mesh/merge-gate head deb2020bd47d merged into trunk 5652a1494493 — pass: builds postgres, sent nowhere; no bus step; 2 wait(s) for a person; every machine …
mesh/repo-check head deb2020bd47d merged into trunk 5652a1494493 — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
mesh/merge-gate head 41cdd032084e merged into trunk 6268f8f94bda — pass: builds keycloak, postgres, sent nowhere; no bus step; 3 wait(s) for a person; ever…
mesh/repo-check head 41cdd032084e merged into trunk 6268f8f94bda — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
Only a moved consumer's plan names postgres, so on the moved path every
consumer still given by the controller's grant file was counted unasked
and offered for retirement (ace 5 of 5, novox 7 of 9), and could have
been retired unasked where the bound allowed. The moved path now reads
MESH_RECEIVES again: its logins are asked, the ones no plan names are
made and checked by the harness's grant pass until R1 (issue 682), and
an unreadable grant file retires nothing (issue 241). The harness's
grant pass becomes apply, identically in keycloak's copy.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds postgres, sent nowhere; no bus step; 2 wait(s) for a person; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 …
mesh_store_reader held pg_read_all_data, so every caller of mesh-store.query
and postgres_query could read every column the store holds: the signing key
nodes trust, sealed secrets, password hashes. The reader now holds no role;
each minute, on every database, its memberships are revoked and its grants
brought to what the consumer's contribution lists under readable, minus any
column or table whose name says it holds a secret. Before a statement runs,
the reader's own session is asked which secret columns it can read and the
statement is refused if any; a statement naming a known secret table is
refused before it is sent.
The hourly release of ADR 0229's brake still ended in the mesh acting alone on
a mistake. A consumer now stays active until the same unasked set holds for
five passes, waits for a person past three or half of those held, is disabled
and marked rather than withdrawn, comes back as it was when asked again, and is
deleted only through the provider's delete tool. The backend keeps the mark, so
a restart forgets nothing and finds what was withdrawn before.
A provider failed every consumer for a day and said so only in its journal
(hq issue 179). The provisioner loop now emits provisioner.failing after five
minutes without a success — create, check or secret — and repeats it every
fifteen; provisioner.recovered on the next success, on withdrawal, and on the
first success after a restart, so the controller can name it in status
(hq ADR 0224).
letta crash-loops on 'type "vector" does not exist': pgvector is not a
trusted extension, so only the provider's superuser can create it, and
the provisioner never did. A contribution may now name extensions; the
provider creates each (IF NOT EXISTS, available ones only) in the
consumer's database on every pass. Go per the standing rule for a
TypeScript module that changes. letta asks for vector.
lead-57
fix-cat-pas@novox
mesh-tools
jochen