaches every module at once could never be noticed.
It is a module now, and these edges resolve.
Build edges are discovered by building; requires and provides are stated by the
module about itself. Both belong in the graph and answer different questions —
and "what provides postgres-database" needed a sweep over every manifest, which
only something holding all of them can do.
The catalogue expected each edge to name a module and a commit. The builder
sends a pinned image reference — it cannot know which module produced it, that
is a fact about the graph. So every build that had been built on top of anything
was rejected, and only the modules built against nothing ever registered.
Versions now record what they published, and an edge resolves through that. An
edge to an artifact no module here produced is kept: it resolves by itself when
that module is registered, which is the ordinary case while a mesh fills in.
`run` imports an entrypoint without binding a broker — it exists for a step that
works offline and exits. Both the catalogue and amqp-ping subscribe on import,
so both died on the first on() with no broker bound.
The runtime base carries what every module needs, and a database driver is not
that. Installed into an empty directory because the module's package.json also
names the sdk, which lives in the base rather than on a registry.
Its provisioner container named an image nobody could produce — a zero digest
placeholder. It names an artifact instead, and the module says how to build it,
so the mesh can make the database provider the catalogue needs.
Its account is scoped from what it emits and consumes, and it declared neither —
which is why asking for a generic module account produced one that authenticated
and could do nothing, with the refusal surfacing a layer away as a permissions
error against a queue.
Declaring the announcement is not documentation here. It is what the permission
is derived from.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
A module's runtime image was assembled by a script copying the sdk and the tool
runtime out of neighbouring checkouts, so it could only be built on a workstation
that had them. That is why no module declared what it was made of and why
forty-seven point at a placeholder.
The tool runtime becomes an image a module's runtime is built FROM, published like
any other artifact. The module then builds from its own directory and that base —
one clone, which is what the builder can actually be asked for (novox/hq ADR 0069).
The dependency stops being a property of somebody's machine and becomes a build
edge, pinned to a digest the mesh's registry assigned.
The compiler is invoked by its real path rather than through node_modules/.bin:
those are symlinks to a launcher that requires its library relatively, and
resolving them while building the base leaves a launcher pointing at nothing.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
It links module-versions to each other and knows nothing about nodes; which
machine runs what stays the control plane's (novox/hq ADR 0070, 0072). Keeping
them apart is what lets the control plane carry on composing declarations while
this is down.
The builder announces what it built, this places it in the graph and announces
what that means, and the control plane hooks the meaning rather than the build
output. A rebuild producing the commit already current is registered and is not
an upgrade — announcing it would ripple outward forever through modules that did
not change.
Ordering is not computed. Modules stale and waiting on nothing that is itself
stale are announced as buildable; the rest stay stale and appear once whatever
they were waiting for is registered, so a chain and a diamond need no special
handling and nothing holds a plan.
Four tools over the graph: what this mesh holds, one module in full, what a
change to a module reaches, and what must be rebuilt and why. The edges are
derived from builds rather than declared, so they cannot drift from what the code
actually uses.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
A proof branch, not for main: the route-forwarding bed reads this module's literal
image and would break until the module is built.
The modelling is right regardless — the image is upstream, so the mesh should
mirror it once into its own registry and pin what that registry assigned, rather
than every machine fetching a reference somebody else can move.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
The code that turns a repository into artifacts already existed and is deliberately
something a machine runs as an ordinary module rather than something the control
plane does. There was no module for it, so it could never be placed and never ran —
which is why nothing in the catalogue could be produced.
It asks for a container runtime because it builds images, requires the artifact
store because it publishes into it, and claims one per machine. Its credential
folder is mounted rather than the file, since a file mount keeps pointing at the
old contents after the mesh writes new ones.
The store is reached on the machine's own loopback: the address in a binding is
where a machine sits on the private network, and the store has to be co-located
anyway because runtimes refuse a plain-HTTP registry anywhere else.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
The module said MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS=${machine:at}:5671, and that cannot work in either
direction.
At genesis it does not resolve at all. `at` is a machine's name on the PRIVATE network,
and the mesh only holds one for a node that has an overlay placement and resolves the
networking module — neither of which exists when the control plane is installed, which
is step 9 of ten, long before anything has been placed anywhere. mesh-control refuses a
${machine:} key it does not hold rather than writing the literal through, so the push
would have stopped with "this machine says name".
