A node-scope provider that answers a requirement on the same machine and
serves connection facts (a port) but mints no credential delivered
nothing to a co-located consumer. resolve.go only built the delivering
Needed when brokered[want] was set — true only for mesh-scope providers;
a node-scope keyless provider set local[want] instead and fell through,
so knownFor saw no binding and boundInto refused the consumer's
${bound:model-access:port} file.
Deliver the served facts as a need whenever the same-node answer serves a
non-empty set, with a loopback fallback for the address when the node is
off the private network — the reachability rule does not apply to two ends
on one machine. The brokered (credentialed, mesh-scope) path is untouched.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
One registry line — `"openai": StaticKey`. The generic static-key adapter
already serves any vendor (accept is the vendor-independent seal, deliver is the
value unchanged, and refresh/identity/usage are not implemented), so a second
static-key vendor is data, not code. The shape-selection test now asserts
For("openai") reports static-key.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A container with `network: host` was skipped when the mesh injects its
`<node>.internal` names, on the belief it "shares the machine's hosts file
already". It does not: `docker run --network host` still gives the container
its own /etc/hosts (localhost and its own id only), so every internal name the
mesh wrote is invisible inside it, and a client that dials one gets EAI_AGAIN.
This surfaced with the first host-network consumer to dial a provider by the
`.internal` address the mesh hands it as `${bound:...:at}` (the model-usage
store reaching its postgres). The remedy is the same `--add-host` every other
container already gets — the runtime accepts it with `--network host`
(verified against Docker) and mesh-host emits it for any network mode.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The manager module's seal now runs over the audited tweetnacl-sealedbox-js (mesh-catalog
anthropic-manager) rather than a hand-transcribed NaCl. Regenerate the fixture's sealed value
from that new seal() over the same node key pair and plaintext, so the fixture is the new
library's output. crypto_box_seal is randomised, so the blob differs; the wire format does
not. TestModuleSealedBoxOpensInGo still opens it under box.OpenAnonymous and recovers the
plaintext, proving TS(tweetnacl-sealedbox-js) to Go interop.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The refreshable-grant refresh token no longer rides a custom at-rest envelope that a
module opens with a node private key. A module is never given a node's private sealing
key, so that path could not exist -- the gap Phase C hit.
Instead the refresh token is a credential sealed to the MANAGER holder with the same
anonymous box (secrets.Seal / crypto_box_seal) every credential uses, stored as one
sealed blob, and delivered by the existing host-unseal-and-mount: the host opens it with
the node's real key and mounts the cleartext at the manager module's bound path, exactly
as a consumer's db password is delivered.
- refresh_grant now stores { sealed, manager_key }, dropping the AtRest token/wrapped_key
columns; internal/secrets/atrest.go is retired (nothing else used it).
- the licence records its manager as (node, module); KeyFor delivers the refresh token to
the manager holder and the access token to consumers, disambiguated by module so the two
can co-locate. Accept and the reseal skip the manager holder.
- the manager holder is delivered the node's PUBLIC sealing key in its bound facts, so the
module can re-seal a rotated refresh token with no private key of its own; the
declaration tolerates its empty pre-adoption secret rather than refusing.
- SubmitRefresh / set-grant take a sealed blob, never a refresh token in the clear.
The invariant holds unchanged: the control plane never reads the refresh token, and no node
but the manager holds it. A committed cross-language test proves the TypeScript module seal
opens under Go box.OpenAnonymous (the host's Unseal) -- both are NaCl crypto_box_seal.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Phase C of model-access (ADR 0050). Refresh above calls an in-process
VendorRefresher, which would open the at-rest envelope inside the control
plane's own process. Anthropic must not: its refresh runs on the manager
node. So add SubmitRefresh, the companion that publishes a refresh a
manager node already performed -- it is given only the new access token in
the clear (sealed per holder, as any accepted key) and an opaque re-sealed
refresh envelope (stored unopened). The refresh token in the clear never
crosses this boundary. The reseal-and-publish half is extracted and shared
with Refresh, so the sealing logic is one implementation.
