Rotate a credential and move both ends together
The invariant novox/hq ADR 0001 records as unowned, and it was measurably false in HAL: a provision documented as never rotating minted a new password on every adoption and updated only the provider's row. Consumers on three nodes held dead credentials for two days while the mesh reported success. Nothing enumerated who held the old one. Three things make that impossible here. The holders are a set the mesh can name — each pair has its own credential, so rotating one consumer touches one role and the affected list is a query rather than an assumption. Both ends are pushed by this command rather than a later one, because leaving the sending to whoever remembered is the fault exactly. And it is all-or-nothing: if any affected machine cannot be resolved, nothing is sent and the old credential keeps working, which is a mesh that has not rotated rather than one that has half-rotated. The window is stated rather than hidden: a role's password changes on the provider and the file changes on the consumer, and they cannot be simultaneous. The provisioner now takes its superuser password from the file the mesh wrote, which is how the mesh delivers one. Passing it through the environment needed a person in the middle of the one path that exists so there is not one — and put a superuser password where `docker inspect` prints it.
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@@ -230,3 +230,42 @@ func (i *Inventory) AcceptSecretForModule(ctx context.Context, node, module, nam
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record.ID, module, name, sealed.ForConsumer, key)
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return err
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}
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// Holder is one end-to-end credential: who gets it and who must create it.
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type Holder struct {
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Provision string
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Consumer string
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Provider string
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}
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// HoldersOf is every pair sharing a credential for one provision.
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//
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// **The question rotation has to ask, and the one HAL could not.** There, a provision had a single
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// shared credential and rotating it updated the provider's row; nothing enumerated who else held
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// the old one, so three nodes carried dead credentials for two days and the mesh reported success
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// (novox/hq ADR 0001). Here each pair has its own credential, and this is the list that makes
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// "every consumer" a set the mesh can name rather than a hope.
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//
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// Empty consumer means all of them.
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func (i *Inventory) HoldersOf(ctx context.Context, provision, consumer string) ([]Holder, error) {
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rows, err := i.store.Pool().Query(ctx,
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`select s.name, c.name, p.name from secret s
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join node c on c.id = s.consumer
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join node p on p.id = s.provider
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where s.name = $1 and ($2 = '' or c.name = $2)
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order by c.name, p.name`, provision, consumer)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var out []Holder
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for rows.Next() {
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var h Holder
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if err := rows.Scan(&h.Provision, &h.Consumer, &h.Provider); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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out = append(out, h)
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}
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return out, rows.Err()
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}
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