And afterwards it would be the wrong address anyway. This value is what every enrolment
token tells a joining node to dial. A machine that has not enrolled is not on the
overlay, so an overlay name is precisely the one thing it cannot reach.
It is the substrate's own fact — the address the broker advertises, decided by whoever
wrote the bundle, which the mesh did not make and cannot invent. So it arrives the way
the store connections beside it arrive: an own-secret the installer delivers with
`secret accept`, read out of the bundle it produced. mesh-bootstrap already does this for
every variable the module fills from a secret; this one simply joins them.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Its image is FROM scratch and runs as 65534. The host writes a sealed own-secret 0600,
owned by root, which is right — but the module then bind-mounted those three files into
the container and told the process to open them. It cannot:
$ docker run --rm -v <0600 root file>:/run/secrets/inventory:ro \
-e MESH_STORE_INVENTORY_FILE=/run/secrets/inventory mesh-control:development status
MESH_STORE_INVENTORY_FILE names /run/secrets/inventory ... and it cannot be read:
open /run/secrets/inventory: permission denied
Measured on a workstation, not reasoned about. Every other module in this catalogue gets
away with the same mount because its runtime container runs as root; this one does not,
and genesis (novox/hq ADR 0067) would have stopped at step 9 with a control-plane module
that starts and cannot open a context.
The connections go through the env file this module already has instead. That file is
mode 0600 and is read by the container runtime's client, which is root — the same reason
the broker's URL has always reached the process this way. It also sidesteps the inode
that a file bind mount pins (290be37, step-ca): --env-file is read afresh at create, and
restart-on names it.
The own-secrets stay exactly as they were, because the installer delivers the substrate's
real connection strings into them with `secret accept` before the first push — the mesh
did not make those credentials and cannot invent them.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A file bind mount tracks the inode. The host writes atomically — new file, rename
over — so the container keeps reading the file that was there when it started,
and a rotated or newly-delivered secret never reaches it. Mounting the parent
directory resolves the path on each open instead.
This is a known shape (hal KB troubleshooting/docker-bind-mounts), and it cost an
hour here before it was looked up: the CA crash-looped on a root key it had
already been given, because the container still held the inode from before the
key arrived.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The pinned digest named the arm64 manifest, so an x86 machine pulled it and the
container died with 'exec format error' on every restart. It never showed while
the lab ran its own registry: the harness pushed the WORKSTATION's copy, which
is amd64, and every machine then pulled that under a digest the registry had
just assigned. The registry was quietly correcting the architecture too.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Nine references across seven modules named ':latest'. ADR 0006 forbids it and
the host refuses it by name — and the refusal had never fired, because the lab
pushed every image into its own registry and rewrote each reference to the
digest it had just assigned. Deleting that registry made these the only
manifests the host would now reject (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/039).
The digests are what each tag resolves to today, read from the registry that
serves them.
This is a stopgap and should be said as one: a digest written into a repository
is wrong the moment anybody rebuilds, which is precisely why the design has the
repository name artifacts and the mesh hold digests. Until something builds and
publishes, a digest that is stale is still better than a tag that silently moves.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A route-label migration gave the registry a public name, and with it a
requirement. But the registry is the first module a new mesh installs: at that
moment nothing provides a route, so the push is refused and a mesh cannot get
its own image store — the cycle 04-ISSUES/029 closed, re-entered through a
different door.
The same rule that record states applies: a module providing the artifact store
cannot depend on what the store is needed to deliver. A public name for it is an
ordinary want and belongs to a module beside it, installed once there is a mesh
to install things.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
novox/hq ADR 0067 pivots genesis through a temporary control plane and then
reinstalls the control plane as an ordinary module pinned to a digest the mesh's
own registry assigned. That record notes the one thing missing: a control-plane
module manifest, which did not exist.
It could not be written honestly before now. The control plane read its store
connection from MESH_STORE_<CONTEXT>, that connection string carries a password,
and a manifest can put a sealed value into a file's `content` but has nothing
that substitutes into a container's `env`. So the manifest could carry the
password in the clear, or omit the setting. mesh-control now also accepts
MESH_STORE_<CONTEXT>_FILE, which is how every other module here is given secret
material, and the manifest follows.