CLI: licence grant (print the opaque envelope), set-grant (store a
module-produced envelope -- adoption), submit-refresh (access token +
optional rotated envelope). Tests defend that the manager alone opens the
refresh token and the control plane never holds it in the clear.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The ADR 0050 carve-out, built generic and vendor-neutral. A refreshable-grant
licence records one manager node; that node holds the refresh token encrypted at
rest, access tokens are still sealed per holder, and the refresh token is never in
a holder's delivery. Bounded on the three stated axes: refreshable-grant vendors
only, the refresh token only, the manager node only. Anthropic's actual OAuth
refresh stays a Phase-C plug-in behind a clean seam.
- New at-rest crypto (secrets.SealAtRest/OpenAtRest): envelope encryption distinct
from the per-holder anonymous-box seal. The refresh token is under a symmetric
data key (secretbox); the data key is wrapped to the manager node's public
sealing key. The database alone holds ciphertext and a wrapped key with no
private half to open either — only the manager node reads it back.
- Refreshable-grant adapter dispatch: anthropic is now refreshable-grant,
anthropic-api-key the static-key second case. The adapter implements the
Refresher seam by delegating to an injected VendorRefresher (the Phase-C plug,
none shipped). static-key is untouched. The type assertion to Refresher is what
gates the carve-out to refreshable-grant vendors.
- Refresh lease/rotate/publish flow (Licences.Refresh): a transaction-scoped
advisory lock is the single-refresher lease; the new access token comes from the
vendor refresh, is sealed per holder (secrets.Seal, as Accept does) and delivered
on the next push — doc 13's reseal-and-publish half, all-or-nothing. The refresh
token stays put, re-encrypted at rest only if the vendor rotated it.
- Manager and refresh_grant schema: consolidated into migrations/0001 and carried
by a new incremental 0003 (the dual-write rule).
- 17 new tests, including the four security checks: KeyFor never carries the
refresh token, a static key has no manager and cannot be refreshed, the at-rest
token needs the manager's key, and a refresh delivers a new sealed access token.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
ADR 0050 Phase A. Rename the licence's `provider` field to `vendor` — the
inventory already uses "provider" for which node answers a brokered provision,
and one word must not carry two facts — and route the licence layer's sealing
and delivery through a per-vendor adapter selected by that field.
The rename touches the Go struct/params/SQL in internal/licences, the operator
CLI, and the schema: 0001 (the consolidated schema) now creates the column as
`vendor`; a new guarded 0002 renames it on a database that predates the change,
and is a no-op on a fresh one.
The adapter (internal/licences/adapters) has a `shape` and the two verbs a
static-key vendor needs — accept (the generic anonymous-box seal) and deliver
(the sealed blob unchanged). refresh/identity/usage are named as optional
capability interfaces so the refreshable-grant seam exists before its code.
A registry maps vendor→shape (anthropic→static-key for now, with a Phase-B
TODO to swap it to refreshable-grant); an unknown vendor is refused clearly.
Behaviour is unchanged from the operator's view except the field name.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A consumer that requires a provision whose serves names no consumer key (redis-cache, amqp)
contributes no payload, but it still ASKS for it. ContributionsFrom keyed 'asks' on
contributions alone, so such a consumer's grant got From='' — read as withdrawn — and the
provider never created its account. redis-cache consumers (e.g. baserow) were silently
unprovisioned, tolerated only by their embedded fallback. A module asks iff it still requires
the provision, whether or not it hands anything up. Regression test added.
Found by the lavinmq AMQP provider bed (given:[] for a require-only amqp consumer); fix
lab-proven green there.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A container may declare schedule: "<cron>", the recurring twin of
run-once. The resolver already carries a resource's keys through
untouched, so schedule reaches the rendered host declaration on its own;
what belongs here is refusing, near its author, what the host would
otherwise refuse far away.
The manifest parser refuses a schedule that is not a string, one that is
not a well-formed five-field cron (cron.go: fields, ranges, *, comma,
dash, slash), and the contradictory pair run-once + schedule -- a
container runs once and gates, or on a cadence, or stays up, never two.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The provider-seal-key gate: on a node with two modules requiring the same provision (baserow
and letta both consuming postgres), sealedFor matched a need by provision NAME alone, so a
file's ${secret:X} placeholder took whichever consumer's sealed credential came last in
r.Needs -- the OTHER module's password. baserow was handed letta's password and could not
authenticate. The secrets:-map delivery path already guards this (For == m.Module, novox/hq
04-ISSUES/022); the ${secret:...} placeholder path did not. Added the same guard.
