anthropic model-access: manager + consumer modules #16
@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
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// Adoption: the ONE time an operator's refresh token enters the mesh, and it enters already sealed.
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//
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// The refresh token is read here, on the MANAGER NODE, sealed at rest to that node's own key, and
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// only the sealed envelope leaves this process (novox/hq ADR 0050, Phase C). The control plane stores
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// that envelope via `licence set-grant` without ever seeing the refresh token in the clear — the same
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// bound every refresh keeps. This is the counterpart to `refresh/index.js`: adoption seals the first
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// envelope, refresh opens and re-seals it.
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// The refresh token is read here, on the MANAGER NODE, sealed to that node's PUBLIC sealing key, and
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// only the sealed box leaves this process (novox/hq ADR 0050). The control plane stores that box via
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// `licence set-grant` without ever seeing the refresh token in the clear — the same bound every
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// delivery keeps. This is the counterpart to `refresh/index.js`: adoption seals the first box, refresh
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// re-seals a rotated one; both use the very anonymous box (`crypto_box_seal`) the mesh seals every
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// credential with, so the HOST unseals the stored box to mount the cleartext back — this module is
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// never given a private key and opens nothing.
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//
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// MESH_ANTHROPIC_REFRESH_TOKEN_FILE the operator's refresh token, read once and never written out
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// MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE the manager node's public sealing key (base64 raw X25519)
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// MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT where the sealed envelope is written, for `licence set-grant`
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// MESH_ANTHROPIC_ADOPT_TOKEN_FILE the operator's refresh token, read once and never written out
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// MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE the manager holder's bound facts, carrying manager_public_key
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// MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT where the sealed box is written, for `licence set-grant`
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import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, renameSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
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import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { sealAtRest } from "../atrest.js";
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import { seal } from "../sealedbox.js";
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import { managerPublicKey, writeSealedGrant } from "../grantfile.js";
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function required(name: string): string {
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const v = process.env[name];
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@@ -21,19 +23,13 @@ function required(name: string): string {
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return v;
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}
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const refreshToken = readFileSync(required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_REFRESH_TOKEN_FILE"), "utf8").trim();
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const refreshToken = readFileSync(required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_ADOPT_TOKEN_FILE"), "utf8").trim();
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if (!refreshToken) throw new Error("[anthropic-manager] there is no refresh token to adopt");
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const nodePub = readFileSync(required("MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE"), "utf8").trim();
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const envelope = sealAtRest(refreshToken, nodePub);
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// The node's PUBLIC sealing key, delivered by the mesh in the manager holder's bound facts. Public,
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// so it is safe to hand a module; the private half stays with the host, which is what opens the box.
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const nodePub = managerPublicKey(required("MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE"));
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const out = required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT");
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mkdirSync(dirname(out), { recursive: true });
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const tmp = `${out}.tmp`;
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writeFileSync(
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tmp,
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JSON.stringify({ token: envelope.token, wrapped_key: envelope.wrappedKey, manager_key: envelope.managerKey }),
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{ mode: 0o600 },
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);
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renameSync(tmp, out);
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console.error("[anthropic-manager] sealed the refresh token at rest; only this node's key opens it");
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const sealed = seal(new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(refreshToken, "utf8")), nodePub);
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writeSealedGrant(required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT"), sealed, nodePub);
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console.error("[anthropic-manager] sealed the refresh token to this node's key; only the host opens it");
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@@ -1,174 +0,0 @@
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// The refresh token, encrypted at rest so ONE node — the manager — can read it back, and nothing
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// else can: not the control plane, not a copy of its database, not another node.
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//
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// **Why this file exists at all.** novox/hq ADR 0050 draws one bounded carve-out in the mesh's "the
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// control plane cannot read what it stores" guarantee: a refreshable-grant credential (Anthropic's
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// subscription OAuth) must be rotated centrally, and rotating it means SOME node reads the refresh
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// token back, every cycle. The ADR names exactly one such node — the *manager* — and this is the
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// mechanism by which it, and only it, reads that token. mesh-control (the control plane) holds the
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// output of this as three opaque strings and never runs the open: it has no key that could.
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//
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// **The construction (ECIES over the node's own sealing key).** Envelope encryption:
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// - a fresh random 32-byte data key encrypts the refresh token with AES-256-GCM (`token`);
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// - that data key is wrapped to the manager node's X25519 sealing key — the same key pair the
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// host already holds for the node — via an ephemeral-static ECDH → HKDF-SHA256 → AES-256-GCM
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// (`wrappedKey`, carrying the ephemeral public key in front);
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// - `managerKey` is the node public key the data key was wrapped to, kept so a node that has since
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// rotated its key learns it can no longer open this, rather than discovering it as a decrypt
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// that fails.
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// Recovering the refresh token needs the node's X25519 *private* half, which never leaves that
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// machine. A copy of the control plane's database is a directory of ciphertexts and wrapped keys
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// with nothing to open either.
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//
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// **On format.** This is the manager module's own at-rest format, distinct from mesh-control's Go
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// `secrets.AtRest` (which is NaCl secretbox + sealed box). That is deliberate and safe: on the
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// Anthropic path the manager module is the ONLY component that seals or opens the envelope — it
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// seals at adoption, it opens and re-seals every refresh — and mesh-control stores the three parts
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// as opaque strings it never interprets. The two never have to agree byte-for-byte because the
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// bytes never cross the language boundary in an opened form. (If an operator-facing adopt path in
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// mesh-control ever needed to produce the first envelope, the two would have to be unified — a NaCl
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// port in TS, or a Go manager runtime. Flagged, not silently assumed.)
