Fixes issue 238 (the mesh banned its own operator's address for four weeks), per hq ADR 0339 (accepted 2026-10-13), which extends ADR 0186 and narrows ADR 0179 §4.
What
§1 the setting. The mesh-wide setting own-addresses (a list, or one line of addresses and ranges, both families) reaches each machine as the mergeable file /etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json, whose own content is {"own-addresses": []}. So the module composes while the setting is unset: a ${setting:own-addresses} would have left fail2ban out of every machine until the operator gave a value, since ADR 0262 gives an operator's value no default. The file is trusted, which makes the key a terminal key: it is set only at the controller's terminal, and an agent cannot widen what every jail spares.
§2 every jail ignores them. The base ignoreip in jail.local gains file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses. fail2ban 1.1 (FileIPAddrSet; checked present on novox) reloads that file within a second of a change, so a new value needs no restart. The new process watch (fail2ban-tools watch, as root) writes the entries there, one per line, by rename. The file is declared create-once and empty, so it exists before the daemon first reads it. Every look, the watch asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names it. A jail that sets its own ignoreip would leave it out, and is said.
§3 ban refuses them.node-intrusion-prevention.ban refuses an address on own-addresses, or on any entry of the jail's live ignore list (the ADR 0186 ranges). The refusal names the entry the address lies on, and nothing reaches the daemon. fail2ban's banip bans whatever it is given, ignore list or not. An unreadable setting also refuses the ban (fail closed).
§4 a warning. The watch follows /var/log/fail2ban.log (rotation, half-written lines and a restart that rereads the last day are all handled) for [<jail>] Ignore <address> by file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses. That is the daemon's own line for a failure the list spared; the private ranges log by ip and are not counted. It keeps each failure for a day. The new tool fail2ban_health is the watch's health (kind tool, 60s, 2 looks). While a jail ignored a failure from one of the operator's own addresses in the last day it answers not healthy: "the jail gitea counted 40 failure(s) from 203.0.113.5, one of the operator's own addresses, in the last day, the last at …, and banned none". The controller raises that as fail2ban's warning condition on that node, which clears a day after the last failure. It also says a stopped watch, a jail missing the list and a setting entry that is not an address. No controller change is needed: a module resource's unhealthy state is already a warning naming the module and node, with the tool's words.
run (fail2ban.service) gains health: unit, which is also the other kind ADR 0240 rule 2 asks beside a tool check. health-undeclared falls from 67 to 66.
§5 (deriving node uplinks) is left to issue 572, as the record says.
Design limits I chose: the watch looks every 30s and remembers at most 10000 failures per jail and address (the count then says "at least"). The health calls the watch stopped after 3 minutes without a look.
Tests (own_test.go, plus the updated ban and tool-list tests in client_test.go). They do not compile against main's code (undefined ReadOwn, ParseOwn, Watcher, ReadHealth…), and the manifest test fails on main's module.json (no file: entry, no setting file, no watch).
The setting as a list or a line, a bad entry left out and said, a missing file read as no entry, a broken one read as an error.
Ban refuses the home address, an address in an own range, 192.168.1.1 and an address in the mesh range, and the daemon is never asked to set. An unreadable setting refuses too.
The 2026-10-04 loop: 40 ignored failures from the home address said as one jail, one address and a count of 40. A half-written line is not counted. A restarted watch still knows the last day. It clears one day after the last failure. A private address ignored by ip is not counted.
A jail lacking the list, a bad entry, a stopped watch and no watch at all are each not healthy.
The manifest: one base ignoreip ending in the file: entry, no other resource setting ignoreip, the setting file mergeable/trusted/taking only own-addresses from [], the list create-once, and the watch as root with its tool health.
MESH_GATE=<controller built from mesh-controller main 1826b68> MESH_CHECK_MODULES=fail2ban sh merge-check.sh: exit 0 (words, agent-home, secrets, paths, module check fail2ban: ok … ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s, 66 as kept, go test -race).
Reviewers' checklist
The acceptance, end to end after delivery: with own-addresses set at the controller's terminal, fail2ban_settings for every jail on every node lists file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses; fail2ban_health is healthy; a ban of that address answers refused.
No hand workaround: nothing is banned or unbanned live, and the ban list is still never written by the mesh.
Manifest consistent: the setting is a terminal key, and the list file is placed only by this module.
After merge, for the operator: set the home address at the controller's terminal: mesh-controller settings set fail2ban '{"own-addresses": ["<home uplink>"]}' (mesh layer). Until then the list is empty and nothing changes in what is banned. It raises no notification unless a jail ignores a failure from that address.
