A route now consumed with two hosts when the mesh composed both — the
same host under internal-name reaches the same rule as its public name,
restoring the convenience a predecessor proxy gave for reaching a service
over the VPN without a public TLS round trip (the field composeName now
writes, feat/route-carries-internal-alias — this branch depends on that
one landing for internal-name to ever be populated; builds and tests
clean without it, just serves nothing extra).
Never certified: onlyWhatTheMeshSaid used routed(), which answered yes
for any host in the table regardless of how it got there. A new
eligibleForACME() checks a parallel 'public' set instead — every host
reached through a route's own name, never one reached only through its
internal-name — so an internal alias is proxied but never given its own
failing ACME order. routed() is unchanged and still used for the 404
message, which legitimately wants 'is this host served at all.'
Found reviewing my own change before merging it, and it was load-bearing rather than cosmetic.
Priority was read with asPort, which caps at 65535. A rule declared above that silently became
priority 0 and stopped shadowing the route it exists to shadow. The one real rule this has to
reproduce is declared at 100000 — so path scoping and refusal would both have shipped looking
complete, passing their tests, and doing nothing on the only case that motivated them.
A priority is an ordering and has no range. asWhole takes any whole number the mesh wrote and
rejects a non-integral one, which was not meant as a priority.
Also: a host may now be routed on some paths and not others, which made the 404 dishonest — it
said "no route for this name" while listing that very name as served, a contradiction an
operator has to disbelieve the proxy to get past. An uncovered path now says so, and a name
that is genuinely not served still lists what is.
Two regression tests, both through the proxy rather than against the parser, because the parser
was where the bug looked fine.
Implements novox/hq ADR 0108, closing issue 116. The proxy's request path was a host lookup
and a forward, so it applied nothing — while the ingress it replaces relies on four things it
had none of.
Path scoping came first because it is a prerequisite, not a sibling. The table mapped a host
to one target, so a host could not be routed two ways, and the refusal this issue turns on
matches a path on a host already routed to a workload. No amount of authentication or source
filtering would have made it expressible. The table is now host to an ordered list of rules,
matched on path prefix.
The order is total, not just by priority. Sorting on priority alone leaves rules that share
one in whatever order the map produced, so the same declaration would serve differently
between restarts — a fault that works, and works differently each time, which is the hardest
kind to believe when reported. Within a priority the longer path wins, which is also the
intuitive reading.
auth names a secret and never holds one. A declaration carrying a credential is refused
whole rather than served unprotected, so the option ADR 0108 rejected cannot return by
accident. A secret that cannot be read makes the route refuse and say so, rather than serve
the workload unprotected — a gate that cannot check is not a gate that opens, and the
alternative turns a missing file into a silently public admin surface.
Authentication costs one bcrypt comparison on every path including an unknown user, so an
unknown user is not measurably faster than a known one with a wrong password. That difference
is a way to enumerate a route's users from outside it.
Redirects keep the request's own path and query, or canonicalising one name onto another
would land every deep link on the front page and raise no error doing it.
Eleven tests, four of them for the capabilities and two for the failure modes that rot
quietly: the credential-in-a-declaration refusal, and the unreadable secret failing closed.
Nothing else breaks if those stop working, so nothing else would report it.
No new dependency: bcrypt comes from the x/crypto module already required.
jschoubben
jochen