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import {
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createCipheriv,
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createDecipheriv,
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createPrivateKey,
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createPublicKey,
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diffieHellman,
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generateKeyPairSync,
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hkdfSync,
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randomBytes,
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type KeyObject,
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} from "node:crypto";
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/** The three opaque parts mesh-control stores and forwards, and nothing else. */
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export interface Envelope {
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/** base64( iv ‖ tag ‖ AES-256-GCM(dataKey, refreshToken) ). */
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readonly token: string;
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/** base64( ephemeralPub(32) ‖ iv ‖ tag ‖ AES-256-GCM(kek, dataKey) ). */
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readonly wrappedKey: string;
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/** base64 of the node's raw 32-byte X25519 public key the data key was wrapped to. */
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readonly managerKey: string;
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}
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const INFO = Buffer.from("mesh-atrest-v1");
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const IV_LEN = 12;
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const TAG_LEN = 16;
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const RAW_KEY_LEN = 32;
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/** Import a node's raw 32-byte X25519 public key (standard base64, as the mesh records it). */
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function importPublic(rawBase64: string): KeyObject {
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const raw = Buffer.from(rawBase64, "base64");
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if (raw.length !== RAW_KEY_LEN) {
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throw new Error(`a sealing public key is 32 bytes, not ${raw.length}`);
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}
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return createPublicKey({
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key: { kty: "OKP", crv: "X25519", x: raw.toString("base64url") },
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format: "jwk",
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});
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}
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/** Import a node's raw 32-byte X25519 private key together with its public half. */
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function importPrivate(rawPrivB64: string, rawPubB64: string): KeyObject {
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const priv = Buffer.from(rawPrivB64, "base64");
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const pub = Buffer.from(rawPubB64, "base64");
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if (priv.length !== RAW_KEY_LEN) {
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throw new Error(`a sealing private key is 32 bytes, not ${priv.length}`);
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}
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return createPrivateKey({
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key: { kty: "OKP", crv: "X25519", x: pub.toString("base64url"), d: priv.toString("base64url") },
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format: "jwk",
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});
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}
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/** The raw 32-byte public key of an X25519 KeyObject. */
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function rawPublic(key: KeyObject): Buffer {
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const jwk = key.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { x?: string };
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if (!jwk.x) throw new Error("a public key had no point");
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return Buffer.from(jwk.x, "base64url");
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}
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/** Bind the wrapping key to both the ephemeral and the recipient public key, as a sealed box does. */
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function deriveKek(shared: Buffer, ephemeralPub: Buffer, recipientPub: Buffer): Buffer {
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const salt = Buffer.concat([ephemeralPub, recipientPub]);
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return Buffer.from(hkdfSync("sha256", shared, salt, INFO, 32));
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}
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/**
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* Seal a refresh token so only the holder of managerPublicKey's private half can read it.
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*
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* A fresh data key and ephemeral key each time, so two envelopes of the same token look nothing
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* alike — a rotation that changed nothing is indistinguishable from one that changed everything.
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*/
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export function sealAtRest(refreshToken: string, managerPublicKeyB64: string): Envelope {
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if (!refreshToken) throw new Error("there is nothing to seal");
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const recipient = importPublic(managerPublicKeyB64);
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const recipientPub = rawPublic(recipient);
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// Ephemeral-static ECDH: a throwaway key pair whose public half rides in the envelope.
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const eph = generateKeyPairSync("x25519");
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const ephemeralPub = rawPublic(eph.publicKey);
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const shared = diffieHellman({ privateKey: eph.privateKey, publicKey: recipient });
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const kek = deriveKek(shared, ephemeralPub, recipientPub);
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const dataKey = randomBytes(32);
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const wrappedKey = Buffer.concat([ephemeralPub, aesSeal(kek, dataKey)]);
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const token = aesSeal(dataKey, Buffer.from(refreshToken, "utf8"));
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return {
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token: token.toString("base64"),
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wrappedKey: wrappedKey.toString("base64"),
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managerKey: managerPublicKeyB64,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Recover the refresh token, given the manager node's own key pair. This is the one place a refresh
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* token is in the clear, and it runs only on the manager node.
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*/
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export function openAtRest(env: Envelope, managerPublicKeyB64: string, managerPrivateKeyB64: string): string {
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const priv = importPrivate(managerPrivateKeyB64, managerPublicKeyB64);
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const recipientPub = Buffer.from(managerPublicKeyB64, "base64");
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const wrapped = Buffer.from(env.wrappedKey, "base64");
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if (wrapped.length < RAW_KEY_LEN + IV_LEN + TAG_LEN) {
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throw new Error("the wrapped key is too short to hold what it must");
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}
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const ephemeralPub = wrapped.subarray(0, RAW_KEY_LEN);
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const wrappedRest = wrapped.subarray(RAW_KEY_LEN);
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const ephemeralKey = importPublic(ephemeralPub.toString("base64"));
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const shared = diffieHellman({ privateKey: priv, publicKey: ephemeralKey });
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const kek = deriveKek(shared, ephemeralPub, recipientPub);
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let dataKey: Buffer;
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try {
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dataKey = aesOpen(kek, wrappedRest);
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} catch {
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throw new Error("this refresh token was not wrapped to this manager's key");
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}
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if (dataKey.length !== 32) throw new Error("the wrapped data key is the wrong length");
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const refresh = aesOpen(dataKey, Buffer.from(env.token, "base64"));
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return refresh.toString("utf8");
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}
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// --- AES-256-GCM helpers: output/consume iv ‖ tag ‖ ciphertext ---
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function aesSeal(key: Buffer, plaintext: Buffer): Buffer {
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const iv = randomBytes(IV_LEN);
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const cipher = createCipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
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const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext), cipher.final()]);
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const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
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return Buffer.concat([iv, tag, ct]);
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}
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function aesOpen(key: Buffer, blob: Buffer): Buffer {
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const iv = blob.subarray(0, IV_LEN);
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const tag = blob.subarray(IV_LEN, IV_LEN + TAG_LEN);
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const ct = blob.subarray(IV_LEN + TAG_LEN);
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const decipher = createDecipheriv("aes-256-gcm", key, iv);
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decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
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return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]);
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
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// Reading the manager node's PUBLIC sealing key out of the bound facts the mesh delivers, and
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// writing a sealed refresh token in the wire shape mesh-control reads.
