A withdrawn consumer keeps its data, in every provider that holds some (hq issue 241) #44

Merged
jschoubben merged 2 commits from fix/a-withdrawn-consumer-keeps-its-data into main 2026-10-04 23:45:16 +00:00
10 changed files with 51 additions and 18 deletions
Showing only changes of commit 1fb7ca3d72 - Show all commits
+10
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@@ -564,6 +564,16 @@ export class GiteaAdmin {
GiteaAdmin.fail(`/teams/${found.id}/members/${username}`, member);
}
/** Withdraw a user and keep everything they own: login prohibited, which ensureUser undoes. */
async prohibitLogin(username: string): Promise<void> {
const res = await this.request(`/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, {
method: "PATCH",
body: JSON.stringify({ login_name: username, prohibit_login: true }),
});
if (res.status === 200 || res.status === 404) return;
GiteaAdmin.fail(`/admin/users/${username}`, res);
}
/** Delete a user, purging what they own. A 404 means the mesh already withdrew them — success, not
* an error, so a re-run of remove is safe. */
async deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void> {
+2 -1
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@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@ runProvisioner("npm-package-registry", {
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await gitea.deleteUser(p.as);
// Login prohibited, never deleted (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once): deleting purges every repository the user owns.
await gitea.prohibitLogin(p.as);
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
+5
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@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ export class MailuClient {
await this.api("PATCH", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, { raw_password: password, enabled: true });
}
/** Withdraw a mailbox and keep its mail: disabled, which applyProvisioned undoes. */
async disableUser(email: string): Promise<void> {
await this.api("PATCH", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, { enabled: false });
}
async deleteUser(email: string): Promise<void> {
await this.api("DELETE", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`);
}
+3 -1
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@@ -75,7 +75,9 @@ runProvisioner("smtp", {
// exists, and left otherwise — a mailbox holding mail is the one thing a background loop
// must not guess about (this module's own events file says the same). Withdrawal of a
// named-account consumer is an operator action until the harness carries values here.
await mailu.deleteUser(`${p.as}@${domain()}`).catch(() => {});
// Disabled, never deleted (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once): a mailbox holding mail is the one thing a background loop must
// not destroy. applyProvisioned enables it again when the consumer returns.
await mailu.disableUser(`${p.as}@${domain()}`).catch(() => {});
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
+3 -8
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@@ -47,15 +47,10 @@ runProvisioner("s3-bucket", {
async remove(p: { as: string; derived: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> }): Promise<void> {
const bucket = bucketNamed(p.derived);
// Revoking the key is what cuts the consumer's access. The bucket is emptied-then-dropped only if
// empty; a bucket that still holds objects is left for an operator rather than erroring on every
// reconcile tick — access is already gone, and silently deleting a consumer's data would be worse.
// Revoking the key is what cuts the consumer's access, and the bucket is kept, empty or not
// (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once). A bucket is removed by a person, never by this loop.
try { await minio.removeAccessKey(p.as); } catch { /* already gone */ }
try {
await minio.removeBucket(bucket);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[minio] bucket ${bucket} not removed (likely non-empty), access revoked: ${err}`);
}
console.error(`[minio] ${p.as} withdrawn: access key revoked, bucket ${bucket} kept`);
await announce("bucket.removed", { bucket, accessKey: p.as });
},
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@@ -125,6 +125,18 @@ export class MongoClient {
/** Drop a database and its owning user, idempotently. Dropping the database evicts its data; the
* user is removed first so a re-grant of the same login starts clean. */
/** Withdraw a consumer and keep its database: the user keeps its name and loses every role. */
async lockUser(database: string, user: string): Promise<void> {
await this.admin(async (client) => {
const target = client.db(database);
try {
await target.command({ updateUser: user, roles: [] });
} catch (err) {
if (!(err instanceof MongoServerError && err.code === 11)) throw err; // 11: UserNotFound
}
});
}
async dropDatabaseAndUser(database: string, user: string): Promise<void> {
await this.admin(async (client) => {
const target = client.db(database);
+3 -2
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@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ runProvisioner("mongodb-database", {
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await mongo.dropDatabaseAndUser(p.as, p.as);
await announce("database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as });
// Locked, never dropped (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once). create gives the roles back.
await mongo.lockUser(p.as, p.as);
await announce("database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as, kept: "true" });
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
+8
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@@ -256,6 +256,14 @@ export class MssqlClient {
}
/** Drop a database and its login, idempotently, after evicting live connections. */
/** Withdraw a consumer and keep its database: its login is disabled, which create undoes. */
async disableLogin(login: string): Promise<void> {
const logins = await this.query(
`SELECT 1 AS ok FROM sys.server_principals WHERE name = ${literal(login)}`,
);
if (logins.length > 0) await this.exec(`ALTER LOGIN ${ident(login)} DISABLE`);
}
async dropDatabaseAndLogin(database: string, login: string): Promise<void> {
const dbs = await this.query(
`SELECT 1 AS ok FROM sys.databases WHERE name = ${literal(database)}`,
+3 -2
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@@ -41,8 +41,9 @@ runProvisioner("mssql-database", {
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await mssql.dropDatabaseAndLogin(p.as, p.as);
await announce("database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as });
// Disabled, never dropped (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once). create enables the login again.
await mssql.disableLogin(p.as);
await announce("database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as, kept: "true" });
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
+2 -4
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@@ -31,9 +31,7 @@ runProvisioner("analytics", {
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
const token = await umami.getToken();
// Keyed on the mesh-derived login, the one identity the harness carries into removal.
const site = await umami.findWebsite(token, p.as);
if (site) await umami.deleteWebsite(token, site.id);
// The website and its analytics are kept (novox/hq issue 241: a withdrawal never destroys a consumer's data — on 2026-10-04 a misread grants file withdrew every consumer at once); a person deletes a site, never this loop.
console.error(`[umami] ${p.as} withdrawn: website and its analytics kept`);
},
});