Also dedups the contributions file: when provider and consumer are co-located, grantsFor
enumerates the same-node consumer, so a consumer was emitted twice into the provider's
receives file (once full with its grant, once partial). The m.Contributes loop now skips a
(provision, module) the grants loop already carried; non-grant contributions (routes) still emit.
Regression test added: two consumers of one provision each get their own credential. Proven
end-to-end on a two-node lab install (mesh-lab assigned-two-node-db): baserow and letta on one
node, substrate on another, each authenticates with its own minted password.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A container may be marked `run-once: true` — a step the host runs to completion,
gating whatever the declaration places after it. The control plane's part is
small: the field is carried to the host unchanged (containers pass through as
maps), and the step keeps its author-order position ahead of the container it
gates, because the gate is declaration order, not a resolved dependency
(ADR 0005).
The manifest parser refuses a run-once that is not a boolean and the pair
run-once + restart-on (contradictory lifecycles) — near the manifest rather than
far away on the machine, the same lesson the action ban records. Three unit
tests; go build ./... and go test ./... green.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A node says it is there every minute and describes what it applied rarely,
and both went through Heard, which wrote every one down as a report. So a
bare alive replaced the node's last real apply with an empty one -- clearing
the declaration digest `current` is measured against, the carried ports a
push assigns around, and the clean-or-failed outcome. A node that had just
caught up read as behind within the minute, and never converged.
Whether it converged in time was a race the node's own apply set: the link's
one loop applies a declaration to completion before it can send the pending
heartbeat, so a fast apply (catalogue-small) leaves the digest standing the
~60s until the next beat -- long enough for the lab to see `current` -- while
a heavy wave whose apply outran the first beat (mongodb + unifi + marrytts)
had the alive fire milliseconds after the report and never showed `current`
at all, timing out settle even at 1200s.
Heard now returns after moving last_seen for a report that carries no account
of what the machine did -- nothing applied, nothing refused, nothing failed,
which is exactly a bare alive. A real report always carries one. This is what
the commit that began hearing alives said it did and did not: "a bare word
that a node is there moves last_seen and touches nothing else."
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
04-ISSUES/036: the media stack is several modules that must share the
library and download directories on one machine, but the manifest could
only say "a directory I own". Six modules each declared the same paths as
their own resources, and the resolver's duplicate-owner refusal — right
in general — would refuse the stack's only sensible assignment the first
time two of them landed on one node.
Add an `accesses` field: a pre-existing, operator-owned path a module is
granted use of but does not own (novox/hq ADR 0051). Distinct from a
`directory` resource on every axis the host acts on — the mesh creates,
chowns and reconciles a directory; it mounts an access and owns nothing.
An access is not a resource, so it never enters the duplicate-owner map
and several modules may name one path with no conflict. What is refused
is the contradiction: a path one module owns and another accesses.
Rendered into the declaration as an `access` resource, before the
container that mounts it, so the host can find it present or refuse
clearly. Unit tests cover co-resolution (the exact 036 case), the
unchanged owner-vs-owner refusal, the owner-vs-accessor refusal, and
access validation.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A module may declare a short `slug`; the mesh derives mesh_<node>_<slug|name> and
refuses at assignment (naming the slug as the remedy) when it would still overflow —
identityLimit is now 20, an S3 access key's, the tightest of the backends a login
reaches (04-ISSUES/010). The slug rides the grant so the provider derives the same
login the consumer does, even across nodes. CheckIdentity is now wired, in grantsFor.