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//
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// **The public key is delivered, not derived.** The manager module holds no node key of its own
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// (novox/hq ADR 0050) — it is deliberately never given one. To seal a refresh token to this node it
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// needs the node's PUBLIC sealing key, and mesh-control puts that in the manager holder's bound facts
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// (`serves.manager_public_key`), safe to disclose because it is public. Both adoption and every
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// rotation read it from there.
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import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, renameSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
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/** The manager node's public sealing key, from the bound facts file the mesh delivers. */
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export function managerPublicKey(boundFile: string): string {
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const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync(boundFile, "utf8")) as { serves?: Record<string, unknown> };
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const key = raw.serves?.["manager_public_key"];
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if (typeof key !== "string" || key === "") {
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throw new Error(
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"the bound facts carry no manager_public_key — this node is not the licence's manager, or " +
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"the manager holder has not been delivered yet",
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);
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}
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return key;
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}
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/** Write a sealed refresh token in the {sealed, manager_key} wire shape mesh-control reads. */
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export function writeSealedGrant(path: string, sealed: string, managerKey: string): void {
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mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
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const tmp = `${path}.tmp`;
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writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify({ sealed, manager_key: managerKey }), { mode: 0o600 });
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renameSync(tmp, path);
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}
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@@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
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"capabilities": [
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"container-runtime"
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],
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"requires": [
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"model-access"
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],
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"binds": {
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"model-access": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/model.json"
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},
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"secrets": {
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"model-access": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/refresh-token"
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},
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"own-secrets": {
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"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/broker"
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},
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@@ -17,26 +26,12 @@
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"path": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager",
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"mode": "0700"
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},
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{
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"id": "keys",
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"type": "directory",
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"path": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/keys",
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"mode": "0700"
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},
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{
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"id": "out",
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"type": "directory",
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"path": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out",
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"mode": "0700"
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},
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{
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"id": "config",
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"type": "file",
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"path": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/config.json",
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"merge": "json",
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"content": "{}",
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"mode": "0600"
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},
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{
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"id": "refresh",
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"type": "container",
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@@ -55,9 +50,8 @@
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"env": {
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"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
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"MESH_ANTHROPIC_LICENCE": "personal",
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"MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_FILE": "/run/state/grant.json",
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"MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE": "/run/state/keys/sealing.pub",
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"MESH_NODE_SEALING_PRIVATE_FILE": "/run/state/keys/sealing.priv",
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"MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE": "/run/state/refresh-token",
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"MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE": "/run/state/model.json",
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"MESH_ANTHROPIC_ACCESS_OUT": "/run/state/out/access-token",
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"MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT": "/run/state/out/grant.json",
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"MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_OUT": "/run/state/out/usage.json",
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@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
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// The manager's scheduled run (novox/hq ADR 0050/0053). It is the whole of the carve-out in one
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// place, and it runs on the MANAGER NODE, never in the control plane:
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//
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// 1. read the opaque refresh-token envelope the control plane forwarded (it cannot open it);
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// 2. open it HERE with the node's own sealing key — the one moment a refresh token is in the clear,
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// on the one node the ADR permits it;
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// 3. call the vendor's OAuth token endpoint to mint a fresh access token (and maybe a rotated
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// 1. read the refresh token as CLEARTEXT — the host unsealed the stored box with THIS node's private
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// key and mounted it at the module's bound secret path, exactly as it delivers any credential.
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// This module holds no node key and opens nothing itself;
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// 2. call the vendor's OAuth token endpoint to mint a fresh access token (and maybe a rotated
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// refresh token);
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// 4. re-seal the rotated refresh token at rest (still openable by this node alone);
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// 5. hand the control plane back ONLY the access token in the clear + the opaque re-sealed
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// envelope — never the refresh token — which it seals per holder and stores;
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// 6. poll usage with the fresh access token and record the licence-grain reading.
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// 3. if the vendor rotated the refresh token, SEAL the new one to this node's PUBLIC sealing key
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// (delivered in the bound facts) with the same anonymous box the mesh seals every credential with;
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// 4. hand the control plane back ONLY the access token in the clear + the opaque re-sealed box —
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// never the refresh token — which it seals per consumer holder and stores;
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// 5. poll usage with the fresh access token and record the licence-grain reading.
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//
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// mesh-control receives the products of steps 5–6 through `licence submit-refresh` (access token +
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// opaque envelope). The refresh token never leaves this process except as ciphertext.
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// mesh-control receives the products of steps 3–4 through `licence submit-refresh` (access token +
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// sealed box). The refresh token never leaves this process except as ciphertext, and it never had to
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// be opened here at all — the host did that.
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//
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// This runs as `mesh-tools run`, which connects no broker, so the outputs are written to files the
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// host mounts; the submit itself (the transport to mesh-control) is done by the caller invoking
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +25,8 @@
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import { readFileSync, writeFileSync, renameSync, mkdirSync } from "node:fs";
|
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import { dirname } from "node:path";
|
||||
|
||||
import { openAtRest, sealAtRest, type Envelope } from "../atrest.js";
|
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import { seal } from "../sealedbox.js";
|
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import { managerPublicKey, writeSealedGrant } from "../grantfile.js";
|
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import { refreshGrant, grantFromRefresh, readUsage, flattenUsage } from "../client.js";
|
||||
|
||||
function required(name: string): string {
|
||||
@@ -32,30 +35,6 @@ function required(name: string): string {
|
||||
return v;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function readTrimmed(path: string): string {
|
||||
return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Accept an envelope in either the wire (snake_case) or internal (camelCase) shape. */
|
||||
function readEnvelope(path: string): Envelope {
|
||||
const raw = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8")) as Record<string, string>;
|
||||
const token = raw.token ?? "";
|
||||
const wrappedKey = raw.wrappedKey ?? raw.wrapped_key ?? "";
|
||||
const managerKey = raw.managerKey ?? raw.manager_key ?? "";
|
||||
if (!token || !wrappedKey || !managerKey) {
|
||||
throw new Error("the refresh-token envelope is missing one of token/wrapped_key/manager_key");
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { token, wrappedKey, managerKey };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Write the envelope in the wire (snake_case) shape mesh-control's `submit-refresh` reads. */
|
||||
function writeEnvelope(path: string, env: Envelope): void {
|
||||
atomicWrite(
|
||||
path,
|
||||
JSON.stringify({ token: env.token, wrapped_key: env.wrappedKey, manager_key: env.managerKey }),
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function atomicWrite(path: string, content: string): void {
|
||||
mkdirSync(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
|
||||
const tmp = `${path}.tmp`;
|
||||
@@ -66,14 +45,18 @@ function atomicWrite(path: string, content: string): void {
|
||||
async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
const licence = process.env.MESH_ANTHROPIC_LICENCE ?? "unknown";
|
||||
|
||||
const envelope = readEnvelope(required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_FILE"));
|
||||
const nodePub = readTrimmed(required("MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE"));
|
||||
const nodePriv = readTrimmed(required("MESH_NODE_SEALING_PRIVATE_FILE"));
|
||||
// Step 1: the refresh token as cleartext, unsealed and mounted by the HOST. No open here.
