Let the controller ask an issued credential's tool in its own name, and seal it again over a remade pair (hq issue 526, ADR 0305)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds build-agent, mesh-controller, route-proxy → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it…
mesh/repo-check pass: its merge-check.sh passed
mesh/delivery delivered
mesh/delivery-group group feat/526-a-provider-delivers-what-its-software-issued delivered: every member is delivered
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds build-agent, mesh-controller, route-proxy → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it…
mesh/repo-check pass: its merge-check.sh passed
mesh/delivery delivered
mesh/delivery-group group feat/526-a-provider-delivers-what-its-software-issued delivered: every member is delivered
The bus left the controller out of the caller-named grants, so issued could never reach plex's tool; the controller is now granted exactly the tools of offers whose software issues the credential, composed from the records, so the installer's first user list is unchanged. A pair remade on a key change or accepted by hand kept the issued stamp and was never sealed again; those writes now clear it.
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@@ -58,7 +58,9 @@ const (
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// **Remade when either end's sealing key changes.** A node that rejoined generated a new key and
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// can no longer open what was sealed to the old one, so keeping the blob would deliver something
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// unreadable for ever. The new secret reaches both ends in the same push, which is the only
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// moment they can be changed together.
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// moment they can be changed together. A remade value is the mesh's, whatever the row held: its
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// origin says made and it carries no stamp, so a value a provider's software issued is sealed to it
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// again at the provider's next ask (novox/hq ADR 0305 §5) rather than read as still held.
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func (i *Inventory) SecretFor(ctx context.Context, name, consumer, consumerModule, provider, local string) (
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Secret, error) {
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consumerKey, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, consumer)
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@@ -121,7 +123,8 @@ func (i *Inventory) SecretFor(ctx context.Context, name, consumer, consumerModul
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for_consumer = excluded.for_consumer, for_provider = excluded.for_provider,
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consumer_key = excluded.consumer_key, provider_key = excluded.provider_key,
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created_at = now(),
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operator_sealed = excluded.operator_sealed, operator_key = excluded.operator_key`,
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operator_sealed = excluded.operator_sealed, operator_key = excluded.operator_key,
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origin = 'made', generation = null`,
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name, consumerNode.ID, consumerModule, providerNode.ID,
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made.ForConsumer, made.ForProvider, made.ConsumerKey, made.ProviderKey, forOperator, operatorKey, local)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -202,7 +205,7 @@ func (i *Inventory) AcceptSecretForPair(ctx context.Context, name, consumer, con
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on conflict (name, local, consumer, consumer_module, provider) do update set
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for_consumer = excluded.for_consumer, for_provider = excluded.for_provider,
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consumer_key = excluded.consumer_key, provider_key = excluded.provider_key,
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created_at = now(), origin = excluded.origin,
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created_at = now(), origin = excluded.origin, generation = null,
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operator_sealed = excluded.operator_sealed, operator_key = excluded.operator_key`,
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name, consumerNode.ID, consumerModule, providerNode.ID,
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sealed.ForConsumer, sealed.ForProvider, sealed.ConsumerKey, sealed.ProviderKey,
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