The switch to release 6 is today's controller's last plan, and the bus runs the user list it composes until the new
controller writes one: so the new controller's writes of each node's compositions and their digests, each new
node-engine's reads of its own compositions and wants and its backup holder's verbs and word, and the assigner's read
of the digests must be granted by this controller already (ADR 0539 clauses 2, 6, 9 and 16; the review's A1).
internal/chain holds typed Build, Rollout and Assignment and a Backend with no delete or purge, in memory and on the bus. The builds and rollouts buckets are asserted with history 64, no age and values up to just under a mebibyte; the assignments bucket gets the same, keeping its marker age because a stream cannot be made to disallow message ages. Migration 0104 makes the one-row chain_moved switch. The controller keeps no consolidated schema, so 0104 is the whole schema change. Nothing reads the buckets yet.
mesh/merge-gate error: builds build-agent, mesh-controller, route-proxy → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; the check could not run: killed by hand
Every one of the 48 core failures of research 031 was found by a person
looking; the mesh's answers carried the fact for whoever asked and told
nobody.
- The condition store (to-be 45 §2): mesh-controller_conditions, one key
per open condition, written by compare-and-set so a person's silence
and the watchdogs never lose each other's word; every transition kept
ninety days in mesh-controller_condition-history and said as the
seat's events condition-raised / condition-changed / condition-cleared
(the condition at the top level, with event, at, change, why, show),
offered again while the bus is away. Raised and cleared by observation
only; a clearing reopened within ten minutes is the same condition with
its count up, its silence kept. Verbs: conditions, conditions show,
conditions silence (a hand act, at most a week), conditions history.
- ADR 0224's provider standing is the first kind, provider-failing, held
by the provider's events; the provider_standing table is no longer read
or written (left in place: dropping it is the operator's word).
- status leads with the open conditions, urgent first, and says all well
only with none open; conditions it cannot read are said and not well.
- The signals table compiled in, one watchdog loop over it every 30s: S1
heartbeat (3 intervals, asleep machines excepted, control node urgent
after 30 min), S2 report after a send, S3 plan tier, S4 event loop deaf,
S5 merge not acted, S6 ask lost, S7 call hung, S8 provider silent, S9
advisories, S10 self-check silent, S11 node tools silent, S13 stale
refusals; S12, S14, S15 deferred with their reasons. A row that cannot
see raises probe-failed and clears nothing. A test generated from the
table suppresses each signal inside and past its bound.
- The bus's advisories (maximum deliveries, a mesh consumer deleted) and
the controller's own slow consumer and refused subjects, said in the
mesh's words.
- doctor: the probe registry D1-D10 (D5 deferred) and DW, every five
minutes, each in thirty seconds; a probe that cannot run is never a
pass. D1 validates with mesh-host's own validator. Every run ends with
the doctor-heartbeat event mesh-watcher listens for.
- The controller is granted its new buckets, events, the two advisories
and $SRV.INFO; the node tools their tools-alive heartbeat. The streams
and consumers the controller asserts and the ones D6/D7 expect are one
derivation.
A cancel writes the ask's id into the seat's cancelled set before deleting
the ask, and a write is a publish to the bucket's subject, which the
controller was not granted: against a server holding exactly the
controller's composed list, every cancel timed out.