Fixes issue 238 (the mesh banned its own operator's address for four weeks), per hq ADR 0339 (accepted 2026-10-13), which extends ADR 0186 and narrows ADR 0179 §4.
**What**
- **§1 the setting.** The mesh-wide setting `own-addresses` (a list, or one line of addresses and ranges, both families) reaches each machine as the mergeable file `/etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json`, whose own content is `{"own-addresses": []}`. So the module composes while the setting is unset: a `${setting:own-addresses}` would have left fail2ban out of every machine until the operator gave a value, since ADR 0262 gives an operator's value no default. The file is `trusted`, which makes the key a terminal key: it is set only at the controller's terminal, and an agent cannot widen what every jail spares.
- **§2 every jail ignores them.** The base `ignoreip` in jail.local gains `file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses`. fail2ban 1.1 (FileIPAddrSet; checked present on novox) reloads that file within a second of a change, so a new value needs no restart. The new process `watch` (`fail2ban-tools watch`, as root) writes the entries there, one per line, by rename. The file is declared `create-once` and empty, so it exists before the daemon first reads it. Every look, the watch asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names it. A jail that sets its own ignoreip would leave it out, and is said.
- **§3 ban refuses them.** `node-intrusion-prevention.ban` refuses an address on `own-addresses`, or on any entry of the jail's live ignore list (the ADR 0186 ranges). The refusal names the entry the address lies on, and nothing reaches the daemon. fail2ban's `banip` bans whatever it is given, ignore list or not. An unreadable setting also refuses the ban (fail closed).
- **§4 a warning.** The watch follows `/var/log/fail2ban.log` (rotation, half-written lines and a restart that rereads the last day are all handled) for `[<jail>] Ignore <address> by file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses`. That is the daemon's own line for a failure the list spared; the private ranges log `by ip` and are not counted. It keeps each failure for a day. The new tool `fail2ban_health` is the watch's `health` (kind tool, 60s, 2 looks). While a jail ignored a failure from one of the operator's own addresses in the last day it answers not healthy: "the jail gitea counted 40 failure(s) from 203.0.113.5, one of the operator's own addresses, in the last day, the last at …, and banned none". The controller raises that as fail2ban's warning condition on that node, which clears a day after the last failure. It also says a stopped watch, a jail missing the list and a setting entry that is not an address. **No controller change is needed:** a module resource's unhealthy state is already a warning naming the module and node, with the tool's words.
- `run` (fail2ban.service) gains `health: unit`, which is also the other kind ADR 0240 rule 2 asks beside a tool check. health-undeclared falls from 67 to 66.
- §5 (deriving node uplinks) is left to issue 572, as the record says.
**Design limits I chose:** the watch looks every 30s and remembers at most 10000 failures per jail and address (the count then says "at least"). The health calls the watch stopped after 3 minutes without a look.
**Tests** (`own_test.go`, plus the updated ban and tool-list tests in `client_test.go`). They do not compile against main's code (undefined ReadOwn, ParseOwn, Watcher, ReadHealth…), and the manifest test fails on main's module.json (no `file:` entry, no setting file, no watch).
- The setting as a list or a line, a bad entry left out and said, a missing file read as no entry, a broken one read as an error.
- Ban refuses the home address, an address in an own range, 192.168.1.1 and an address in the mesh range, and the daemon is never asked to set. An unreadable setting refuses too.
- The 2026-10-04 loop: 40 ignored failures from the home address said as one jail, one address and a count of 40. A half-written line is not counted. A restarted watch still knows the last day. It clears one day after the last failure. A private address ignored `by ip` is not counted.
- A jail lacking the list, a bad entry, a stopped watch and no watch at all are each not healthy.
- The manifest: one base ignoreip ending in the `file:` entry, no other resource setting ignoreip, the setting file mergeable/trusted/taking only `own-addresses` from `[]`, the list create-once, and the watch as root with its tool health.
`MESH_GATE=<controller built from mesh-controller main 1826b68> MESH_CHECK_MODULES=fail2ban sh merge-check.sh`: exit 0 (words, agent-home, secrets, paths, module check `fail2ban: ok … ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s`, 66 as kept, `go test -race`).
**Reviewers' checklist**
- The acceptance, end to end after delivery: with `own-addresses` set at the controller's terminal, `fail2ban_settings` for every jail on every node lists `file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses`; `fail2ban_health` is healthy; a `ban` of that address answers refused.
- No hand workaround: nothing is banned or unbanned live, and the ban list is still never written by the mesh.
- Manifest consistent: the setting is a terminal key, and the list file is placed only by this module.