|
||||
const refreshToken = readFileSync(required("MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE"), "utf8").trim();
|
||||
if (!refreshToken) {
|
||||
// Nothing was delivered — the manager has not adopted a refresh token yet, or the push has not
|
||||
// landed. Said rather than treated as an empty token the vendor would reject obscurely.
|
||||
throw new Error("[anthropic-manager] no refresh token was delivered; adopt one first");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 2: the one open, on the manager node.
|
||||
const refreshToken = openAtRest(envelope, nodePub, nodePriv);
|
||||
// The node's PUBLIC sealing key, to re-seal a rotated refresh token. Public, delivered in the facts.
|
||||
const nodePub = managerPublicKey(required("MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE"));
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 3: the vendor call.
|
||||
// Step 2: the vendor call.
|
||||
const refreshed = await refreshGrant(refreshToken);
|
||||
if (!refreshed) {
|
||||
// A dead endpoint or a rejected token: nothing to publish, and we do not clobber a good grant.
|
||||
@@ -84,16 +67,16 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
throw new Error(`[anthropic-manager] the refresh of ${licence} returned no access token`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 4: re-seal the rotated refresh token, if the vendor rotated it. Nothing to store otherwise.
|
||||
// Step 3: re-seal the rotated refresh token, if the vendor rotated it. Nothing to store otherwise.
|
||||
if (grant.rotatedRefresh) {
|
||||
const rotated = sealAtRest(grant.rotatedRefresh, nodePub);
|
||||
const sealed = seal(new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(grant.rotatedRefresh, "utf8")), nodePub);
|
||||
if (process.env.MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT) {
|
||||
writeEnvelope(process.env.MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT, rotated);
|
||||
writeSealedGrant(process.env.MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT, sealed, nodePub);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 5: the access token in the clear, for the control plane to seal per holder. This is all it
|
||||
// ever receives that is not ciphertext.
|
||||
// Step 4: the access token in the clear, for the control plane to seal per consumer holder. This is
|
||||
// all it ever receives that is not ciphertext.
|
||||
atomicWrite(required("MESH_ANTHROPIC_ACCESS_OUT"), grant.access.accessToken);
|
||||
|
||||
console.error(
|
||||
@@ -101,7 +84,7 @@ async function main(): Promise<void> {
|
||||
(grant.rotatedRefresh ? ", refresh token rotated and re-sealed" : ", refresh token unchanged"),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Step 6: licence-grain usage, best-effort — a usage read failing must not fail the refresh.
|
||||
// Step 5: licence-grain usage, best-effort — a usage read failing must not fail the refresh.
|
||||
try {
|
||||
const usage = await readUsage(grant.access.accessToken);
|
||||
if (usage) {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
|
||||
// A NaCl `crypto_box_seal`, in TypeScript, byte-compatible with Go's `box.SealAnonymous`.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// **Why this file exists, and why it is exactly this.** novox/hq ADR 0050's refreshable-grant
|
||||
// carve-out delivers the refresh token to the manager module the way the mesh delivers every other
|
||||
// credential: sealed to the node's key, and unsealed by the *host* — never by the module. The host
|
||||
// unseals with Go's `golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/box.OpenAnonymous` (mesh-host
|
||||
// internal/identity/sealing.go), and mesh-control seals with `box.SealAnonymous`
|
||||
// (mesh-control internal/secrets/seal.go). Both are NaCl `crypto_box_seal`:
|
||||
//
|
||||
// sealed = ephemeralPub(32) ‖ crypto_box(msg, nonce, recipientPub, ephemeralSecret)
|
||||
// nonce = blake2b( ephemeralPub ‖ recipientPub , 24 bytes, unkeyed )
|
||||
//
|
||||
// When the vendor rotates the refresh token, the manager module must store the new one back the
|
||||
// same way — sealed to the manager node's own sealing key — so mesh-control keeps it without ever
|
||||
// reading it and the host can later unseal it to deliver the cleartext again. That reseal happens
|
||||
// here, on the manager node, in TypeScript. It therefore has to produce the *identical* byte format
|
||||
// Go's `Open` accepts, or the host would refuse the delivery.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// **Dependency-free on purpose.** The module runtime image carries only mesh-tools' node_modules
|
||||
// (novox/hq ADR 0052), so a module cannot pull `tweetnacl` at runtime. node:crypto gives X25519 but
|
||||
// not XSalsa20-Poly1305 or a 24-byte BLAKE2b, so the `crypto_box` and the nonce hash are transcribed
|
||||
// here from the public-domain TweetNaCl (Chestnykh/Mandiri, 2014) and blakejs (dcposch, RFC 7693).
