// minio's provisioner — the adapter that makes minio a provider of the mesh `s3-bucket` interface
// (the name in module.json's `provides`). The reconcile loop, the contributions file, and reading
// the mesh's minted secret are the sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how minio
// creates and removes a consumer's bucket and its scoped access key (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048).
//
// The `s3-bucket` interface: a consumer connects to an S3 endpoint with an access key confined to
// its own bucket. It depends on `s3-bucket`, not on minio, so any S3-compatible provider could serve
// it.
//
// **The access key and its secret are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (ADR 0048).** The mesh
// derives the login (the access-key id) and hands it to both ends, and mints the secret key. minio
// creates the service account under exactly that access key with exactly that secret — a credential
// the provisioner invented is one the consumer could never present. The bucket is derived from the
// login, so teardown recomputes it with nothing to persist.

import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { MinioClient, bucketFor } from "../client.js";

const minio = MinioClient.fromEnv();

runProvisioner("s3-bucket", {
  async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
    const bucket = bucketFor(p.as);
    const accessKeyId = p.as;

    if (!(await minio.bucketExists(bucket))) await minio.createBucket(bucket);
    // Re-mint the scoped key idempotently: drop any prior one under this id, then add it back with
    // the mesh's secret.
    try { await minio.removeAccessKey(accessKeyId); } catch { /* none yet — first provision */ }
    await minio.createAccessKey(bucket, accessKeyId, p.password);

    await announce("module.minio.bucket.created", {
      bucket,
      consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
      accessKey: accessKeyId,
      endpoint: minio.baseUrl,
    });
  },

  async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
    const bucket = bucketFor(p.as);

    // Revoking the key is what cuts the consumer's access. The bucket is emptied-then-dropped only if
    // empty; a bucket that still holds objects is left for an operator rather than erroring on every
    // reconcile tick — access is already gone, and silently deleting a consumer's data would be worse.
    try { await minio.removeAccessKey(p.as); } catch { /* already gone */ }
    try {
      await minio.removeBucket(bucket);
    } catch (err) {
      console.error(`[minio] bucket ${bucket} not removed (likely non-empty), access revoked: ${err}`);
    }

    await announce("module.minio.bucket.removed", { bucket, accessKey: p.as });
  },

  // Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
  // the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
  async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
    return minio.canReachAs(bucketFor(p.as), p.as, p.password);
  },
});

/** Emit best-effort: a broker hiccup is logged and dropped, never allowed to throw back and fail a
 *  bucket that was made. */
async function announce(type: string, body: unknown): Promise<void> {
  try {
    await emit(type, body);
  } catch (err) {
    console.error(`[minio] could not emit ${type}: ${err}`);
  }
}