**After merge, for the operator:** set the home address at the controller's terminal: `mesh-controller settings set fail2ban '{"own-addresses": ["<home uplink>"]}'` (mesh layer). Until then the list is empty and nothing changes in what is banned. It raises no notification unless a jail ignores a failure from that address.
mesh/merge-gate head 93d58f3740a0 merged into trunk 5cd608ba8898 — pass: builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wit…
mesh/repo-check head 93d58f3740a0 merged into trunk 5cd608ba8898 — pass: its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-…
mesh/delivery covered after its failure: a later walk that contains it was delivered: plan-1791883115921573192 (novox/mesh-catalog at 45d01e77 into main,…
An agent polling the forge from the operator's home got that home banned for a day and then four
weeks, and nothing in the house reached the control-node. Every jail spared only private ranges.
The mesh-wide setting own-addresses reaches the machine as a mergeable file whose own content is
the empty list, so the module composes while it is unset. A new watch process (root) writes its
entries into a list every jail's base ignoreip names as file:, which fail2ban reloads without a
restart; it checks every jail names that list and keeps each failure a jail ignored because of it
for a day. The new fail2ban_health tool judges the watch, so the controller raises a warning
naming node, jail, address and count. The ban verb refuses an address on the setting or on the
jail's ignore list before the daemon is asked.
Deliverynovox/mesh-catalog@93d58f3740a0 — failed since 2026-10-13T09:18:14Z
Covered: covered after its failure: a later walk that contains it was delivered: plan-1791883115921573192 (novox/mesh-catalog at 45d01e77 into main, done, contains its merge f35b0675)
Delivery plan — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
tier 0: fail2ban
ace: receives fail2ban
g14: receives fail2ban
novox: receives fail2ban
shanks: receives fail2ban
grants step: if this changes what the bus's user list says (a new tool, subject or user), novox is sent that list alone, every build there kept, before fail2ban is judged on its first machine
Machines
fail2ban on ace: rolled-back — not healthy within 10m0s of its apply: raised since it was sent: module.fail2ban.ace.unhealthy — fail2ban on ace is not healthy: its process fail2ban.watch fails its tool check
Transitions
2026-10-13 08:55 (new) → proposed (announced): novox/mesh-catalog#266's head announced
2026-10-13 08:57 proposed → checked (checked): a verdict names this commit and the trunk's head as its trunk commit
2026-10-13 08:57 checked → ready (accepted): the gate passed or warned, and the repository's own check did not fail
2026-10-13 09:05 ready → published (merged): on the trunk its modules follow: merged there, and its walk opened — or nothing for a walk to move
2026-10-13 09:06 published → delivering (go): its walk started: let go by this owner in its group's order, by a person, or on the controller's own path — not a failed walk that carried a later commit for it, after which it waits for a walk of its own commit
2026-10-13 09:18 delivering → failed (failed): its walk failed, carrying its own commit: a gate on a first machine (what it carried put back), a build, a machine
The commit's note under refs/notes/mesh-plan keeps every transition: git log --notes=mesh-plan.
<!-- mesh-delivery:view -->
**Delivery** `novox/mesh-catalog@93d58f3740a0` — **failed** since 2026-10-13T09:18:14Z
**Covered**: covered after its failure: a later walk that contains it was delivered: plan-1791883115921573192 (novox/mesh-catalog at 45d01e77 into main, done, contains its merge f35b0675)
**Delivery plan** — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
- tier 0: fail2ban
- ace: receives fail2ban
- g14: receives fail2ban
- novox: receives fail2ban
- shanks: receives fail2ban
- grants step: if this changes what the bus's user list says (a new tool, subject or user), novox is sent that list alone, every build there kept, before fail2ban is judged on its first machine
**Machines**
- fail2ban on ace: rolled-back — not healthy within 10m0s of its apply: raised since it was sent: module.fail2ban.ace.unhealthy — fail2ban on ace is not healthy: its process fail2ban.watch fails its tool check
**Transitions**
- 2026-10-13 08:55 (new) → proposed (announced): novox/mesh-catalog#266's head announced
- 2026-10-13 08:57 proposed → checked (checked): a verdict names this commit and the trunk's head as its trunk commit
- 2026-10-13 08:57 checked → ready (accepted): the gate passed or warned, and the repository's own check did not fail
- 2026-10-13 09:05 ready → published (merged): on the trunk its modules follow: merged there, and its walk opened — or nothing for a walk to move
- 2026-10-13 09:06 published → delivering (go): its walk started: let go by this owner in its group's order, by a person, or on the controller's own path — not a failed walk that carried a later commit for it, after which it waits for a walk of its own commit
- 2026-10-13 09:18 delivering → failed (failed): its walk failed, carrying its own commit: a gate on a first machine (what it carried put back), a build, a machine
The commit's note under `refs/notes/mesh-plan` keeps every transition: `git log --notes=mesh-plan`.
