8 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
mesh-tools	652b00b25b	Say on every directory how it treats files it does not know, and check it (issue 1024, ADR 0422) ... Every directory and archive resource carries `unknown`: move-out for a home folder whose program writes nothing there (the node-engine, delivered in mesh-host #117, moves the rest to ~/.local/state/mesh-moved/<module>/ with a list), module for ~/.ssh and ~/.claude, program elsewhere; `knows` keeps what a program or the operator relies on (powerlevel10k's compiled files, i3's scripts and the asus/g14 drop-ins, dunst's slack rule, betterbird's records, node-env's forge credential, issue 1033). Two shared folders are no longer declared. Each module's README says it. checks/owned holds every manifest to it; checks/sshdir stays while main's merge check runs it (issue 1035). Tests that pin a manifest follow the new key only. Reviewed in three rounds.	2026-10-17 16:23:03 +00:00
jochen	26f9c6e10d	nfs-server: one test per guard (each stray guard, the failed-reload retry, the empty data list, the walk's stop, a stopping pass); say that a start drops hand-made exports and that unknown backup paths are a deliberate warning (review of #142)	2026-10-09 14:45:03 +02:00
jochen	7320d99a11	Make nfs-server reconcile the kernel's exports with its file, so a failed reload or a withdrawn grant is not left exported while the module says it is healthy; warn on a stale or unknown backup list	2026-10-09 14:43:32 +02:00
jochen	72a6d062dc	Let SIGTERM cancel a running pass and bound nfs-server's clean-up at 10 s, so a hanging command cannot keep the export file past the stop timeout	2026-10-09 14:43:32 +02:00
jochen	87d6a5549c	Check every share against where the backup seat keeps its data on every pass, so the hour a clean look is believed cannot hide a new repository	2026-10-09 14:43:32 +02:00
jochen	29ac6ee16a	Say that the modules' own checks are the only line before root, since sudo grants the account everything	2026-10-08 20:21:28 +02:00
jochen	8738c02d00	nfs-server: export a share only to the nodes granted and wanting it, and never root's, a symlinked or nested backup, or an unmounted dataset ... The review of #136 found a share could squash every client to root, be judged at a symlink's name rather than its folder, sit inside or above a backup repository deeper than one level, export an unmounted dataset's empty folder, go to every address in the private network's range, and stay exported after the module left. Each is now refused or closed, with a test that reproduced it first: - a folder owned by uid or gid 0 is refused; - the path is resolved through symlinks and every check runs on the real folder, which the export line names; - a share inside a backup repository (any parent) or holding one within four levels is refused, and a look cut short by its bound refuses; - every line carries mp, or mp=<its filesystem's mount point>; - a share goes only to the nodes this machine's grants setting names and whose mounts module wants it on the bus, at the lower access, at the roster's address inside the range; nothing without wants; - the process is declared before its config, so on unassignment it finds the config gone, removes its export file and lets the shares go; - confirm accepts the seat's string "true".	2026-10-08 20:20:05 +02:00
jochen	48fba44471	Add the nfs-server module: a node shares a folder with the mesh's machines only, every client mapped to the folder's owner (hq ADR 0263)	2026-10-08 18:36:01 +02:00