Every module named its events the way the old bus spelled a routing key — `module.<module>.<verb>`. Design 29 says a module names an event locally and the mesh works out where it lands, so all 37 were stale against a rule already decided. On the new bus that derives into a namespace belonging to a module called "module", so no cross-module subscription in the mesh matched anything: nothing failed, nothing reacted (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/127). 36 manifests converted, and 43 files of module code with them. The code mattered as much as the manifests: the runtime builds the subject from what `emit()` is handed, so a converted manifest with unconverted code would have had the permission and the subject disagree. Three things the new check found on the way: - `photos` emitted an event its manifest never declared, which the new bus refuses outright. Declared. - `showcase` waited for an event nothing emits, so its demo could never be triggered — only `showcase` may publish under its own name. It emits both halves now. - `distribution` declared an event named after a different module. It emits `image.pushed` under its own name. An event about a *role* belongs on the seat, where the name outlives whoever holds it, but the sdk has no way to publish on a seat yet, so that stays recorded rather than declared. The audit logger's "everything" pattern is `**` rather than the old bus's `#`.
52 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
52 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript
// mosquitto's provisioner — the adapter that makes mosquitto a provider of the mesh `mqtt-topic`
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// interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file, and reading the mesh's minted password are
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// the sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how mosquitto creates and removes a
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// per-consumer MQTT client (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048).
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//
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// The `mqtt-topic` interface: a consumer connects as `as` with the password the mesh minted, and
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// publishes and subscribes under `<as>/#`, isolated from every other consumer by a Dynamic Security
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// role scoped to exactly that subtree.
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//
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// **The login and password are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (ADR 0048).** The mesh derives the
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// login and hands it to both ends so they agree, and mints the password and delivers a copy to each.
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// mosquitto creates exactly that client with exactly that password — a name or password the
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// provisioner invented is one the consumer could never present.
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import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
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import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
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import { MosquittoClient } from "../client.js";
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const mosquitto = MosquittoClient.fromEnv();
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/** Emit a lifecycle event without letting a broker hiccup fail the provisioning itself. */
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async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, string>): Promise<void> {
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try {
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await emit(type, body);
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} catch (err) {
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console.error(`[provisioner:mqtt-topic] emit ${type} failed: ${err}`);
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}
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}
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runProvisioner("mqtt-topic", {
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async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
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// The topic subtree is scoped to the consumer's own login, so one cannot read another's topics.
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const topicPrefix = p.as;
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await mosquitto.createScopedClient(p.as, p.password, topicPrefix);
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await announce("topic.provisioned", {
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consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
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username: p.as,
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topicPrefix,
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});
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},
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async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
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await mosquitto.deleteScopedClient(p.as);
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await announce("topic.deprovisioned", { username: p.as });
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},
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// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
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// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
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async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
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return mosquitto.holdsClient(p.as, p.password);
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},
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});
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