Merge check at 93d58f37
Judged: head 93d58f3740a0 merged into trunk 5cd608ba8898; read beside it: mesh-controller 1826b68a22b5, mesh-controller-main 1826b68a22b5, mesh-host 7a41e120635b, mesh-tools 954e1a53eef9
mesh/merge-gate: PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)
mesh/repo-check: PASS — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)
Delivery plan — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
tier 0: fail2ban
ace: receives fail2ban
g14: receives fail2ban
novox: receives fail2ban
shanks: receives fail2ban
grants step: if this changes what the bus's user list says (a new tool, subject or user), novox is sent that list alone, every build there kept, before fail2ban is judged on its first machine
read by no module's build: health-undeclared
Run by the build seat on ace as build-1791881726825149083 (builds --log build-1791881726825149083).
--- the gate: fail2ban
fail2ban: ok, 2 tool(s), ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s
long-running resources without health: 0
files asking for a setting without saying whether it is trusted: 0
1 manifest(s) checked. Judged against the seats this binary carries; a claim on one of the mesh's own seats is judged fully at registration, and a seat declared by a module not given here reads as unknown. Identities judged on a 6-character machine name, against the bounds of the providers given here
judging 1 module(s) changed against 4 machine(s), as the snapshot of 2026-10-13T08:39:10Z says they run
composing every machine as the mesh is
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
composing every machine with the change
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
merge gate: PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
judged by controller development build against the facts of 2026-10-13T08:39:10Z
modules the change moves:
- fail2ban (changed)
machines:
- a machine (f35): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- holds mesh-dns-resolver (idt): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- holds git, holds mesh-artifact-store, holds mesh-broker, holds mesh-catalog, holds mesh-delivery, holds mesh-dns-resolver, holds mesh-store, holds mesh-vault, holds npm-package-registry, the control node, the hub (ygcyr): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- a machine (yvbpsm): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
a merge would rebuild 1 module(s) in 1 tier(s): fail2ban
notes:
- health-undeclared read by no module's build, and rebuild nothing (issue 280)
--- its merge-check.sh (go toolchain)
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/words 0.002s
words: 12 retired words and 70 daemons' lines, none in the 46216 strings of 714 files
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/agenthome 0.011s
agent-home: no archive and no file written into under the agent's home
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/secrets 0.011s
secrets: no setting can replace a vault secret in a mergeable file (1 known, nested)
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/paths 0.006s
paths: no module names another's state on its machine (3 known, listed to go)
long-running resources without health: 66, as kept
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/deps 0.203s
testing modules/fail2ban
ok fail2ban/cmd/fail2ban-tools 1.028s
--- its merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript toolchain)
**Merge check** at `93d58f37`
Judged: head `93d58f3740a0` merged into trunk `5cd608ba8898`; read beside it: mesh-controller `1826b68a22b5`, mesh-controller-main `1826b68a22b5`, mesh-host `7a41e120635b`, mesh-tools `954e1a53eef9`
- `mesh/merge-gate`: **PASS** — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)
- `mesh/repo-check`: **PASS** — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)
**Delivery plan** — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
- tier 0: fail2ban
- ace: receives fail2ban
- g14: receives fail2ban
- novox: receives fail2ban
- shanks: receives fail2ban
- grants step: if this changes what the bus's user list says (a new tool, subject or user), novox is sent that list alone, every build there kept, before fail2ban is judged on its first machine
- read by no module's build: health-undeclared
Run by the build seat on ace as `build-1791881726825149083` (`builds --log build-1791881726825149083`).
