// mosquitto's admin client — mosquitto's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Both
// this module's tools and its provisioner import it, and nothing outside mosquitto does.
//
// Client, role and ACL administration is driven through `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec`, not a hand-rolled
// MQTT stack: the module may take NO npm dependency beyond @novox/mesh-sdk, and mosquitto ships the
// exact admin client for its Dynamic Security plugin — so it shells out to it, the same way postgres
// drives itself through `psql`, minio through `mc` and mailu through `doveadm`. One boundary,
// `ctl()`, and every method is built on it.
//
// Why the Dynamic Security plugin and not `password_file`: dynsec creates and revokes clients while
// the broker runs, over an admin connection, with no broker restart and no file the host rewrites —
// the true analog of redis's runtime ACL users. A `password_file` would have to be re-read on a
// SIGHUP the runtime cannot cleanly send across containers, and — declared as a managed file — would
// be rewritten by the host on every reconcile, wiping every provisioned user (novox/nox issue 011).
// The one cost dynsec carries is the bootstrap file; see initBootstrapFile() and the module README.

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { promisify } from "node:util";

const run = promisify(execFile);

export interface MqttConn {
  readonly host: string;
  readonly port: number;
  /** The Dynamic Security admin client the runtime authenticates as. */
  readonly adminUser: string;
  readonly adminPassword: string;
}

export class MosquittoClient {
  constructor(private readonly conn: MqttConn) {}

  /**
   * Build from the module's resolved environment. Reads MESH_MQTT_* first (the documented names),
   * falling back to the MESH_PROVISION_* keys the manifest already sets on the provisioner
   * container. Throws if it cannot find a host and an admin password — the right failure, because
   * without them nothing it does can work.
   */
  static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): MosquittoClient {
    const endpoint = env.MESH_PROVISION_MQTT ?? ""; // "host:port"
    const host = env.MESH_MQTT_HOST ?? (endpoint ? endpoint.split(":")[0] : undefined);
    const port =
      Number(env.MESH_MQTT_PORT ?? (endpoint.includes(":") ? endpoint.split(":")[1] : "") ?? "1883") || 1883;
    const adminUser = env.MESH_MQTT_ADMIN_USER ?? env.MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER ?? "mesh-admin";
    const adminPassword = env.MESH_MQTT_PASSWORD ?? readSecretFile(env.MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE);
    if (!host || !adminPassword) {
      throw new Error(
        "mosquitto host or admin password is not set — mosquitto's own code cannot reach the broker",
      );
    }
    return new MosquittoClient({ host, port, adminUser, adminPassword: adminPassword ?? "" });
  }

  get host(): string {
    return this.conn.host;
  }

  get port(): number {
    return this.conn.port;
  }

  /**
   * Run one `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec <args>` command against the broker as the admin client and return
   * its stdout. Connects over MQTT with the verified connect flags `-h`/`-p`/`-u`/`-P`. A failed
   * command rejects — a failure here is an error, not a success with a warning.
   *
   * The exit code cannot carry that verdict: `mosquitto_ctrl` 2.0.x exits 0 from its dynsec
   * subcommands **even when they fail** — a "Client not found", an "already exists", a rejected
   * "Connection error: Not authorized", an "Unable to connect" all return status 0 and report the
   * failure only as a line of text, on stdout or stderr (verified live against 2.0.11). Trusting the
   * exit code is exactly how a `createClient` the broker refused reads back as a provisioned
   * consumer. So the combined output is scanned for the tool's error markers and a match is raised as
   * the failure it is.
   *
   * The admin password rides on argv (`-P`): mosquitto_ctrl 2.x exposes no password env var and no
   * password file for a broker connection — its only non-interactive mechanism is `-P`, its only
   * other mechanism an interactive prompt. This is a real mosquitto limitation, not a choice; unlike
   * psql's PGPASSWORD there is nothing cleaner to reach for. The exposure is momentary and confined
   * to this single-purpose runtime container; see the module README.
   */
  async ctl(...args: string[]): Promise<string> {
    const base = [
      "-h", this.conn.host,
      "-p", String(this.conn.port),
      "-u", this.conn.adminUser,
      "-P", this.conn.adminPassword,
    ];
    const { stdout, stderr } = await run("mosquitto_ctrl", [...base, "dynsec", ...args], {
      maxBuffer: 16 << 20,
    });
    const failure = ctlError(`${stdout}\n${stderr}`);
    if (failure) {
      throw new Error(`mosquitto_ctrl dynsec ${args[0] ?? ""} failed: ${failure}`);
    }
    return stdout;
  }

  /** Whether a dynsec client with this username already exists. */
  async clientExists(username: string): Promise<boolean> {
    try {
      await this.ctl("getClient", username);
      return true;
    } catch (err) {
      // Only "not found" means the client is genuinely absent. Any other failure — an auth
      // rejection, an unreachable broker — must NOT be read as "absent": that would send us down
      // the createClient path and bury the real error. Re-raise anything that is not a clean miss.
      if (/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) return false;
      throw err;
    }
  }