What the substrate bundle gives the control-plane container today, and where
each part has gone:
MESH_STORE_INVENTORY own-secret `inventory`, mounted, named by _FILE
MESH_STORE_IDENTITY own-secret `identity`, mounted, named by _FILE
MESH_STORE_LICENCES own-secret `licences`, mounted, named by _FILE
MESH_BROKER_AMQP own-secret `broker`, through an env-file hole
MESH_BROKER_MANAGEMENT own-secret `broker-management`, likewise
MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS ${machine:at}:5671 in that same env-file
MESH_BROKER_CERTIFICATE plain env; the path is not a secret
network host, args ["serve"], the broker's TLS volume unchanged
The two broker URLs go through an env-file rather than a file of their own
because mesh-control has no MESH_BROKER_AMQP_FILE. That is the same fault one
layer over, and the same remedy would fix it; it is out of this change's scope
and is written down rather than papered over.
None of these values is in the manifest. Each is an own-secret the operator
supplies with `secret accept` — the mesh cannot invent a connection string — and
the container restarts when any of them changes.
The module claims `the-control-plane` at mesh scope, which the bundle has no way
to say: two control planes writing one inventory is a fault worth refusing at
assignment. It carries no `listens`, because `serve` dials the broker and binds
nothing. The image is the catalogue's placeholder digest for a mesh-built image,
which the installer replaces with what the registry assigned.
Checked with the real parser: all 67 manifests through catalogue.ParseManifest
and every module's CheckIdentity against all four node names — 0 problems — and
this manifest rendered through Resolution.Declaration, so the ${secret:…} names,
${machine:at}, the restart-on ids and the image pin are exercised rather than
merely parsed. Slug `control`: mesh_shanks_control is 19 of the 20 an S3 access
key keeps.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Its API certificate carried localhost only, so a proxy dialling the address the
mesh handed over refused it on hostname verification. The names now compose from
the machine the module was assigned to, which a manifest could not know and now
does not have to (mesh-control ${machine:...}).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The upstream `smallstep/step-ca` image runs as uid 1000. An own-secret lands as
a file the host writes root:root 0600 — the module says only a name and a path,
so there is nowhere to say who must be able to read it — and the container
crash-looped on `permission denied` reading its own root key. The lab got past
it first with `chmod 0644`, which hands the root key to every local user, and
then by running the CA as root, which is worse.
Neither is needed. A module composes its own files, and a `file` resource takes
both a `mode` and an `owner`, with `${secret:name}` reaching the module's own
secrets — the mechanism redis already uses to hand its password to a server
running as 999. So the three pieces of init material are declared as owned
files: still 0600, owned by 1000:1000, and those are what the container mounts.
The raw own-secret files stay where they were. Nothing mounts them now; they are
how the secret comes to exist on the machine, and the host is the only thing
that reads them. Same shape as redis's `default.secret`.
Verified against the real code rather than by inspection: mesh-control attaches
the sealed value to each of the three resources and keeps `owner` and `mode`
(`sealedFor` + `intoFile` over this manifest), and mesh-host parses `owner` on a
sealed-substituted file and lands it 0600 owned by 1000:1000 (`applyFile`).
An identity is `mesh_<node>_<slug-or-name>` and a backend keeps 20 characters
(an S3 access key). Overflow makes a module unresolvable, and this catalogue
was finding it one module at a time, on a raise: route-proxy on novox is 22,
home-assistant on ace is 23. Two found by hand where a sweep would have found
eighteen.
So the whole catalogue was swept instead, against the longest node name the
mesh actually has (`shanks`, six characters) rather than against the node each
module happens to sit on today — a module is assigned somewhere, and where is
not a property of the manifest. That leaves eight characters for the identity
source, and eighteen modules were over it.