|
||||
// X25519 (ephemeral key generation and the Diffie-Hellman) is left to node:crypto, which is
|
||||
// standards-conformant and interoperates with Go's curve25519 regardless of who generated a key.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// **How it is kept honest.** A cross-language test seals a fixture here and opens it in Go
|
||||
// (mesh-control internal/secrets/sealedbox_xcheck_test.go), and this module's own test round-trips
|
||||
// it against a second decrypt. A transcription slip surfaces there as a seal Go cannot open, not as
|
||||
// a refresh token silently mangled in production.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// This module SEALS only. It never opens — opening is the host's job, with the node private key the
|
||||
// module is deliberately never given.
|
||||
|
||||
import {
|
||||
createPublicKey,
|
||||
diffieHellman,
|
||||
generateKeyPairSync,
|
||||
type KeyObject,
|
||||
} from "node:crypto";
|
||||
|
||||
const RAW_KEY_LEN = 32;
|
||||
// "expand 32-byte k", the Salsa20 constant.
|
||||
const SIGMA = new Uint8Array([
|
||||
101, 120, 112, 97, 110, 100, 32, 51, 50, 45, 98, 121, 116, 101, 32, 107,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Seal a value to a node's public sealing key, producing what Go's `box.OpenAnonymous` opens.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* @param value the plaintext (e.g. a rotated refresh token)
|
||||
* @param recipientPublicB64 the node's raw 32-byte X25519 public key, standard base64
|
||||
* @returns standard-base64( ephemeralPub ‖ box )
|
||||
*/
|
||||
export function seal(value: Uint8Array, recipientPublicB64: string): string {
|
||||
const recipientPub = Buffer.from(recipientPublicB64, "base64");
|
||||
if (recipientPub.length !== RAW_KEY_LEN) {
|
||||
throw new Error(`a sealing public key is 32 bytes, not ${recipientPub.length}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
const recipientKey = importRawX25519Public(recipientPub);
|
||||
|
||||
// Ephemeral-static ECDH: a throwaway X25519 key pair whose public half rides in front, and the
|
||||
// raw Diffie-Hellman point shared with the recipient. node:crypto does both.
|
||||
const eph = generateKeyPairSync("x25519");
|
||||
const ephemeralPub = rawX25519Public(eph.publicKey);
|
||||
const dh = new Uint8Array(diffieHellman({ privateKey: eph.privateKey, publicKey: recipientKey }));
|
||||
|
||||
// The crypto_box shared key is HSalsa20 of the DH point (crypto_box_beforenm).
|
||||
const boxKey = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
cryptoCoreHsalsa20(boxKey, new Uint8Array(16), dh, SIGMA);
|
||||
|
||||
// nonce = blake2b(ephemeralPub ‖ recipientPub, 24), unkeyed — exactly Go's sealNonce.
|
||||
const nonce = blake2b24(concat(ephemeralPub, recipientPub));
|
||||
|
||||
const boxed = cryptoBox(value, nonce, boxKey);
|
||||
|
||||
return Buffer.from(concat(ephemeralPub, boxed)).toString("base64");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- X25519 via node:crypto ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function importRawX25519Public(raw: Uint8Array): KeyObject {
|
||||
return createPublicKey({
|
||||
key: { kty: "OKP", crv: "X25519", x: Buffer.from(raw).toString("base64url") },
|
||||
format: "jwk",
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function rawX25519Public(key: KeyObject): Uint8Array {
|
||||
const jwk = key.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { x?: string };
|
||||
if (!jwk.x) throw new Error("a public key had no point");
|
||||
return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(jwk.x, "base64url"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- crypto_box / crypto_secretbox (XSalsa20-Poly1305) ---------------------------------------
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Transcribed from TweetNaCl (public domain). crypto_box after the DH/HSalsa20 above is exactly
|
||||
// crypto_secretbox: XSalsa20 keystream XOR, then a Poly1305 tag over the ciphertext.
|
||||
|
||||
/** crypto_box_afternm: secretbox(msg, nonce, key), returning tag(16) ‖ ciphertext. */
|
||||
function cryptoBox(msg: Uint8Array, nonce: Uint8Array, key: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
|
||||
// secretbox operates on a 32-byte-zero-prefixed message; its output's first 16 bytes are zero,
|
||||
// and the useful box is everything from byte 16 (the Poly1305 tag, then the ciphertext).
|
||||
const m = new Uint8Array(32 + msg.length);
|
||||
m.set(msg, 32);
|
||||
const c = new Uint8Array(m.length);
|
||||
cryptoSecretbox(c, m, m.length, nonce, key);
|
||||
return c.subarray(16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cryptoSecretbox(
|
||||
c: Uint8Array,
|
||||
m: Uint8Array,
|
||||
d: number,
|
||||
n: Uint8Array,
|
||||
k: Uint8Array,
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
if (d < 32) throw new Error("secretbox message underflow");
|
||||
cryptoStreamXor(c, 0, m, 0, d, n, k);
|
||||
cryptoOnetimeauth(c, 16, c, 32, d - 32, c);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) c[i] = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function L32(x: number, c: number): number {
|
||||
return (x << c) | (x >>> (32 - c));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function ld32(x: Uint8Array, i: number): number {
|
||||
let u = x[i + 3] & 0xff;
|
||||
u = (u << 8) | (x[i + 2] & 0xff);
|
||||
u = (u << 8) | (x[i + 1] & 0xff);
|
||||
return (u << 8) | (x[i + 0] & 0xff);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function st32(x: Uint8Array, j: number, u: number): void {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
||||
x[j + i] = u & 255;
|
||||
u >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function core(out: Uint8Array, inp: Uint8Array, k: Uint8Array, c: Uint8Array, h: boolean): void {
|
||||
const w = new Uint32Array(16);
|
||||