```
--- the gate: fail2ban
fail2ban: ok, 2 tool(s), ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s
long-running resources without health: 0
files asking for a setting without saying whether it is trusted: 0
1 manifest(s) checked. Judged against the seats this binary carries; a claim on one of the mesh's own seats is judged fully at registration, and a seat declared by a module not given here reads as unknown. Identities judged on a 6-character machine name, against the bounds of the providers given here
judging 1 module(s) changed against 4 machine(s), as the snapshot of 2026-10-13T08:39:10Z says they run
composing every machine as the mesh is
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
composing every machine with the change
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
the bus's user list leaves out 5 user(s) the mesh has minted no credential for: controller, node.f35, node.idt, node.ygcyr, node.yvbpsm. Each is a user that cannot connect until one is issued
merge gate: PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
judged by controller development build against the facts of 2026-10-13T08:39:10Z
modules the change moves:
- fail2ban (changed)
machines:
- a machine (f35): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- holds mesh-dns-resolver (idt): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- holds git, holds mesh-artifact-store, holds mesh-broker, holds mesh-catalog, holds mesh-delivery, holds mesh-dns-resolver, holds mesh-store, holds mesh-vault, holds npm-package-registry, the control node, the hub (ygcyr): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
- a machine (yvbpsm): composes; the change adds 4 resource(s) and removes 0 (+directory:fail2ban.state-dir, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses, +file:fail2ban.own-addresses-list, +process:fail2ban.watch)
a merge would rebuild 1 module(s) in 1 tier(s): fail2ban
notes:
- health-undeclared read by no module's build, and rebuild nothing (issue 280)
--- its merge-check.sh (go toolchain)
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/words 0.002s
words: 12 retired words and 70 daemons' lines, none in the 46216 strings of 714 files
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/agenthome 0.011s
agent-home: no archive and no file written into under the agent's home
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/secrets 0.011s
secrets: no setting can replace a vault secret in a mergeable file (1 known, nested)
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/paths 0.006s
paths: no module names another's state on its machine (3 known, listed to go)
long-running resources without health: 66, as kept
ok git.novox.be/novox/mesh-catalog/checks/deps 0.203s
testing modules/fail2ban
ok fail2ban/cmd/fail2ban-tools 1.028s
--- its merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript toolchain)
```
I read ADR 0339 (accepted, version 6), ADR 0186, ADR 0179, and hq issue 238, cloned the repository over HTTPS into /var/tmp/review-266, and read the diff against main (5cd608b) in modules/fail2ban: module.json, client.go, own.go (new), own_test.go (new), watch.go (new), main.go and health-undeclared.
Every clause of ADR 0339 is built, and I found nothing beyond it. Clause 1 (the mesh-wide setting) is the mergeable, trusted file /etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json (own-addresses resource), starting from {"own-addresses": []}, parsed by ParseOwn/ReadOwn in own.go; an unparseable entry is left out and named as a problem, never widening what is spared. Clause 2 (every jail ignores them) is built by appending file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses to jail.local's base ignoreip, beside the ADR 0186 ranges; I checked every other resource's content in module.json and confirmed none of jail-sshd, jail-recidive, or the door modules gitea, route-proxy and mailu sets its own ignoreip, so all inherit the base list, recidive included. The watch (watch.go) also actively asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names the file and reports any that do not. Clause 3 (the ban verb refuses them) is Fail2ban.spared in client.go: it refuses an address on own-addresses or on any entry the jail's live ignoreip already carries, names the entry, and never calls the daemon; an unreadable setting also refuses (fails closed). Clause 4 (a refused ban is seen) is watch.go's log tailing for the daemon's own "Ignore
by file:..." line, kept for a day and surfaced by fail2ban_health, which the run resource's new health: unit and the watch's health: tool (fail2ban_health) turn into the controller's existing module-unhealthy warning — no controller change was needed, which matches the PR's claim. Clause 5 (deriving node uplinks) is correctly left undone, citing issue 572.
Terminal-only still lets the operator set it the way ADR 0339 means. The own-addresses resource is declared exactly like other modules' trusted, takes-settings mergeable files (e.g. betterbird's prefs/accounts/identities, restic's retention), and the merge-gate's own module check reports "files asking for a setting without saying whether it is trusted: 0", so the manifest is accepted as a terminal (trusted) key under ADR 0277's generic settings-propose path; mesh-controller.settings confirms fail2ban is a known module with no layer yet (not merged, so own-addresses is not live to propose today). I did not find anything missing, but this is read from the manifest pattern and the controller's generic (module-agnostic) propose mechanism, not from a live propose call against this key, since the module is not yet delivered with it.
An empty setting changes nothing that is banned today. jail.local's ignoreip keeps every range it had and only appends the file: entry; the list file own-addresses-list is create-once and empty, so with no operator value the ignore list and the daemon's behaviour are unchanged. I confirmed this with own_test.go's coverage of an unwritten/empty setting.
An address on the setting cannot be banned by any jail, including recidive: recidive.conf sets no ignoreip of its own, so it inherits jail.local's DEFAULT, which carries the file: entry; the ban verb's own refusal (client.go Ban/spared) also applies per-jail, by name, including recidive; and the watch's per-look check of every jail's live ignoreip (not just the ones declared here) would surface any jail that silently diverges.