Slugs added, chosen to stay greppable in a provider's user list:
anthropic-consumer claude openai-consumer openai
anthropic-manager anthmgr portainer portain
audit-logger audit public-acme pubacme
bookshelf books qbittorrent qbt
cloudflare-dns cfdns resolv-conf resolv
confluence confl resolved-split-dns splitdns
home-assistant hass route-proxy rproxy
invoicing invoice verdaccio verdacc
mosquitto mosq
nextcloud ncloud
A slug changes the login the mesh mints, so a module already provisioned under
its full name is re-minted under the slug and its old login withdrawn — which
is the provisioner's ordinary business, but it is a change, not a no-op.
Checked with the real parser: every one of the 66 manifests through
`catalogue.ParseManifest`, and every module's `CheckIdentity` against all four
node names. 0 problems, where the same check over the parent commit reports 44.
nextcloud's label was migrated from a wrong module-name default; its real
production hostname is drive.novox.be. novox.be is the bare-domain apex, now the
'@' label (composeName gained apex support).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Piece A + B of ADR 0056, completing the internal-CA work in ff01ada.
Selectable issuer. acme-ca is now a role two providers can satisfy: step-ca
(internal CA) or the new public-acme (a fact-only module, no container/listen)
that serves Let's Encrypt production. A mesh assigns one or the other to satisfy
route-proxy's `requires: acme-ca`.
One directory shape for both. A provider serves the ACME directory's parts the
way the mesh already models any reachable service -- an address (`at`), a `port`
and a `path` -- and route-proxy composes `https://<at>:<port><path>`. step-ca
lets the mesh fill `at` (its node) and `port` (its single listen) and serves only
`path`; public-acme, not being a mesh service, serves all three (overriding `at`
with the public host). Same composition either way.
Empty root means the system trust store. Both providers serve `root`: step-ca
the operator root PEM (settled per mesh), public-acme an empty string. route-proxy
writes it to the CA bundle file unconditionally; the binary now reads an empty
bundle as "the root is already trusted by the OS" and falls back to system roots
(examples/route-proxy/main.go, committed on the mesh-control ADR-0056 branch).
step-ca inits from the operator's root. The operator's root cert, root key and
root-key password are mounted at the smallstep entrypoint's default init paths
(/run/secrets/root_ca.crt, root_ca_key, root_ca_key_password) with the matching
DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_*_FILE vars, so `step ca init` adopts the operator's root
instead of self-generating one -- the CA that signs is the CA route-proxy trusts.
Route names are labels, not FQDNs. Every routed module now contributes a `label`
(the leftmost subdomain) instead of a full public hostname; the node's public
domain composes the name. Apex (novox.be) is left as a full name -- composeName
has no empty-label/apex convention yet (mesh-control follow-up).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Piece C of ADR 0056: an internal authority certifies routed names by the same
path a public one would, with the proxy pointed at whichever issuer the mesh
names and trusting that issuer's root.
step-ca (new): provides acme-ca (mesh scope), listens 9000 from mesh, persists
its CA home under uid 1000. The root CA cert reaches consumers as a served
value settled from a per-mesh operator setting (no baked root); the init
password and root key are sealed secrets, not literals. No route-name -> IP
hosts map (that is Piece B). Upstream smallstep/step-ca pinned by Docker Hub
digest.
route-proxy: requires + binds acme-ca. ACME_DIRECTORY is composed on the
consumer side from ${bound:acme-ca:at}:${bound:acme-ca:port}, and ACME_CA_BUNDLE
is a file whose content is ${bound:acme-ca:root} -- both from the binding,
replacing the hardcoded directory and the baked root PEM.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Add a `route` contribution (requires/contributes/binds) to every web app so
each gets a Host-routed public name via route-proxy, mirroring the
de-spiegel/only-office pattern:
- novox: gitea, keycloak, nextcloud, umami, invoicing, verdaccio, registry,
and mailu (single mail.novox.be -> 7080; admin/webmail/api ride that port).
- ace: grafana, sonarr, radarr, lidarr, bazarr, ombi, tautulli, jackett,
nodered, searxng, home-assistant, bookshelf, baserow.
Split photos so its three sites each get a name: photos keeps server +
admin-client (photos.novox.be), and new photos-eef (eef.novox.be) and
photos-filip (filip.novox.be) modules carry the client sites.
The production FQDN stays the literal default; a per-node .incus name is a
settings override applied where the mesh runs, not a manifest hardcoding.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
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