The 21 media/home modules, the SaaS tool modules (cloudflare-dns,
confluence, gitlab, jira), model-usage, and the model-access trio get
the same Dockerfile + build section as batch 1. Scheduled-only modules
(anthropic-consumer, anthropic-manager, openai-consumer) deliberately
declare no MESH_TOOL_MODULES — every container of theirs names its
command. mosquitto's run-once bootstrap container builds from the same
artifact. Modules with third-party deps (model-usage: pg;
anthropic-manager: tweetnacl) install them beside their compiled code.
Also fixes cloudflare-dns's package.json, unparseable since its
description lost a closing quote.
Deliberately still without build sections: builder and mesh-controller
(the foundation builds them by its own path), distribution (provides
the artifact store — building it through itself is refused by design),
route-proxy (cross-repo build context, deferred), and the
upstream-image-only modules, which have no code to build.
An identity is `mesh_<node>_<slug-or-name>` and a backend keeps 20 characters
(an S3 access key). Overflow makes a module unresolvable, and this catalogue
was finding it one module at a time, on a raise: route-proxy on novox is 22,
home-assistant on ace is 23. Two found by hand where a sweep would have found
eighteen.
So the whole catalogue was swept instead, against the longest node name the
mesh actually has (`shanks`, six characters) rather than against the node each
module happens to sit on today — a module is assigned somewhere, and where is
not a property of the manifest. That leaves eight characters for the identity
source, and eighteen modules were over it.
Slugs added, chosen to stay greppable in a provider's user list:
anthropic-consumer claude openai-consumer openai
anthropic-manager anthmgr portainer portain
audit-logger audit public-acme pubacme
bookshelf books qbittorrent qbt
cloudflare-dns cfdns resolv-conf resolv
confluence confl resolved-split-dns splitdns
home-assistant hass route-proxy rproxy
invoicing invoice verdaccio verdacc
mosquitto mosq
nextcloud ncloud
A slug changes the login the mesh mints, so a module already provisioned under
its full name is re-minted under the slug and its old login withdrawn — which
is the provisioner's ordinary business, but it is a change, not a no-op.
Checked with the real parser: every one of the 66 manifests through
`catalogue.ParseManifest`, and every module's `CheckIdentity` against all four
node names. 0 problems, where the same check over the parent commit reports 44.
The manager module drops its bespoke ECIES at-rest envelope and the node-private-key mount.
A module is never given a node's private key, so it cannot open an envelope -- the refresh
token is now delivered to it as cleartext by the host, unsealed from an ordinary sealed box.
- sealedbox.ts: a dependency-free NaCl crypto_box_seal (node:crypto for X25519, transcribed
XSalsa20-Poly1305 and BLAKE2b-24), byte-compatible with Go's box.SealAnonymous. It SEALS
only -- opening is the host's job. Proven by a cross-language test in mesh-control.
- adopt: reads the node's PUBLIC key from the delivered bound facts and seals the operator's
refresh token to it, handing out only the box.
- refresh: reads the refresh token as cleartext the host mounted, calls the vendor, re-seals
a rotated token to the node's public key, submits only { access token, box }.
- module.json: a model-access holder now -- binds the facts, binds the refresh token as a
sealed secret; no keys dir, no MESH_NODE_SEALING_* mount.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Phase C of vendor-agnostic model-access (ADR 0050/0054). Two TypeScript
runtime modules:
- anthropic-manager: the refresh token is sealed at rest to the manager
node's own key (atrest.ts, envelope encryption over X25519) and opened
ONLY on the manager node. adopt seals the first envelope; refresh opens
it, calls the Anthropic OAuth token endpoint, re-seals a rotated refresh
token, and hands the control plane only the access token plus the opaque
envelope. Also polls licence-grain usage (ADR 0054).
- anthropic-consumer: writes the delivered access token to
~/.claude/.credentials.json, access-token-only, atomically (the refresh
token is never delivered); reports session-grain usage from the CLI
transcripts; a fail-closed identity guard (expected-uuid plumbing is a
flagged TODO).
Both run as scheduled containers (ADR 0053). Pure logic covered by
node --test fixtures (at-rest round-trip, credential strip, transcript
sum, refresh merge).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jschoubben