The upstream `smallstep/step-ca` image runs as uid 1000. An own-secret lands as
a file the host writes root:root 0600 — the module says only a name and a path,
so there is nowhere to say who must be able to read it — and the container
crash-looped on `permission denied` reading its own root key. The lab got past
it first with `chmod 0644`, which hands the root key to every local user, and
then by running the CA as root, which is worse.
Neither is needed. A module composes its own files, and a `file` resource takes
both a `mode` and an `owner`, with `${secret:name}` reaching the module's own
secrets — the mechanism redis already uses to hand its password to a server
running as 999. So the three pieces of init material are declared as owned
files: still 0600, owned by 1000:1000, and those are what the container mounts.
The raw own-secret files stay where they were. Nothing mounts them now; they are
how the secret comes to exist on the machine, and the host is the only thing
that reads them. Same shape as redis's `default.secret`.
Verified against the real code rather than by inspection: mesh-control attaches
the sealed value to each of the three resources and keeps `owner` and `mode`
(`sealedFor` + `intoFile` over this manifest), and mesh-host parses `owner` on a
sealed-substituted file and lands it 0600 owned by 1000:1000 (`applyFile`).
Piece A + B of ADR 0056, completing the internal-CA work in ff01ada.
Selectable issuer. acme-ca is now a role two providers can satisfy: step-ca
(internal CA) or the new public-acme (a fact-only module, no container/listen)
that serves Let's Encrypt production. A mesh assigns one or the other to satisfy
route-proxy's `requires: acme-ca`.
One directory shape for both. A provider serves the ACME directory's parts the
way the mesh already models any reachable service -- an address (`at`), a `port`
and a `path` -- and route-proxy composes `https://<at>:<port><path>`. step-ca
lets the mesh fill `at` (its node) and `port` (its single listen) and serves only
`path`; public-acme, not being a mesh service, serves all three (overriding `at`
with the public host). Same composition either way.
Empty root means the system trust store. Both providers serve `root`: step-ca
the operator root PEM (settled per mesh), public-acme an empty string. route-proxy
writes it to the CA bundle file unconditionally; the binary now reads an empty
bundle as "the root is already trusted by the OS" and falls back to system roots
(examples/route-proxy/main.go, committed on the mesh-control ADR-0056 branch).
step-ca inits from the operator's root. The operator's root cert, root key and
root-key password are mounted at the smallstep entrypoint's default init paths
(/run/secrets/root_ca.crt, root_ca_key, root_ca_key_password) with the matching
DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_*_FILE vars, so `step ca init` adopts the operator's root
instead of self-generating one -- the CA that signs is the CA route-proxy trusts.
Route names are labels, not FQDNs. Every routed module now contributes a `label`
(the leftmost subdomain) instead of a full public hostname; the node's public
domain composes the name. Apex (novox.be) is left as a full name -- composeName
has no empty-label/apex convention yet (mesh-control follow-up).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Piece C of ADR 0056: an internal authority certifies routed names by the same
path a public one would, with the proxy pointed at whichever issuer the mesh
names and trusting that issuer's root.
step-ca (new): provides acme-ca (mesh scope), listens 9000 from mesh, persists
its CA home under uid 1000. The root CA cert reaches consumers as a served
value settled from a per-mesh operator setting (no baked root); the init
password and root key are sealed secrets, not literals. No route-name -> IP
hosts map (that is Piece B). Upstream smallstep/step-ca pinned by Docker Hub
digest.
route-proxy: requires + binds acme-ca. ACME_DIRECTORY is composed on the
consumer side from ${bound:acme-ca:at}:${bound:acme-ca:port}, and ACME_CA_BUNDLE
is a file whose content is ${bound:acme-ca:root} -- both from the binding,
replacing the hardcoded directory and the baked root PEM.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jschoubben