licences: deliver the refresh token by the ordinary sealed path, not a bespoke envelope

The refreshable-grant refresh token no longer rides a custom at-rest envelope that a
module opens with a node private key. A module is never given a node's private sealing
key, so that path could not exist -- the gap Phase C hit.

Instead the refresh token is a credential sealed to the MANAGER holder with the same
anonymous box (secrets.Seal / crypto_box_seal) every credential uses, stored as one
sealed blob, and delivered by the existing host-unseal-and-mount: the host opens it with
the node's real key and mounts the cleartext at the manager module's bound path, exactly
as a consumer's db password is delivered.

  - refresh_grant now stores { sealed, manager_key }, dropping the AtRest token/wrapped_key
    columns; internal/secrets/atrest.go is retired (nothing else used it).
  - the licence records its manager as (node, module); KeyFor delivers the refresh token to
    the manager holder and the access token to consumers, disambiguated by module so the two
    can co-locate. Accept and the reseal skip the manager holder.
  - the manager holder is delivered the node's PUBLIC sealing key in its bound facts, so the
    module can re-seal a rotated refresh token with no private key of its own; the
    declaration tolerates its empty pre-adoption secret rather than refusing.
  - SubmitRefresh / set-grant take a sealed blob, never a refresh token in the clear.

The invariant holds unchanged: the control plane never reads the refresh token, and no node
but the manager holds it. A committed cross-language test proves the TypeScript module seal
opens under Go box.OpenAnonymous (the host's Unseal) -- both are NaCl crypto_box_seal.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
This commit is contained in:
2026-09-07 01:55:08 +02:00
parent 8e0c22fc2e
commit 33fd28ffa6
15 changed files with 563 additions and 593 deletions
+7 -1
View File
@@ -237,12 +237,18 @@ func (r Resolution) Declaration(with Rendering) ([]map[string]any, error) {
found = &r.Needs[i]
}
}
if found != nil && found.ByRecord && found.Sealed == "" {
if found != nil && found.ByRecord && found.Sealed == "" && !found.Manager {
// Answered by a record whose key has not been supplied since this consumer was
// put on it. **Refused, not skipped.** The mesh discarded the plaintext when the
// key was accepted and cannot seal another, so a machine that resolved cleanly
// would receive no file at all and fail at whatever tried to read it — which is
// the outcome ADR 0024 exists to avoid, arrived at politely.
//
// The manager holder is the one exception (novox/hq ADR 0050): an empty refresh token
// is a licence whose manager has not adopted one yet, a real waiting state rather than
// a lost key. It falls through to the skip below — its bound facts (carrying the
// manager's public key) are still delivered, which is what adoption needs to seal the
// first refresh token.
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"%s on this machine uses the licence %q and no key has been sealed to it. "+
"The mesh cannot make one; supply it again with `licence key %s`",