Also, the minted secret shrinks to 40 chars (30 bytes) from 43: an S3 secret key is
8-40, the same fit-the-tightest-backend rule on the credential's other half.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
CreateModuleAccount now also grants serve.<module>.* (declare, bind, consume its
own tool queues) and mesh.rpc (bind them on, publish replies) — so a module can
serve its tools and reply, scoped to exactly its own, and no other module's. The
broker tests still hold a module out of another's queue.
listens.from was a manifest constant — one value for every node a module runs
on. Now a per-node setting overrides it: {"expose": {"5432": "anywhere"}} makes
postgres public on the machine it is set for while it stays from:mesh elsewhere,
and the firewall (ADR 0050) is computed from the effective source. Exposure()
validates it — a port the module does not listen on, or a source that is not
mesh/anywhere/machine, is refused rather than reaching nothing; UnusedSettings
knows 'expose' is a real destination. Tested: default mesh, setting opens it to
anywhere, bad settings refused.
LavinMQ refuses a non-administrator declaring a queue with a dead-letter
exchange, so a scoped module cannot make its own. EnsureModuleQueue declares
<node>.<module>.events with its DLX as the mesh, and 'module issue' does so
for a consuming module — the runtime then passively checks it rather than
declaring. Verified against a real broker: the scoped account binds and
consumes the pre-declared queue.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
CreateModuleAccount gives an assigned module its own broker account whose
permissions ARE its manifest: declare and read its own <node>.<module>.events
queue, read the events exchange to bind onto if it consumes, write the events
exchange only if it emits. The account name carries the node (sealed per
machine), the permissions carry the module (one cannot read another's queue).
The builder becomes one instance of this rule rather than a separate kind.
EnsureEventExchanges declares the bus the substrate owns — mesh.events,
mesh.rpc, mesh.events.dead + a retention queue — idempotently, since a module
account may not declare an exchange.
Scope tested as patterns (no broker needed), and every management call verified
against a real LavinMQ. Honest limit recorded in the code: LavinMQ has no topic
permissions, so ADR 0047's emit-origin reservation (module.<self>.*) is stamped
by the sdk, not enforced by the broker; a pure consumer like the audit logger
is unaffected.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A module declares the event types it emits and the patterns it consumes,
parallel to provides/requires (novox/hq ADR 0046). Events span module.*,
mesh.* and node.* sources; a consumes for an event nothing emits is a
dangling edge. Fields only here; the dangling-edge check and the runtime
wiring follow.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The report carries the digest of the declaration it applied (mesh-host
8211d8b), and the mesh stores it beside the outcome. `reported` rows in
the status JSON now say `current`: whether the machine's last word
names the declaration last sent.
Not derivable from the timestamps beside it, which is why they were
not enough: an apply begun under the previous declaration reports
after the next send — newer, and still about the old words. The lab
lost exactly that race between one test's closing push and the next
test's opening one.
Empty digests — every host from before reports carried one — read as
not current, which errs toward waiting rather than toward asserting on
files that are not there yet.
"Not waiting" says the declaration is current, not that the machine
finished applying it: the sent digest is recorded at send. So a test
that pushed, saw waiting clear, and asked the machine what it was
running found containers that did not exist yet — the certificate fix
made compositions stable, and the settling that used to fail first had
been hiding the gap behind it.
The mesh already held the missing half: every machine's last report,
with its time. It just was not in the JSON. `reported` now sets each
machine's last word beside when the current declaration went to it, and
"has it caught up" becomes a comparison of two timestamps the mesh
recorded itself — a report newer than the send means the machine acted
on what was sent; older means it is still working, which waiting alone
cannot distinguish.
Every signing carries a fresh random serial, so a mesh that signed per
composition composed a different declaration every time it was asked
what a machine should be. Every machine carrying a certificate then
stood eternally "waiting" — pushed seconds ago and already behind — and
the forge test, the first to wait for settledness on such a machine,
failed four runs in a row wearing three other faults' clothes.
Found live on a kept mesh, which is what settled it: two plans seconds
apart, identical to the byte but for one serial, in the certificate
file. Deduction had four theories; the diff had one line.
The keeping columns had existed since the serving key's migration —
"and what was issued for it" — and were written by nothing, the same
shape ReleasePorts was found in this morning.
Kept beside the serving key it certifies, and it stands while the name,
the key and the clock agree: a node rejoining with a new key or renamed
gets a fresh signing, exactly as if nothing were kept, and so does one
whose certificate is into its last stretch of life. The port's rule and
the secret's, applied to the third thing composed fresh each time.