const x = new Uint32Array(16);
|
||||
const y = new Uint32Array(16);
|
||||
const t = new Uint32Array(4);
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
||||
x[5 * i] = ld32(c, 4 * i);
|
||||
x[1 + i] = ld32(k, 4 * i);
|
||||
x[6 + i] = ld32(inp, 4 * i);
|
||||
x[11 + i] = ld32(k, 16 + 4 * i);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) y[i] = x[i];
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
|
||||
for (let m = 0; m < 4; m++) t[m] = x[(5 * j + 4 * m) % 16];
|
||||
t[1] ^= L32((t[0] + t[3]) | 0, 7);
|
||||
t[2] ^= L32((t[1] + t[0]) | 0, 9);
|
||||
t[3] ^= L32((t[2] + t[1]) | 0, 13);
|
||||
t[0] ^= L32((t[3] + t[2]) | 0, 18);
|
||||
for (let m = 0; m < 4; m++) w[4 * j + ((j + m) % 4)] = t[m];
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (let m = 0; m < 16; m++) x[m] = w[m];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (h) {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) x[i] = (x[i] + y[i]) | 0;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
||||
x[5 * i] = (x[5 * i] - ld32(c, 4 * i)) | 0;
|
||||
x[6 + i] = (x[6 + i] - ld32(inp, 4 * i)) | 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
|
||||
st32(out, 4 * i, x[5 * i]);
|
||||
st32(out, 16 + 4 * i, x[6 + i]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) st32(out, 4 * i, (x[i] + y[i]) | 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cryptoCoreHsalsa20(out: Uint8Array, inp: Uint8Array, k: Uint8Array, c: Uint8Array): void {
|
||||
core(out, inp, k, c, true);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cryptoStreamSalsa20Xor(
|
||||
c: Uint8Array,
|
||||
cpos: number,
|
||||
m: Uint8Array,
|
||||
mpos: number,
|
||||
b: number,
|
||||
n: Uint8Array,
|
||||
k: Uint8Array,
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
const z = new Uint8Array(16);
|
||||
const x = new Uint8Array(64);
|
||||
if (!b) return;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) z[i] = n[i];
|
||||
while (b >= 64) {
|
||||
coreSalsa20(x, z, k, SIGMA);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 64; i++) c[cpos + i] = m[mpos + i] ^ x[i];
|
||||
let u = 1;
|
||||
for (let i = 8; i < 16; i++) {
|
||||
u = (u + (z[i] & 0xff)) | 0;
|
||||
z[i] = u & 0xff;
|
||||
u >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
b -= 64;
|
||||
cpos += 64;
|
||||
mpos += 64;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (b > 0) {
|
||||
coreSalsa20(x, z, k, SIGMA);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < b; i++) c[cpos + i] = m[mpos + i] ^ x[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function coreSalsa20(out: Uint8Array, inp: Uint8Array, k: Uint8Array, c: Uint8Array): void {
|
||||
core(out, inp, k, c, false);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cryptoStreamXor(
|
||||
c: Uint8Array,
|
||||
cpos: number,
|
||||
m: Uint8Array,
|
||||
mpos: number,
|
||||
d: number,
|
||||
n: Uint8Array,
|
||||
k: Uint8Array,
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
const s = new Uint8Array(32);
|
||||
cryptoCoreHsalsa20(s, n, k, SIGMA);
|
||||
cryptoStreamSalsa20Xor(c, cpos, m, mpos, d, n.subarray(16), s);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const MINUSP = new Uint32Array([5, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 252]);
|
||||
|
||||
function add1305(h: Uint32Array, c: Uint32Array): void {
|
||||
let u = 0;
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 17; j++) {
|
||||
u = (u + ((h[j] + c[j]) | 0)) | 0;
|
||||
h[j] = u & 255;
|
||||
u >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function cryptoOnetimeauth(
|
||||
out: Uint8Array,
|
||||
outpos: number,
|
||||
m: Uint8Array,
|
||||
mpos: number,
|
||||
n: number,
|
||||
k: Uint8Array,
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
const x = new Uint32Array(17);
|
||||
const r = new Uint32Array(17);
|
||||
const h = new Uint32Array(17);
|
||||
const c = new Uint32Array(17);
|
||||
const g = new Uint32Array(17);
|
||||
for (let j = 0; j < 16; j++) r[j] = k[j];
|
||||
r[3] &= 15;
|
||||
r[4] &= 252;
|
||||
r[7] &= 15;
|
||||
r[8] &= 252;
|
||||
r[11] &= 15;
|
||||
r[12] &= 252;
|
||||
r[15] &= 15;
|
||||
|
||||
let j: number;
|
||||
while (n > 0) {
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) c[j] = 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16 && j < n; ++j) c[j] = m[mpos + j];
|
||||
c[j] = 1;
|
||||
mpos += j;
|
||||
n -= j;
|
||||
add1305(h, c);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 17; i++) {
|
||||
x[i] = 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) {
|
||||
x[i] =
|
||||
(x[i] + (h[j] * (j <= i ? r[i - j] : (320 * r[i + 17 - j]) | 0)) | 0) | 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 17; i++) h[i] = x[i];
|
||||
let u = 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
|
||||
u = (u + h[j]) | 0;
|
||||
h[j] = u & 255;
|
||||
u >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
u = (u + h[16]) | 0;
|
||||
h[16] = u & 3;
|
||||
u = (5 * (u >>> 2)) | 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) {
|
||||
u = (u + h[j]) | 0;
|
||||
h[j] = u & 255;
|
||||
u >>>= 8;
|
||||
}
|
||||
u = (u + h[16]) | 0;
|
||||
h[16] = u;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) g[j] = h[j];
|
||||
add1305(h, MINUSP);
|
||||
const s = -(h[16] >>> 7) | 0;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 17; j++) h[j] ^= s & (g[j] ^ h[j]);
|
||||
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) c[j] = k[j + 16];
|
||||
c[16] = 0;
|
||||
add1305(h, c);
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) out[outpos + j] = h[j];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- BLAKE2b (24-byte, unkeyed) — the sealed-box nonce hash ----------------------------------
|
||||
//
|
||||
// Transcribed from blakejs (RFC 7693 reference). Only the fixed path this needs: no key, no salt,
|
||||
// no personalisation, a single ≤128-byte input.