Tests fail on main and pass at the head, and merge-check.sh passes. I copied head's own_test.go and client_test.go onto a clean checkout of main (5cd608b) and ran go test: it fails to build main, reporting "undefined: SettingFile", "undefined: ParseOwn", "undefined: ReadOwn" and "unknown field Root in struct literal of type Fail2ban", matching the PR's own claim. At the head (93d58f374), go build ./... and go test ./... -race both pass ("ok fail2ban/cmd/fail2ban-tools"). Gitea's own checks on this exact head are green: "mesh/merge-gate": "PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)", and "mesh/repo-check": "PASS — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)"; the posted merge-check log shows "fail2ban: ok, 2 tool(s), ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s", "long-running resources without health: 0" and the kept health-undeclared count moving from 67 to 66, which matches the diff.
I banned and unbanned nothing on any machine; all checks above were done by reading the diff, running the module's own Go tests locally against both main and the head, and reading Gitea's recorded check output.
Verdict: approve at 93d58f3740a0878b347952726307ae96cc55c82b
I read ADR 0339 (accepted, version 6), ADR 0186, ADR 0179, and hq issue 238, cloned the repository over HTTPS into /var/tmp/review-266, and read the diff against main (5cd608b) in modules/fail2ban: module.json, client.go, own.go (new), own_test.go (new), watch.go (new), main.go and health-undeclared.
1. Every clause of ADR 0339 is built, and I found nothing beyond it. Clause 1 (the mesh-wide setting) is the mergeable, trusted file /etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json (own-addresses resource), starting from {"own-addresses": []}, parsed by ParseOwn/ReadOwn in own.go; an unparseable entry is left out and named as a problem, never widening what is spared. Clause 2 (every jail ignores them) is built by appending file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses to jail.local's base ignoreip, beside the ADR 0186 ranges; I checked every other resource's content in module.json and confirmed none of jail-sshd, jail-recidive, or the door modules gitea, route-proxy and mailu sets its own ignoreip, so all inherit the base list, recidive included. The watch (watch.go) also actively asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names the file and reports any that do not. Clause 3 (the ban verb refuses them) is Fail2ban.spared in client.go: it refuses an address on own-addresses or on any entry the jail's live ignoreip already carries, names the entry, and never calls the daemon; an unreadable setting also refuses (fails closed). Clause 4 (a refused ban is seen) is watch.go's log tailing for the daemon's own "Ignore <address> by file:..." line, kept for a day and surfaced by fail2ban_health, which the run resource's new health: unit and the watch's health: tool (fail2ban_health) turn into the controller's existing module-unhealthy warning — no controller change was needed, which matches the PR's claim. Clause 5 (deriving node uplinks) is correctly left undone, citing issue 572.
2. Terminal-only still lets the operator set it the way ADR 0339 means. The own-addresses resource is declared exactly like other modules' trusted, takes-settings mergeable files (e.g. betterbird's prefs/accounts/identities, restic's retention), and the merge-gate's own module check reports "files asking for a setting without saying whether it is trusted: 0", so the manifest is accepted as a terminal (trusted) key under ADR 0277's generic settings-propose path; mesh-controller.settings confirms fail2ban is a known module with no layer yet (not merged, so own-addresses is not live to propose today). I did not find anything missing, but this is read from the manifest pattern and the controller's generic (module-agnostic) propose mechanism, not from a live propose call against this key, since the module is not yet delivered with it.
3. An empty setting changes nothing that is banned today. jail.local's ignoreip keeps every range it had and only appends the file: entry; the list file own-addresses-list is create-once and empty, so with no operator value the ignore list and the daemon's behaviour are unchanged. I confirmed this with own_test.go's coverage of an unwritten/empty setting.
4. An address on the setting cannot be banned by any jail, including recidive: recidive.conf sets no ignoreip of its own, so it inherits jail.local's DEFAULT, which carries the file: entry; the ban verb's own refusal (client.go Ban/spared) also applies per-jail, by name, including recidive; and the watch's per-look check of every jail's live ignoreip (not just the ones declared here) would surface any jail that silently diverges.
5. Tests fail on main and pass at the head, and merge-check.sh passes. I copied head's own_test.go and client_test.go onto a clean checkout of main (5cd608b) and ran go test: it fails to build main, reporting "undefined: SettingFile", "undefined: ParseOwn", "undefined: ReadOwn" and "unknown field Root in struct literal of type Fail2ban", matching the PR's own claim. At the head (93d58f374), go build ./... and go test ./... -race both pass ("ok fail2ban/cmd/fail2ban-tools"). Gitea's own checks on this exact head are green: "mesh/merge-gate": "PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)", and "mesh/repo-check": "PASS — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)"; the posted merge-check log shows "fail2ban: ok, 2 tool(s), ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s", "long-running resources without health: 0" and the kept health-undeclared count moving from 67 to 66, which matches the diff.