Three faults, one file split. All from reading, all verified to bite.
Unassign now releases the module's ports. ReleasePorts existed, said
"for when it is unassigned" in its own comment, and was called by
nothing — so a fixed port stayed claimed in the name of a module that
was gone, and the next module needing it was refused by a ghost.
Kept-once-chosen is a promise about a module that is still here.
MachineSide reads addressed mappings. "127.0.0.1:8080:80" was split at
the first colon, "127.0.0.1" failed to parse as a port, and the mapping
was silently skipped — putting the filter back on the declared port,
the exact fault the function was written to end. The machine side is
the second-from-last part, which is the reading the host already
applies, and the substrate bundle writes that shape today.
An allocation race answers in the mesh's words. Two concurrent picks of
the same port used to surface as a Postgres constraint violation,
verbatim. The table has two keys, so the collision is one of two facts:
the racer was this same assignment — then its answer is the answer,
kept-once-chosen does not care who chose — or another module took the
machine port, and an unfixed pick is simply made again against the
moved free list. A fixed port that lost the race is refused by name.
Told apart by re-reading the row, not by the constraint's name, so this
does not couple to the migration's spelling.
And the artifact-store cycle tests moved to bootstrap_cycle_test.go;
machineside_test.go had quietly become three subjects.
Refused where it is written: a module that provides `artifact-store` and
also builds artifacts asks the mesh to put an artifact into the thing
that artifact is needed to create. Building publishes to the store, and
the builder will not start without one — "a built artifact nobody can
fetch is not built".
This is the question the substrate record asks of every candidate: can
it grant itself the thing it provides? The store cannot create its own
database, the broker cannot create its own virtual host, and a registry
cannot grant itself a repository. The first two are why they are in the
bundle. This is the same sentence, unenforced.
So such a module names its image, exactly as the bundle names the three
a first node starts from. One that wants an interface or a tool server
beside it is a second module, mirrored the ordinary way once the first
is running — a real limit, and better said here than discovered on a
mesh new enough that nobody is watching it.
Refused at the manifest because the alternative is a build that never
returns.
The provision name is now a constant. A string compared in one place is
a convention; a string a rule turns on is a fact.
object-store.json and minio.json described the same thing: same image,
same provision at the same scope, same provisioner. Not two
implementations a person could choose between — one module written
twice. Assigning both to a node would have collided on `s3-bucket`.
It exists because it was written first, to pair with photos.json for the
README's worked edge, and minio.json was the fuller version of the same
module written later. Nobody removed the first.
The pair test keeps its point and now reads the surviving one. Checked
across the rest: this was the only duplicate.
The rule was right about data and wrong about everything else. The
builder mounts the container runtime's socket, which is not its data,
does not belong to it, and must not be declared as one of its
directories — and the check refused the builder's own manifest.
Caught by the lab, though not honestly: the run was already going when
this went in, so the builder binary was rebuilt mid-run with the check
compiled into it and the failure was mine, not the mesh's. Confirmed
against the manifest directly rather than inferred from the log.
What it was protecting is real and stands — the fourteen mounts are all
declared. But enforcing it needs a way to tell "the directory my data
lives in" from "a machine facility I was granted", and the mesh has no
vocabulary for the second. `capabilities` is the closest thing and does
not name paths. That is a design decision, so it goes back to
04-ISSUES/026 rather than being invented here to make a check pass.
The check that every real manifest still parses is kept. It costs
nothing and it is how the next attempt at this finds out sooner.
Closes the half of 04-ISSUES/026 that would otherwise come back. The
fourteen mounts across the forge, the mail system, the store and the
object store are all declared now — but nothing said they had to be, so
they were right by coincidence and the next volume added would not be.
A bind mount whose source does not exist is created by the container
runtime, as root, with a mode it picks. So `owner` and `mode` — which
exist precisely so a module can say who its data belongs to — were
silently not applied to the only directories holding data.
And the rule written for exactly this case did not reach them. A
directory the mesh declared and no longer wants is kept, not removed,
when it holds anything the mesh did not put there (ADR 0030). That is
the answer to *what happens to my data when a module goes away*, and it
is written in terms of declared directories: an undeclared one sits
outside it, because the mesh does not know it is there.