|
||||
|
||||
const BLAKE2B_IV32 = new Uint32Array([
|
||||
0xf3bcc908, 0x6a09e667, 0x84caa73b, 0xbb67ae85, 0xfe94f82b, 0x3c6ef372, 0x5f1d36f1, 0xa54ff53a,
|
||||
0xade682d1, 0x510e527f, 0x2b3e6c1f, 0x9b05688c, 0xfb41bd6b, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x137e2179, 0x5be0cd19,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
const SIGMA82 = new Uint8Array(
|
||||
[
|
||||
0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2,
|
||||
11, 7, 5, 3, 11, 8, 12, 0, 5, 2, 15, 13, 10, 14, 3, 6, 7, 1, 9, 4, 7, 9, 3, 1, 13, 12, 11, 14,
|
||||
2, 6, 5, 10, 4, 0, 15, 8, 9, 0, 5, 7, 2, 4, 10, 15, 14, 1, 11, 12, 6, 8, 3, 13, 2, 12, 6, 10, 0,
|
||||
11, 8, 3, 4, 13, 7, 5, 15, 14, 1, 9, 12, 5, 1, 15, 14, 13, 4, 10, 0, 7, 6, 3, 9, 2, 8, 11, 13,
|
||||
11, 7, 14, 12, 1, 3, 9, 5, 0, 15, 4, 8, 6, 2, 10, 6, 15, 14, 9, 11, 3, 0, 8, 12, 2, 13, 7, 1, 4,
|
||||
10, 5, 10, 2, 8, 4, 7, 6, 1, 5, 15, 11, 9, 14, 3, 12, 13, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10,
|
||||
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 14, 10, 4, 8, 9, 15, 13, 6, 1, 12, 0, 2, 11, 7, 5, 3,
|
||||
].map((n) => n * 2),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
interface Blake2bCtx {
|
||||
b: Uint8Array;
|
||||
h: Uint32Array;
|
||||
t: number;
|
||||
c: number;
|
||||
outlen: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function b2bGet32(arr: Uint8Array, i: number): number {
|
||||
return (arr[i] ^ (arr[i + 1] << 8) ^ (arr[i + 2] << 16) ^ (arr[i + 3] << 24)) >>> 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function add64aa(v: Uint32Array, a: number, b: number): void {
|
||||
const o0 = v[a] + v[b];
|
||||
let o1 = v[a + 1] + v[b + 1];
|
||||
if (o0 >= 0x100000000) o1++;
|
||||
v[a] = o0;
|
||||
v[a + 1] = o1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function add64ac(v: Uint32Array, a: number, b0: number, b1: number): void {
|
||||
let o0 = v[a] + b0;
|
||||
if (b0 < 0) o0 += 0x100000000;
|
||||
let o1 = v[a + 1] + b1;
|
||||
if (o0 >= 0x100000000) o1++;
|
||||
v[a] = o0;
|
||||
v[a + 1] = o1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function b2bG(
|
||||
v: Uint32Array,
|
||||
m: Uint32Array,
|
||||
a: number,
|
||||
b: number,
|
||||
c: number,
|
||||
d: number,
|
||||
ix: number,
|
||||
iy: number,
|
||||
): void {
|
||||
const x0 = m[ix];
|
||||
const x1 = m[ix + 1];
|
||||
const y0 = m[iy];
|
||||
const y1 = m[iy + 1];
|
||||
|
||||
add64aa(v, a, b);
|
||||
add64ac(v, a, x0, x1);
|
||||
|
||||
let xor0 = v[d] ^ v[a];
|
||||
let xor1 = v[d + 1] ^ v[a + 1];
|
||||
v[d] = xor1;
|
||||
v[d + 1] = xor0;
|
||||
|
||||
add64aa(v, c, d);
|
||||
|
||||
xor0 = v[b] ^ v[c];
|
||||
xor1 = v[b + 1] ^ v[c + 1];
|
||||
v[b] = (xor0 >>> 24) ^ (xor1 << 8);
|
||||
v[b + 1] = (xor1 >>> 24) ^ (xor0 << 8);
|
||||
|
||||
add64aa(v, a, b);
|
||||
add64ac(v, a, y0, y1);
|
||||
|
||||
xor0 = v[d] ^ v[a];
|
||||
xor1 = v[d + 1] ^ v[a + 1];
|
||||
v[d] = (xor0 >>> 16) ^ (xor1 << 16);
|
||||
v[d + 1] = (xor1 >>> 16) ^ (xor0 << 16);
|
||||
|
||||
add64aa(v, c, d);
|
||||
|
||||
xor0 = v[b] ^ v[c];
|
||||
xor1 = v[b + 1] ^ v[c + 1];
|
||||
v[b] = (xor1 >>> 31) ^ (xor0 << 1);
|
||||
v[b + 1] = (xor0 >>> 31) ^ (xor1 << 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function blake2bCompress(ctx: Blake2bCtx, last: boolean): void {
|
||||
const v = new Uint32Array(32);
|
||||
const m = new Uint32Array(32);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
|
||||
v[i] = ctx.h[i];
|
||||
v[i + 16] = BLAKE2B_IV32[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
v[24] = v[24] ^ ctx.t;
|
||||
v[25] = v[25] ^ (ctx.t / 0x100000000);
|
||||
if (last) {
|
||||
v[28] = ~v[28];
|
||||
v[29] = ~v[29];
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) m[i] = b2bGet32(ctx.b, 4 * i);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 0, 8, 16, 24, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 0], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 1]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 2, 10, 18, 26, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 2], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 3]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 4, 12, 20, 28, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 4], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 5]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 6, 14, 22, 30, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 6], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 7]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 0, 10, 20, 30, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 8], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 9]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 2, 12, 22, 24, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 10], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 11]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 4, 14, 16, 26, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 12], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 13]);
|
||||
b2bG(v, m, 6, 8, 18, 28, SIGMA82[i * 16 + 14], SIGMA82[i * 16 + 15]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) ctx.h[i] = ctx.h[i] ^ v[i] ^ v[i + 16];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
function blake2b24(input: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
|
||||
const outlen = 24;
|
||||
const ctx: Blake2bCtx = {
|
||||
b: new Uint8Array(128),
|
||||
h: new Uint32Array(16),
|
||||
t: 0,
|
||||
c: 0,
|
||||
outlen,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Parameter block: outlen, keylen=0, fanout=1, depth=1; the rest zero.
