The file beside the token that kept its scopes went with C4, and with it
the re-mint of a token carrying a scope beyond the tools' (write:admin).
The value written through own-put now holds the token and its scopes; a
token minted with other scopes, or a value naming none, is minted again
unasked and the one it replaces deleted at the forge. The Go bundles read
the token out of that value. The lost test is back as a row of the scope
test in test/token.test.ts.
Builds: design 47 H2 §808; H-A-439
Two processes that minted at once left the forge two tokens by one name, and a token kept in a file in the
runtime state is a plain state. Both accounts' tokens (mesh-tools, mesh-packages) are now the module's own
secrets in the vault, written through the seat mesh-vault's own-put and read through its get, sealed to the
reading process's key. A refused or expired (token-ttl) token is minted again only by the holder of the lease
mint in the state token-lease (mint-lease); each mint is named <account>-<generation>, and the token it
replaces is deleted by id only after own-put landed. The Go bundles read their tokens through get at start
and at secret-changed; the MESH_GITEA_*_TOKEN_FILE words go. forge_token_lease reads the lease and each
token's age, never the token.
Builds: design 47 H2 §808, §822; H-A-407, H-A-422, H-A-426, H-A-430 (1)
A 401, 502, 503 or connection fault is judged by the forge's own
unauthenticated version read: the read failing, or naming the store
unavailable, answers the kind away with part and words, which every caller
reads as a transport fault; the read passing, a 401 (the fresh token refused
too) is the forge refusing the mesh's admin account, never worded as an
account to create.
Builds: design 47 H2 §776; H-A-350 DMC-2, H-A-354
Design 51 keeps each holder's write side as an own secret beside a read-only tool token. The Go
bundle wrote as the forge's administrator; it now reads with the tools' token (read:package added)
and writes with the mesh-packages account's token (write:package alone), which the watcher makes,
mints, keeps and renews.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JG73KJNrH5EgFXMKKYSrig
mesh/check pass 68dfca105794 on 3bec357968da | unit 4443 run, 0 kept, 15 skipped | integration 4483 run, 0 kept, 23 skipped | over bound: unit, integr…
The operator, 2026-10-23: "disable the gitea branch protection reset thing". setUpToolsAccount (run at every token mint) called ensureMainMerges regardless; it now does so only when the setting is true.
mesh/merge-gate head 48f0662fdea2 merged into trunk 5ce2d07c7f47 — pass: builds gitea → novox; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it di…
mesh/repo-check head 48f0662fdea2 merged into trunk 5ce2d07c7f47 — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
The tools' token reached everything the administrator may do, so their boundary rested on their own guards.
The gitea module now makes a plain account, mesh-tools, with the admin login, gives it write on code, issues
and pull requests of every novox repository through one team, and mints the tools' token for it; the admin's
old token goes only after the new one is kept. The Go forge bundle sends that token, never the admin login.
The forge shows protection rules only to a repository administrator, so every check reads a branch's
protection from the branch. mesh-admin stays a ready author, so marks made before the move keep counting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
mesh/merge-gate head d1debdcce816 merged into trunk 0e7d9e74d22a — pass: builds gitea → novox; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it di…
mesh/repo-check head d1debdcce816 merged into trunk 0e7d9e74d22a — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
The runtime starts the watcher and the tools as two processes over one kept
token. Both minted at once on 2026-10-14 and left two tokens named
mesh-tools; gitea refuses a delete by a name held twice, so every mint
failed and every forge tool with it. A replace now deletes each token by
the name by its id, from the account's whole list, and a mint holds a lock
file beside the kept token and reuses what another process minted.
gitea_api took any endpoint with a token minted for the forge's
administrator with write:admin: an agent could drop a branch's protection
or its required checks, set the merge check's status, write to main or
merge its own pull request (novox/hq ADR 0266 §7, the review of
2026-10-09). gitea_api now reads anything but the administration and
writes only what an author writes; protection is only strengthened; a
merge needs every required status a success and merges only that head; a
guarded repository is not deleted; and the token is minted without
write:admin, a kept one re-minted at the next start.
The forge's own users are the mesh's to settle — making the builder's login
a site admin so private repos build (hq 229) — and the tools' token had no
write:admin. A token kept from before a scope was added lacks it, so the
client now treats the forge's 403 "required scope" like a 401: the source
re-mints by name with the whole list and retries once. The fake forge in the
tests learns /repos/search, which the client has used since 2026-09-28 and
which had left 9 of the 11 token tests failing on main.
Deployed #49 and the watcher immediately broke: GET /user/repos answered 403,
'required=[read:user]' — confirmed live against the running forge (1.27.3).
That route sits under gitea's user scope category despite listing
repositories, not repository as assumed.
Also gives the fake forge real scope enforcement on /user/repos, which is
why the original PR's test suite didn't catch this: it only checked the
token's value was valid, never that it carried the required scope.
The runtime beside the forge served 0 tools: GiteaClient.fromEnv required a token
(settings or MESH_GITEA_TOKEN), nobody had one to give — the mesh raised the forge —
and putting one in settings would store a secret in plaintext in the inventory. So
the fifteen tools registered nothing and the watcher logged "not watching".
What the mesh does deliver is the admin account: a login the manifest names and a
password the vault minted and the host unsealed into a file (ADR 0086). That is
enough to mint a token, so the module does (hq issue 100, the forge's tools):
POST /users/{admin}/tokens over basic auth, scoped to write:repository and
write:issue — the least the tools and the repo watcher need — kept at 0600 in the
module's own state (/var/lib/mesh/gitea/state, a new directory resource the runtime
mounts writable), read back on the next start, and minted afresh when the forge
answers 401 to it or the kept file is gone. A forge whose data came from the
predecessor has no mesh-admin: that is reported in plain words on every poll until
it clears, once per reason, not crash-looped. A configured token still wins and is
never minted over.
The mint happens on the first call, not at registration: a contributor is
synchronous, and a forge not yet answering must not keep the runtime from serving.
One source per kept file in a process, or the watcher and the tools would each
renew on a 401 and drop the other's token by name.