Refused where it is written rather than on the machine, which cannot
tell the difference — by the time the host sees the mount it is being
asked to make a directory, which it is perfectly able to do. The fault
is in the manifest, so it is named at the manifest. Same argument as the
action refusal directly above it.
A path under a declared directory counts as declared, as do the files a
module already names: its own secrets, its grants, what it receives.
Every real manifest is checked to still parse, and the refusal bites.
The lab caught this: a module declaring a port and running no container
had its rule set opened on 20000 while its service sat on 9101. The
firewall reported success and blocked the thing it was told to admit,
which is the precise failure the filtering comment warns about, arrived
at from the other side.
Assignment was applied to every declared port. But a container's mapping
is the thing that translates, and where there is none the software binds
what it binds — the mesh choosing a number does not move the service, it
only makes the mesh wrong about where it is.
The declaration side already knew this: publishedOn rewrites container
ports and nothing else. Filtering did not, so the two disagreed about
the same fact. MachineSide is now the one derivation both follow.
It also fixes a second case nobody had hit yet: a mapping the manifest
wrote itself, like the mail system's 7080:80. That is passed through
untouched when composing, so assigning it a machine port would have
opened a rule on a port the container does not publish. Either side of
such a mapping now names it, and the host side is the answer — a module
may read `listens` as what its software binds or as what the machine
exposes, and both readings want the same number.
Recorded either way, assigned or not: the map means where this module's
port is on this machine, and every reader needs that answer regardless
of who chose it.
Tests bite — making it always assignable reproduces the lab failure.
The other half of ADR 0038, and what 04-ISSUES/028 was actually about.
A module can now avoid colliding with another module; until this it
could not avoid colliding with the mesh itself.
The substrate is not a module. A node raises it from the bundle it
carries before any mesh exists, so the control plane had never heard of
the store, the broker, or its own container — and handed a database
module 5432, which the store already had.
So the machine says. The host records what each resource binds,
distinguishing what it carried from what the mesh sent — a distinction
that already existed so the two never remove each other — and reports
the carried ones. The node states and this context writes, which is the
shape of every message between them.
What the declaration binds, not what is open. A machine's open ports are
a moving target, and assigning around them would mean a port that was
free when it was asked for and taken when it was used.
Replaced whole each time rather than merged: a machine that gave a port
back must be believed about that too, and a set that only grows keeps a
port reserved for something no longer there.
Tested against a real database, and the tests bite — removing the check
hands the module 20000, which the machine had said it holds.
novox/hq ADR 0038. A module cannot choose a port: it is written once and
assigned anywhere, so any number it picks is a guess about a machine it
has never seen. A database module met the mesh's own store on 5432 and
was told, by a container runtime three layers down, that the port was
already allocated.
The number used to appear three times in every module — the rule set,
what a consumer is told, and what the runtime publishes — agreeing only
because one person wrote all three. Now it appears once, in `listens`,
and the other two are derived: the container publishes `20000:5432`, the
consumer is told 20000, and the rule set opens 20000.
An assignment is made once and kept, as a credential is. A port that
moved on every declaration would restart both ends each time and hand a
consumer a number that was true when it was read.
Ports the protocol fixes — mail on 25, submission on 587, DNS on 53 —
say so, and are then claims: one holder per machine, and the second is
refused by name at assignment. That is the mechanism the mesh already
has for what is singular on a machine, pointed at ports.
A mapping written the long way is left exactly as it is. Some things
must be pinned by hand, and quietly overruling somebody who wrote both
halves would be worse than not offering the short form.
Still open, and known: the substrate is not a module, so the mesh has
never heard of its own store and cannot yet assign around it. That is
what 028 will still be about after this.
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/025. Every image reference in every example module
was sixty-four zeros — eighteen of them across five modules. Each
parsed, resolved, and composed into a declaration a host accepts, and
none could ever have started: the machine reaches `docker pull` and
stops. That is why those modules were written and not running, and no
check saw it because every check passed.
The host validates the shape of a reference and nothing more, which is
correct: verifying a digest exists means reaching a registry, and that
is the one thing a host must never have to do. So the last place that
could catch this is the wrong place to try.
