Object store, an s3-bucket provider. Client ported with no npm deps: S3 data plane over fetch + SigV4 (node:crypto), scoped access keys via the mc CLI (the admin API needs an Argon2 payload node built-ins can't make — the honest port hal also used). Tools: list buckets/objects, bucket info, presigned url. The provisioner makes a bucket + scoped key per grant and emits module.minio.bucket.created/removed (the secret stays off the bus). Typechecks; manifest parses. (Trimmed the generated self-consuming ledger: a provider need not subscribe to its own emits.)
67 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
67 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript
// minio's provisioner — the adapter that makes minio a provider of the mesh `s3-bucket` interface
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// (the name in module.json's `provides`). The reconcile loop, sealing and grant-file handling are the
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// sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how minio creates and removes a consumer's
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// bucket and its scoped access key (novox/hq ADR 0044/0045).
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//
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// The `s3-bucket` interface: a consumer receives `{ endpoint, bucket, accessKey, secretKey, region }`
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// — an S3 endpoint and a credential confined to its own bucket. It depends on `s3-bucket`, not on
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// minio, so any S3-compatible provider could serve it.
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//
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// The bucket and access-key id are derived deterministically from the consumer's identity, because
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// the harness hands `remove` only that identity (no stored values) — so teardown recomputes exactly
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// what creation minted, with nothing to persist. The emits fire here, at the real provisioning
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// points (novox/hq ADR 0046/0047); the module's events entrypoint (../index.ts) consumes them.
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import { runProvisioner, type Grant, type Credential } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
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import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
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import { MinioClient, accessKeyFor, bucketFor } from "../client.js";
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const minio = MinioClient.fromEnv();
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runProvisioner("s3-bucket", {
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async create(grant: Grant): Promise<Credential> {
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const bucket = bucketFor(grant.consumer);
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const accessKeyId = accessKeyFor(grant.consumer);
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if (!(await minio.bucketExists(bucket))) await minio.createBucket(bucket);
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// Re-mint the scoped key idempotently: drop any prior one under this id, then add fresh.
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try { await minio.removeAccessKey(accessKeyId); } catch { /* none yet — first provision */ }
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const key = await minio.createAccessKey(bucket, accessKeyId);
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await emit("module.minio.bucket.created", {
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bucket,
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consumer: grant.consumer,
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node: grant.node,
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accessKey: key.accessKey, // the secret is never put on the bus — only the credential file carries it
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endpoint: minio.baseUrl,
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});
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return {
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fields: {
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endpoint: minio.baseUrl,
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bucket,
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accessKey: key.accessKey,
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secretKey: key.secretKey,
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region: minio.region,
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},
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};
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},
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async remove(grant: Grant): Promise<void> {
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const bucket = bucketFor(grant.consumer);
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const accessKeyId = accessKeyFor(grant.consumer);
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// Revoking the key is what cuts the consumer's access. The bucket is emptied-then-dropped only if
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// empty; a bucket that still holds objects is left for an operator rather than erroring on every
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// reconcile tick — access is already gone, and silently deleting a consumer's data would be worse.
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try { await minio.removeAccessKey(accessKeyId); } catch { /* already gone */ }
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try {
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await minio.removeBucket(bucket);
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} catch (err) {
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console.error(`[minio] bucket ${bucket} not removed (likely non-empty), access revoked: ${err}`);
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}
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await emit("module.minio.bucket.removed", { bucket, consumer: grant.consumer, node: grant.node });
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},
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});
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