mesh/check pass a9d96b30be8d on 69056948bfa8 | unit 1639 run, 4201 kept, 46 skipped | integration 1674 run, 4215 kept, 47 skipped | over bound: unit, …
A watch that failed partway kept what it had taken; begun again, the runtime does not hand a key deleted meanwhile, so
a removed assignment read as standing and credentialRefusal could hand a consumer credential to a node no longer
running its module. Each attempt now begins from nothing held, and a late delivery to an older attempt changes nothing.
A 'not on the node' refusal is confirmed by a direct read first, since a watched mirror can be behind.
Seed-9's probe (13:31-13:36Z): novox's own of 57 secrets and 146 credentials took 26 s, past the node-engine's 15 s,
and ace and novox refused their whole shadow answer. own read the controller's assignment over the bus once per secret
and per credential (203 reads), read every record of every node, and synced the hand-out record once per value, under
the one lock every node's answers share.
Now the vault watches the assignments mirror (a watch, never a poll) and reads it from memory once caught up, over the
bus until then; one answer reads each module's assignment once; only own/<node>/ records are read; and every hand-out
of one answer is recorded in one synced write, none handed when it cannot be.
Quick fix weighed: a longer bound in the node-engine (VaultWithin). Thorough fix chosen: the cost grows with every
module and every node, and the lock is shared by every shadow answer and every apply.
move-in never replaces a value the vault holds, so where the controller made an own secret anew after the move, the
new value runs while the vault keeps the first. The verb own-take-running takes it from the node-engine of the machine
it is for, keeps the replaced value as the previous generation, raises the generation and says own-replaced without a
value; own_drift lists every own secret a node's shadow answer says another value of, mesh-wide. The module needs the
mesh-sdk head of fix/1126-seed-same-own-resync (delivery.OwnValuesDiffer, the seat's verb).
mesh/check checking 851e8782d569 on da29f77b1081 | novox/mesh-catalog#505 in group feat/1126-nodes-compose
One commit for the branch feat/1126-nodes-compose of mesh-catalog: its 15 commits squashed so its history does not carry two compiled programs committed by mistake and removed later, mesh-config (5.5 MB) and checks/placement (6.2 MB) (issue 1577). The tree equals the former head 2db56067. The operator allowed this rewrite of the feature branch on 2026-10-26.
take-over waits on a hash for every user of the loaded list, and the vault holds no value for the controller's own
account, the node accounts and the enrolled devices. The bus node's engine now hands every loaded user's hash in the
bus module's have, sealed to the vault's key (mesh-host and mesh-sdk on the same branch). The vault answers its key in
node-key, reads the haves (manifest reads node-engine.have, granted from the manifest, no controller change), watches
the bus module's have, opens the handing with its own key, and writes each user it holds no value for into
bus-accounts marked adopted, with the list and node it came from, saying account-hashed. It never touches a user whose
covered account it holds or whose key is its own hash, writes an adopted key again only for another hash, and refuses
a handing from any node the assignments do not name as holding the bus module.
Tools: account_adopt adopts now from the have as the watch does; secret_own, unnarrowed by module, lists the adopted
accounts and the last adoption.
mesh/check pass e7aaa8420eac on 3ded9e780043 | unit 2018 run, 2325 kept, 5 skipped | integration 2040 run, 2344 kept, 9 skipped | over bound: unit, in…
The runtime refuses a state field whose name ends in secret, so no bus-account hash could be written on novox. The test state now applies the same check.
Issue: 1945
mesh/check failed: integration: meshbuildnode/cmd/mesh-build-node.TestAFixtureBundleBuiltTwiceHasOneDigest: no toolchain of this lock is installed und…
The controller hands each process account of a core or moved module with origin issued (ADR 0436 §2); the vault took
only broker and provisioner-broker, refused these and never hashed them. Owed hashes are now said once per pass, and
account_hash says who asked when it refuses too (review round 1).
Issue: 1945
The controller still mints each covered account and hands it to the vault (ADR 0374); ADR 0547 clause 9 has the vault
write the bcrypt hash of what it holds into its own state, readable by the grants part, and say account-hashed. It
hashes on keep, at start every held account with no key of its generation, and again by hand (account_hash); a refused
write is owed and written at the next pass. secret_own says per bus account whether this generation's hash is written.
Issue: 1945