  /**
   * Whether this client already carries this role. mosquitto_ctrl has no idempotent addClientRole:
   * re-binding a role the client already has does not report "already exists" — it reports a bare
   * "Internal error" (verified against 2.0.11), indistinguishable from a genuine fault, so it cannot
   * be swallowed by message. Instead the binding is checked first. `getClient` lists each assigned
   * role under its "Roles:" heading as `<role> (priority: N)`; the role is matched as a whole token.
   */
  async clientHasRole(username: string, role: string): Promise<boolean> {
    let out: string;
    try {
      out = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
    } catch {
      return false; // no such client (or unreadable) — it certainly has no role
    }
    return new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(role)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(out);
  }

  /**
   * Create (or reset to a known state) a client scoped to one topic namespace, idempotently. The
   * client is confined to `<prefix>/#` by a same-named role: it may publish to, subscribe to and
   * receive on exactly its own subtree and nothing else — the MQTT analog of redis's keyspace-scoped
   * ACL user. Called again for an existing client, it resets the password and re-asserts the ACLs.
   */
  async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, topicPrefix: string): Promise<void> {
    const role = username; // one role per client, named for it
    const pattern = `${topicPrefix}/#`;

    if (await this.clientExists(username)) {
      await this.ctl("setClientPassword", username, password);
    } else {
      await this.ctl("createClient", username, "-p", password);
    }

    // A role carrying exactly this client's topic ACLs. createRole, addRoleACL and addClientRole are
    // all one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run against a role/ACL/binding it
    // created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal state — the ACL is
    // deterministic (`<prefix>/#`, allow), so re-adding the identical entry is a no-op — so it is
    // swallowed. (Until the exit code was fixed this was invisible: the tool returned 0 and the
    // rejection was lost; now it surfaces, and each of these adds must tolerate its own idempotent
    // re-run explicitly.)
    await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("createRole", role));
    for (const acl of ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"]) {
      // allow (1) this client to send to, receive on, and subscribe under its own subtree.
      await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl, pattern, "allow"));
    }
    // Bind the role only when it is not already bound — addClientRole is the one call whose
    // idempotent re-run cannot be recognised by message (see clientHasRole).
    if (!(await this.clientHasRole(username, role))) {
      await this.ctl("addClientRole", username, role);
    }
  }

  /** Remove a client and the per-client role created for it, idempotently. */
  async deleteScopedClient(username: string): Promise<void> {
    await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteClient", username));
    await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteRole", username));
  }

  /** The dynsec client list, parsed from `listClients`. */
  async listClients(): Promise<string[]> {
    const out = await this.ctl("listClients");
    return out
      .split(/\r?\n/)
      .map((l) => l.trim())
      .filter((l) => l.length > 0);
  }

  /**
   * Write the Dynamic Security bootstrap file offline, creating the admin client the plugin loads at
   * broker startup. This is a one-time seed, NOT part of the reconcile loop: run once before the
   * broker first starts, against the same path the broker's `plugin_opt_config_file` names. It must
   * never be a host-reconciled managed file — see the module README and novox/nox issue 011.
   */
  async initBootstrapFile(configFile: string): Promise<void> {
    // `dynsec init <file> <admin-username> [admin-password]` is an offline file operation — it does
    // not connect to the broker. The password is a positional argument (omitting it prompts).
    await run("mosquitto_ctrl", ["dynsec", "init", configFile, this.conn.adminUser, this.conn.adminPassword], {
      maxBuffer: 16 << 20,
    });
  }
}

/** Generate a URL-safe password with no argv- or MQTT-hostile characters. */
export function generatePassword(): string {
  return randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
}

/** Escape a string for literal use inside a RegExp. */
function escapeRegExp(s: string): string {
  return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
}

/**
 * Find the failure `mosquitto_ctrl` reported in text while still exiting 0. Its dynsec subcommands
 * surface errors in three shapes, on stdout or stderr:
 *   - `<command>: Error: <message>`   e.g. "createClient: Error: Client already exists"
 *   - `Connection error: <message>`   e.g. "Connection error: Not authorized"
 *   - `Unable to connect (<message>)` e.g. "Unable to connect (Lookup error.)."
 * The only other line it prints unprompted is the "running without encryption" warning, which
 * carries none of these markers. Returns the offending line, or undefined when the output is clean.
 */
function ctlError(output: string): string | undefined {
  for (const raw of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
    const line = raw.trim();
    if (!line) continue;
    if (/(^|:\s)Error:/i.test(line) || /^Connection error:/i.test(line) || /^Unable to connect/i.test(line)) {
      return line;
    }
  }
  return undefined;
}

/** Swallow a "already exists" failure so create paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
async function ignoreExisting(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
  try {
    await p;
  } catch (err) {
    if (!/exist/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
  }
}

/** Swallow a "not found" failure so delete paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
async function ignoreMissing(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
  try {
    await p;
  } catch (err) {
    if (!/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
  }
}

function readSecretFile(path: string | undefined): string | undefined {
  if (!path) return undefined;
  try {
    return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
  } catch {
    return undefined;
  }
}