|
||||
const param = new Uint8Array(64);
|
||||
param[0] = outlen;
|
||||
param[2] = 1;
|
||||
param[3] = 1;
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < 16; i++) ctx.h[i] = BLAKE2B_IV32[i] ^ b2bGet32(param, i * 4);
|
||||
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < input.length; i++) {
|
||||
if (ctx.c === 128) {
|
||||
ctx.t += ctx.c;
|
||||
blake2bCompress(ctx, false);
|
||||
ctx.c = 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx.b[ctx.c++] = input[i];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx.t += ctx.c;
|
||||
while (ctx.c < 128) ctx.b[ctx.c++] = 0;
|
||||
blake2bCompress(ctx, true);
|
||||
|
||||
const out = new Uint8Array(outlen);
|
||||
for (let i = 0; i < outlen; i++) out[i] = ctx.h[i >> 2] >> (8 * (i & 3));
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// --- small helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
function concat(a: Uint8Array, b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
|
||||
const out = new Uint8Array(a.length + b.length);
|
||||
out.set(a, 0);
|
||||
out.set(b, a.length);
|
||||
return out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
import { test } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import { generateKeyPairSync } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
|
||||
import { sealAtRest, openAtRest, type Envelope } from "../atrest.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
/** A node key pair as the mesh records it: raw 32-byte X25519 keys, standard base64. */
|
||||
function nodeKeys(): { pub: string; priv: string } {
|
||||
const kp = generateKeyPairSync("x25519");
|
||||
const pub = (kp.publicKey.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { x: string }).x;
|
||||
const priv = (kp.privateKey.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { d: string }).d;
|
||||
// JWK is base64url; the mesh records standard base64 of the same 32 bytes.
|
||||
const std = (b64url: string) => Buffer.from(b64url, "base64url").toString("base64");
|
||||
return { pub: std(pub), priv: std(priv) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("the manager seals a refresh token and reads it back with its own key", () => {
|
||||
const { pub, priv } = nodeKeys();
|
||||
const env = sealAtRest("rt-the-refresh-token", pub);
|
||||
assert.equal(env.managerKey, pub);
|
||||
// Nothing in the envelope is the refresh token in the clear.
|
||||
assert.doesNotMatch(env.token, /rt-the-refresh-token/);
|
||||
assert.doesNotMatch(env.wrappedKey, /rt-the-refresh-token/);
|
||||
assert.equal(openAtRest(env, pub, priv), "rt-the-refresh-token");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a node that is not the manager cannot open the envelope", () => {
|
||||
const manager = nodeKeys();
|
||||
const other = nodeKeys();
|
||||
const env = sealAtRest("rt-secret", manager.pub);
|
||||
assert.throws(() => openAtRest(env, other.pub, other.priv));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("two seals of the same token look nothing alike", () => {
|
||||
const { pub } = nodeKeys();
|
||||
const a = sealAtRest("rt-secret", pub);
|
||||
const b = sealAtRest("rt-secret", pub);
|
||||
assert.notEqual(a.token, b.token);
|
||||
assert.notEqual(a.wrappedKey, b.wrappedKey);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a tampered envelope is refused, not silently mis-opened", () => {
|
||||
const { pub, priv } = nodeKeys();
|
||||
const env = sealAtRest("rt-secret", pub);
|
||||
const flipped: Envelope = { ...env, token: Buffer.from(env.token, "base64").reverse().toString("base64") };
|
||||
assert.throws(() => openAtRest(flipped, pub, priv));
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
|
||||
import { test } from "node:test";
|
||||
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
|
||||
import { generateKeyPairSync } from "node:crypto";
|
||||
|
||||
import { seal } from "../sealedbox.ts";
|
||||
|
||||
// The definitive proof that this seal interoperates with Go's box.OpenAnonymous (the host's Unseal
|
||||
// and mesh-control's secrets.Seal/Open) is a cross-language test in mesh-control
|
||||
// (internal/secrets/sealedbox_xcheck_test.go), which opens a fixture this module's seal() produced.
|
||||
// These tests hold the TypeScript side: the output has the crypto_box_seal shape, and it is
|
||||
// randomised so a rotation that changed nothing looks nothing like one that changed everything.
|
||||
|
||||
/** A node public key as the mesh records it: raw 32-byte X25519, standard base64. */
|
||||
function aNodePublicKey(): string {
|
||||
const kp = generateKeyPairSync("x25519");
|
||||
const x = (kp.publicKey.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { x: string }).x;
|
||||
return Buffer.from(x, "base64url").toString("base64");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test("a seal has the crypto_box_seal shape: ephemeralPub(32) + tag(16) + ciphertext(len)", () => {
|
||||
const pub = aNodePublicKey();
|
||||
const msg = Buffer.from("rt-a-refresh-token", "utf8");
|
||||
const blob = Buffer.from(seal(new Uint8Array(msg), pub), "base64");
|
||||
// 32 (ephemeral public key) + 16 (Poly1305 tag) + message length.
|
||||
assert.equal(blob.length, 32 + 16 + msg.length);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("two seals of the same value differ — a fresh ephemeral key each time", () => {
|
||||
const pub = aNodePublicKey();
|
||||
const msg = new Uint8Array(Buffer.from("rt-a-refresh-token", "utf8"));
|
||||
assert.notEqual(seal(msg, pub), seal(msg, pub));
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test("a public key that is not 32 bytes is refused before anything is sealed", () => {
|
||||
assert.throws(() => seal(new Uint8Array([1, 2, 3]), Buffer.from("short").toString("base64")));
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
|
||||
"noEmit": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
"include": [
|
||||
"atrest.ts",
|
||||
"sealedbox.ts",
|
||||
"grantfile.ts",
|
||||
"client.ts",
|
||||
"adopt/index.ts",
|
||||
"refresh/index.ts"
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user