Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben 1f5b70a995 The mesh assigns the port, and a module says it once
novox/hq ADR 0038. A module cannot choose a port: it is written once and
assigned anywhere, so any number it picks is a guess about a machine it
has never seen. A database module met the mesh's own store on 5432 and
was told, by a container runtime three layers down, that the port was
already allocated.

The number used to appear three times in every module — the rule set,
what a consumer is told, and what the runtime publishes — agreeing only
because one person wrote all three. Now it appears once, in `listens`,
and the other two are derived: the container publishes `20000:5432`, the
consumer is told 20000, and the rule set opens 20000.

An assignment is made once and kept, as a credential is. A port that
moved on every declaration would restart both ends each time and hand a
consumer a number that was true when it was read.

Ports the protocol fixes — mail on 25, submission on 587, DNS on 53 —
say so, and are then claims: one holder per machine, and the second is
refused by name at assignment. That is the mechanism the mesh already
has for what is singular on a machine, pointed at ports.

A mapping written the long way is left exactly as it is. Some things
must be pinned by hand, and quietly overruling somebody who wrote both
halves would be worse than not offering the short form.

Still open, and known: the substrate is not a module, so the mesh has
never heard of its own store and cannot yet assign around it. That is
what 028 will still be about after this.
2026-09-01 17:52:53 +02:00
jschoubben a5d85266d0 A container does not take restart-on, and nine of them did
This is what stopped the forge. The host refused the whole declaration:

  resource "postgres.server": a container does not use "restart-on",
  and it is set. Refused rather than ignored

`restart-on` belongs to a service. I put it on containers this morning
so one would pick up a rotated credential — nine times across seven
modules — and nothing between the manifest and the machine said a word.
The control plane composed it happily; the parser accepted it; the
manifest tests passed. The only thing that knew was the host, five steps
downstream, and hearing from it cost a seventeen-minute run.

The host was right twice over. It refused, and it refused *everything*,
because applying the parts it understood would leave a machine that
looks configured and is not. One misplaced key therefore stops a module
dead, which is the correct severity and an argument for catching it
where it is written.

So the shapes and their keys are now written down here and checked. They
are duplicated from another repository deliberately — this is its wire
format, like the shape of a grant file — and a contract with two copies
and no check is a contract until somebody edits one.

What this does not fix is why I reached for it: a container cannot
follow a file. Filed separately.
2026-09-01 17:19:04 +02:00
jschoubben ee3cc1b6f4 Pin the example modules to images that exist
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/025. Every image reference in every example module
was sixty-four zeros — eighteen of them across five modules. Each
parsed, resolved, and composed into a declaration a host accepts, and
none could ever have started: the machine reaches `docker pull` and
stops. That is why those modules were written and not running, and no
check saw it because every check passed.

The host validates the shape of a reference and nothing more, which is
correct: verifying a digest exists means reaching a registry, and that
is the one thing a host must never have to do. So the last place that
could catch this is the wrong place to try.

The guard therefore sits where a declaration is composed, not where a
manifest is parsed. A file in a repository is allowed to await a pin —
the design already says the manifest in a repository names artifacts
while the manifest the mesh holds names digests, and the bundle works
exactly that way. What must never happen is a placeholder reaching a
machine, and composing is the last moment before one does.

Twelve third-party images resolved to real digests without pulling
anything, which is also the mechanism the open issue needs. Two
discoveries came free: mailu publishes to ghcr rather than Docker Hub,
so seven references named repositories that do not exist at all; and it
renamed roundcube to webmail, so that one would have failed even with
the right registry.

What stays a placeholder is the mesh's own provisioner images, which
genuinely have no digest until built and pushed — the bundle's problem,
legitimately unresolved here. The stand-in consumer now stands in with
a real image rather than an invented one.
2026-09-01 15:13:33 +02:00
jschoubben 950ebb9e28 The two halves of an object-store edge, as a readable pair
Manifests for a provider and a consumer, so the contract can be read
rather than only exercised through a lab fixture that stages the grants
by hand.

Checked as a pair rather than separately, because two manifests that
only ever parse alone are two manifests nobody has held against each
other. The test asserts the names match, that each side says where it
wants to be told, and that the consumer contributes the key the
provisioner actually reads.

That last one is the trap worth having a test for: a consumer
contributing "name" — which is exactly what a database consumer
contributes — resolves cleanly, deploys, and then fails on the machine
with "asked for a bucket and did not name it". Nothing in that message
points back at the manifest that caused it. Both mistakes were made
while writing these two files.
2026-08-31 17:52:14 +02:00