I banned and unbanned nothing on any machine; all checks above were done by reading the diff, running the module's own Go tests locally against both main and the head, and reading Gitea's recorded check output.
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Fixes issue 238 (the mesh banned its own operator's address for four weeks), per hq ADR 0339 (accepted 2026-10-13), which extends ADR 0186 and narrows ADR 0179 §4.
What
own-addresses(a list, or one line of addresses and ranges, both families) reaches each machine as the mergeable file/etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json, whose own content is{"own-addresses": []}. So the module composes while the setting is unset: a${setting:own-addresses}would have left fail2ban out of every machine until the operator gave a value, since ADR 0262 gives an operator's value no default. The file istrusted, which makes the key a terminal key: it is set only at the controller's terminal, and an agent cannot widen what every jail spares.ignoreipin jail.local gainsfile:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses. fail2ban 1.1 (FileIPAddrSet; checked present on novox) reloads that file within a second of a change, so a new value needs no restart. The new processwatch(fail2ban-tools watch, as root) writes the entries there, one per line, by rename. The file is declaredcreate-onceand empty, so it exists before the daemon first reads it. Every look, the watch asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names it. A jail that sets its own ignoreip would leave it out, and is said.node-intrusion-prevention.banrefuses an address onown-addresses, or on any entry of the jail's live ignore list (the ADR 0186 ranges). The refusal names the entry the address lies on, and nothing reaches the daemon. fail2ban'sbanipbans whatever it is given, ignore list or not. An unreadable setting also refuses the ban (fail closed)./var/log/fail2ban.log(rotation, half-written lines and a restart that rereads the last day are all handled) for[<jail>] Ignore <address> by file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses. That is the daemon's own line for a failure the list spared; the private ranges logby ipand are not counted. It keeps each failure for a day. The new toolfail2ban_healthis the watch'shealth(kind tool, 60s, 2 looks). While a jail ignored a failure from one of the operator's own addresses in the last day it answers not healthy: "the jail gitea counted 40 failure(s) from 203.0.113.5, one of the operator's own addresses, in the last day, the last at …, and banned none". The controller raises that as fail2ban's warning condition on that node, which clears a day after the last failure. It also says a stopped watch, a jail missing the list and a setting entry that is not an address. No controller change is needed: a module resource's unhealthy state is already a warning naming the module and node, with the tool's words.run(fail2ban.service) gainshealth: unit, which is also the other kind ADR 0240 rule 2 asks beside a tool check. health-undeclared falls from 67 to 66.Design limits I chose: the watch looks every 30s and remembers at most 10000 failures per jail and address (the count then says "at least"). The health calls the watch stopped after 3 minutes without a look.
Tests (
own_test.go, plus the updated ban and tool-list tests inclient_test.go). They do not compile against main's code (undefined ReadOwn, ParseOwn, Watcher, ReadHealth…), and the manifest test fails on main's module.json (nofile:entry, no setting file, no watch).by ipis not counted.file:entry, no other resource setting ignoreip, the setting file mergeable/trusted/taking onlyown-addressesfrom[], the list create-once, and the watch as root with its tool health.MESH_GATE=<controller built from mesh-controller main 1826b68> MESH_CHECK_MODULES=fail2ban sh merge-check.sh: exit 0 (words, agent-home, secrets, paths, module checkfail2ban: ok … ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s, 66 as kept,go test -race).Reviewers' checklist
own-addressesset at the controller's terminal,fail2ban_settingsfor every jail on every node listsfile:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses;fail2ban_healthis healthy; abanof that address answers refused.After merge, for the operator: set the home address at the controller's terminal:
mesh-controller settings set fail2ban '{"own-addresses": ["<home uplink>"]}'(mesh layer). Until then the list is empty and nothing changes in what is banned. It raises no notification unless a jail ignores a failure from that address.Delivery
novox/mesh-catalog@93d58f3740a0— failed since 2026-10-13T09:18:14ZCovered: covered after its failure: a later walk that contains it was delivered: plan-1791883115921573192 (novox/mesh-catalog at
45d01e77into main, done, contains its mergef35b0675)Delivery plan — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
Machines
Transitions
The commit's note under
refs/notes/mesh-plankeeps every transition:git log --notes=mesh-plan.Merge check at
93d58f37Judged: head
