give: never take a trusted party's secret at a desk, and announce it before it is kept (hq ADR 0259 §10, the confirmation review's N1-give)

A desk's prompt is answered over the desk machine's bus, on a subject that machine's runtime answers;
on a desk machine agents run as the operator, who holds that credential, so an agent could answer first
with a bot token of its own sealed to the call's key. The secret of a module running as an account of
its own (the Telegram bot's token) is now refused at the desk, before anybody is asked, naming the line
to type at the controller's terminal; there it is announced on every channel, the old one among them,
before it is kept, and not kept when that announcement fails. What is typed at the terminal is not
echoed. Tests: the refusal with nobody asked, and only the desk machine's launcher may answer its
prompt (MaySubscribe).

cmd/mesh-controller/desk_secret_test.go

@@ -245,3 +245,51 @@ func TestOnlyTheGiveLinePassesTheTerminalRuleForSecrets(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 }
+
+// The confirmation review of 2026-10-09, N1-give: a desk's prompt is answered over the desk machine's bus, and
+// on a desk machine agents run as the operator, who holds its runtime's credential — so a trusted party's
+// secret (a module running as an account of its own: the Telegram bot's token) is never taken at a desk.
+// Refused before anybody is asked to type, whoever called, naming the terminal's line.
+func TestATrustedPartysSecretIsNeverTakenAtADesk(t *testing.T) {
+	d, accepted, acts, asked := aDesk(t, sealedTo(t, typed))
+	d.trusted = func(module string) (bool, error) { return module == "telegram", nil }
+	_, err := d.give("anchor", "telegram", "telegram-token", "laptop")
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "controller's terminal alone") ||
+		!strings.Contains(err.Error(), "secret accept anchor telegram telegram-token") {
+		t.Fatalf("a trusted party's secret was taken at the desk, or refused without the line: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(*asked)+len(*accepted)+len(*acts) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("asked %v, accepted %d, recorded %v", *asked, len(*accepted), *acts)
+	}
+	d.trusted = func(string) (bool, error) { return false, errors.New("the store did not answer") }
+	if _, err := d.give("anchor", "telegram", "telegram-token", "laptop"); err == nil || len(*asked) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("a module not known to be untrusted was asked at the desk: %v", err)
+	}
+}
+
+// And who may answer the desk's prompt at all: only the runtime of the machine it is asked on, carrying the
+// launcher that holds the seat there — never the controller, another machine's runtime, or a module's own
+// account (the confirmation review of 2026-10-09, N1-give).
+func TestOnlyTheDeskMachinesLauncherMayAnswerItsPrompt(t *testing.T) {
+	launcher := broker.Declared{Module: "rofi", Holds: []broker.Seat{{Name: "node-launcher", Scope: "node",
+		Serves: []string{"run", "secret"}}}}
+	subject := "mesh.seat.node-launcher.tool.secret.laptop"
+	for _, c := range []struct {
+		p       broker.Principal
+		answers bool
+	}{
+		{broker.Principal{Kind: broker.KindNodeTools, Node: "laptop", Module: broker.RuntimeModule, Carries: []broker.Declared{launcher}}, true},
+		{broker.Principal{Kind: broker.KindNodeTools, Node: "anchor", Module: broker.RuntimeModule, Carries: []broker.Declared{launcher}}, false},
+		{broker.Principal{Kind: broker.KindController}, false},
+		{broker.Principal{Kind: broker.KindModule, Node: "laptop", Module: "lab"}, false},
+		{broker.Principal{Kind: broker.KindNode, Node: "laptop"}, false},
+	} {
+		perms, err := broker.PermissionsFor(c.p)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		if got := broker.MaySubscribe(perms, subject); got != c.answers {
+			t.Errorf("%s may answer %s: %v, want %v", c.p.Username(), subject, got, c.answers)
+		}
+	}
+}