mesh/merge-gate pass: builds docker, keycloak, minio, mosquitto → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; 2 wait(s) for a person; every machine composes with…
mosquitto passed the broker's admin password to mosquitto_ctrl as -P on
every docker exec, and the container runtime keeps every exec's command
line in its event stream, where docker_events returned it. The admin
credentials now reach mosquitto_ctrl as a 0600 options file fed on
stdin, client passwords at its own prompt, and an argv carrying a secret
is refused before it runs. The admin secret says it is taken at start:
the bootstrap re-runs when the mesh replaces it and re-keys the broker
online from the value it last applied, so it can be rotated.
docker_events redacts what an exec's command line carried, and
docker_secrets_in_events names such secrets by name. keycloak's repair
hands kcadm its passwords through KC_CLI_PASSWORD; minio gives mc its
root alias through MC_HOST_mesh.
The Dynamic Security plugin refuses to start the broker unless
dynamic-security.json already holds an admin client, and no reconcile loop
seeds it (novox/hq ADR 0052). Add a run-once init container, declared before
the server container, that runs mosquitto's own bootstrap entrypoint in the
runtime image: it seeds the store offline via mosquitto_ctrl and exits, and
the host gates the broker on its completion.
The bootstrap hands the seeded file to the broker's user (uid 1883, chown +
0600): the broker must read the seed at startup AND persist to it as clients
come and go, but the init container runs as root and would otherwise leave a
file the broker can neither read nor rewrite. This is the ownership question
ADR 0052 left for the lab to settle. It seeds only when the file is absent, so
what the running plugin grows is never clobbered (issue 035).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jochen
jschoubben