93d58f3740a0merged into trunk5cd608ba8898; read beside it: mesh-controller1826b68a22b5, mesh-controller-main1826b68a22b5, mesh-host7a41e120635b, mesh-tools954e1a53eef9mesh/merge-gate: PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)mesh/repo-check: PASS — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)Delivery plan — builds fail2ban → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step
Run by the build seat on ace as
build-1791881726825149083(builds --log build-1791881726825149083).Verdict: approve at
93d58f3740I read ADR 0339 (accepted, version 6), ADR 0186, ADR 0179, and hq issue 238, cloned the repository over HTTPS into /var/tmp/review-266, and read the diff against main (
5cd608b) in modules/fail2ban: module.json, client.go, own.go (new), own_test.go (new), watch.go (new), main.go and health-undeclared.Every clause of ADR 0339 is built, and I found nothing beyond it. Clause 1 (the mesh-wide setting) is the mergeable, trusted file /etc/fail2ban/mesh-own-addresses.json (own-addresses resource), starting from {"own-addresses": []}, parsed by ParseOwn/ReadOwn in own.go; an unparseable entry is left out and named as a problem, never widening what is spared. Clause 2 (every jail ignores them) is built by appending file:/var/lib/mesh-fail2ban/own-addresses to jail.local's base ignoreip, beside the ADR 0186 ranges; I checked every other resource's content in module.json and confirmed none of jail-sshd, jail-recidive, or the door modules gitea, route-proxy and mailu sets its own ignoreip, so all inherit the base list, recidive included. The watch (watch.go) also actively asks the daemon whether each jail's ignore list names the file and reports any that do not. Clause 3 (the ban verb refuses them) is Fail2ban.spared in client.go: it refuses an address on own-addresses or on any entry the jail's live ignoreip already carries, names the entry, and never calls the daemon; an unreadable setting also refuses (fails closed). Clause 4 (a refused ban is seen) is watch.go's log tailing for the daemon's own "Ignore
by file:..." line, kept for a day and surfaced by fail2ban_health, which the run resource's new health: unit and the watch's health: tool (fail2ban_health) turn into the controller's existing module-unhealthy warning — no controller change was needed, which matches the PR's claim. Clause 5 (deriving node uplinks) is correctly left undone, citing issue 572.Terminal-only still lets the operator set it the way ADR 0339 means. The own-addresses resource is declared exactly like other modules' trusted, takes-settings mergeable files (e.g. betterbird's prefs/accounts/identities, restic's retention), and the merge-gate's own module check reports "files asking for a setting without saying whether it is trusted: 0", so the manifest is accepted as a terminal (trusted) key under ADR 0277's generic settings-propose path; mesh-controller.settings confirms fail2ban is a known module with no layer yet (not merged, so own-addresses is not live to propose today). I did not find anything missing, but this is read from the manifest pattern and the controller's generic (module-agnostic) propose mechanism, not from a live propose call against this key, since the module is not yet delivered with it.
An empty setting changes nothing that is banned today. jail.local's ignoreip keeps every range it had and only appends the file: entry; the list file own-addresses-list is create-once and empty, so with no operator value the ignore list and the daemon's behaviour are unchanged. I confirmed this with own_test.go's coverage of an unwritten/empty setting.
An address on the setting cannot be banned by any jail, including recidive: recidive.conf sets no ignoreip of its own, so it inherits jail.local's DEFAULT, which carries the file: entry; the ban verb's own refusal (client.go Ban/spared) also applies per-jail, by name, including recidive; and the watch's per-look check of every jail's live ignoreip (not just the ones declared here) would surface any jail that silently diverges.
Tests fail on main and pass at the head, and merge-check.sh passes. I copied head's own_test.go and client_test.go onto a clean checkout of main (
5cd608b) and ran go test: it fails to build main, reporting "undefined: SettingFile", "undefined: ParseOwn", "undefined: ReadOwn" and "unknown field Root in struct literal of type Fail2ban", matching the PR's own claim. At the head (93d58f374), go build ./... and go test ./... -race both pass ("ok fail2ban/cmd/fail2ban-tools"). Gitea's own checks on this exact head are green: "mesh/merge-gate": "PASS — every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose) (modules: fail2ban)", and "mesh/repo-check": "PASS — its merge-check.sh passed, each part in its toolchain: merge-check.sh (go), merge-check-typescript.sh (typescript)"; the posted merge-check log shows "fail2ban: ok, 2 tool(s), ready: watch by its tool fail2ban_health every 1m0s; run by unit every 30s", "long-running resources without health: 0" and the kept health-undeclared count moving from 67 to 66, which matches the diff.I banned and unbanned nothing on any machine; all checks above were done by reading the diff, running the module's own Go tests locally against both main and the head, and reading Gitea's recorded check output.