A consumer is a module on a machine, not a machine

novox/hq 04-ISSUES/022. A credential was keyed by provision, consumer
node and provider node, so "who is asking" was answered by naming a
host. The node this mesh exists to take over runs eight modules against
one database server.

The symptom had two halves and only one was loud. The provider refused,
naming the modules and explaining they would share one credential, which
reads as a decision rather than a limit. The consumer did not refuse: it
resolved cleanly, wrote one module's credential file and left the others
absent — a service that starts and cannot authenticate, with nothing
saying why. That is 021 again on a different axis.

Three modules wanting one database produced one need, carrying whichever
module mentioned it first, because the resolution walk is a work-list
over names. The fan-out now happens in one place, after the walk. The
record path already did this correctly and said why: a consumer here is
a module on a machine. It is the same rule.

Downstream: the secret's key gains the consuming module, the grant file
is named after both halves, needs are matched by provision and module
rather than provision alone, and the provisioners name the role and the
access key after the module. The refusal in ContributionsTo is gone
because there is nothing left to refuse.

Worth stating plainly: without that refusal, gitea's login would have
opened keycloak's database. From the provisioner's side it created
exactly what it was asked to create.

Existing secrets are discarded rather than backfilled. They cannot say
which module they were for, and a secret is remade and delivered to both
ends on the next push — so this costs one rotation and invents nothing.

Also guards the role name against PostgreSQL's 63-byte truncation, which
is a notice rather than an error and would reintroduce exactly this
collision at a length nobody tests.

Three faults injected — the fan-out removed, needs matched by name
alone, the grant file named after the machine — each caught.
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-01 02:40:09 +02:00
parent 1314be5282
commit 0af3ea1acf
14 changed files with 440 additions and 98 deletions
+30 -21
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,15 @@ func twoNodesWithKeys(t *testing.T) (*Inventory, context.Context) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// A credential belongs to a module on a machine, so the modules holding one must exist
// before it can (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/022). Two of them, because "two consumers on one node"
// is the case that key exists for.
for _, m := range []string{"gitea", "keycloak"} {
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{Module: m, Version: "1"},
Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
return inv, ctx
}
@@ -54,11 +63,11 @@ func TestASecretIsMadeOnceAndKept(t *testing.T) {
// Regenerating on every declaration would restart both ends on every push, and — worse — the
// password a provider was told to create would never be the one its consumer was given.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
first, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
first, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
second, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
second, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -72,7 +81,7 @@ func TestTheStoredSecretIsNotTheSecret(t *testing.T) {
// what an encrypted column does not achieve, because whoever runs the control plane can read
// through it.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
got, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
got, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -105,7 +114,7 @@ func TestANewSealingKeyMeansANewSecret(t *testing.T) {
// A node that rejoined generated a new key and can no longer open what was sealed to the old
// one. Keeping the blob would deliver something unreadable for ever, reported as configured.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -117,7 +126,7 @@ func TestANewSealingKeyMeansANewSecret(t *testing.T) {
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, node.ID, fresh); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -133,14 +142,14 @@ func TestANewSealingKeyMeansANewSecret(t *testing.T) {
func TestRotatingReachesBothEnds(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -175,7 +184,7 @@ func TestAProviderIsToldEveryCredentialItMustCreate(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, who := range []string{"consumer", "second-consumer"} {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", who, "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", who, "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
@@ -206,7 +215,7 @@ func TestANodeWithNoSealingKeyCannotBeGivenASecret(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
_, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
_, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a credential was made for nodes that cannot open one")
}
@@ -217,7 +226,7 @@ func TestANodeWithNoSealingKeyCannotBeGivenASecret(t *testing.T) {
func TestSecretsGoWhenANodeLeaves(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.store.Pool().Exec(ctx, `delete from node where name = 'consumer'`); err != nil {
@@ -340,7 +349,7 @@ func TestACredentialGoesWhenTheConsumerStopsAskingForIt(t *testing.T) {
if err := inv.Assign(ctx, "consumer", "meshboard"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -370,7 +379,7 @@ func TestACredentialGoesWhenEitherMachineDoes(t *testing.T) {
// The case that must not leave a live login behind: a machine removed from the mesh. Its
// credentials go with it, and the provider stops being told to keep them.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.store.Pool().Exec(ctx, `delete from node where name = 'consumer'`); err != nil {
@@ -464,12 +473,12 @@ func TestEveryHolderOfACredentialCanBeNamed(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, consumer := range []string{"consumer", "third"} {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", consumer, "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", consumer, "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
// And one for a different provision, which must not be swept up.
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "cache", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "cache", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -500,14 +509,14 @@ func TestEveryHolderOfACredentialCanBeNamed(t *testing.T) {
// And rotating gives both ends a new credential, together — the same one.
func TestRotatingGivesBothEndsTheSameNewCredential(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider")
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
@@ -534,14 +543,14 @@ func TestRotatingGivesBothEndsTheSameNewCredential(t *testing.T) {
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, third.ID, key); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
untouched, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "third", "provider")
untouched, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "third", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "postgres-database", "consumer", "gitea", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
again, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "third", "provider")
again, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "postgres-database", "third", "gitea", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}