The guard therefore sits where a declaration is composed, not where a
manifest is parsed. A file in a repository is allowed to await a pin —
the design already says the manifest in a repository names artifacts
while the manifest the mesh holds names digests, and the bundle works
exactly that way. What must never happen is a placeholder reaching a
machine, and composing is the last moment before one does.
Twelve third-party images resolved to real digests without pulling
anything, which is also the mechanism the open issue needs. Two
discoveries came free: mailu publishes to ghcr rather than Docker Hub,
so seven references named repositories that do not exist at all; and it
renamed roundcube to webmail, so that one would have failed even with
the right registry.
What stays a placeholder is the mesh's own provisioner images, which
genuinely have no digest until built and pushed — the bundle's problem,
legitimately unresolved here. The stand-in consumer now stands in with
a real image rather than an invented one.
I wrote that a test asserts the control plane's placeholder expression
and the host's still agree. None does, and none in this repository could
— a unit test here can only assert what this repository already
believes.
That is precisely the thing this project refuses to tolerate: a stated
rule with no way to check it, which costs more than no rule because
people believe it. Written by me, today, in the same file that closes a
gap of the same kind.
What actually proves it is the lab, and the comment now says so.
A contribution that is not a credential grant — a module offering
something to another on its own machine — has nobody to be identified
to, and was carrying an empty `as`. A field that is always present and
usually empty teaches a reader to ignore it, including when it is not.
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/023. A consumer was given its password, the address,
the port and where its credential lives, and still could not connect —
the user name was invented by the provisioner and recorded nowhere, and
the rest sat in a JSON binding that a program reading KEY=value cannot
use.
Both halves have the same cause: the mesh knew something and did not say
it.
**Who a consumer is, said once.** The provisioner used to derive
mesh_<node>_<module> and that string existed nowhere else — not in the
control plane, not in the binding, and above all not at the consumer,
which has to present it. Now the mesh derives it once and sends it to
both ends, so they agree by construction rather than by two conventions
that were the same on the day they were written. The provisioners refuse
to invent one if the mesh says nothing, because falling back to a name
of their own would create a role the consumer would never guess and
everything would report success.
**Bound values reach the file that needs them.** ${bound:provision:key}
is the symmetric twin of the sealed placeholder, and simpler: these
values are not secret, so the control plane fills them in before sending
and the host gains no field and learns no format. It stays
name-agnostic — at, as and from are true of any provision, and every
other key comes from what the provider said it serves.
The asymmetry it removes was backwards. The secret is the hard case,
because the mesh must not be able to read it, and the secret was the
part that already arrived.
Keycloak and Gitea now produce complete connections, asserted from the
manifests on disk rather than from fixtures: every part filled, no
placeholder surviving as a value, and the password still a hole only the
host can close. Three faults injected, each caught.
A module may not declare an action: the link may not carry a command to
run, and that bound is what limits a compromised control plane to shapes
it cannot turn into arbitrary code (novox/hq ADR 0005). The host
enforces it, correctly and in the right place.
But a module's resources reach a machine over the link, so a manifest
carrying an action was accepted here, stored, resolved, planned and
pushed — and refused on the machine, in the host's log, with nothing
connecting it back to the manifest that caused it.
The rule held. It was just unusable, which is the same shape as the
network shape earlier today: the refusal was right, arrived far from its
cause, and nobody was reading the log.
The refusal names the rule and what to do instead, because "you may not"
with no alternative is where a module author stops.
Found while checking a claim I had written in the coverage document —
that a module cannot declare one. It could; it just could not deliver
it. The document is corrected.
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/022. A credential was keyed by provision, consumer
node and provider node, so "who is asking" was answered by naming a
host. The node this mesh exists to take over runs eight modules against
one database server.
The symptom had two halves and only one was loud. The provider refused,
naming the modules and explaining they would share one credential, which
reads as a decision rather than a limit. The consumer did not refuse: it
resolved cleanly, wrote one module's credential file and left the others
absent — a service that starts and cannot authenticate, with nothing
saying why. That is 021 again on a different axis.
Three modules wanting one database produced one need, carrying whichever
module mentioned it first, because the resolution walk is a work-list
over names. The fan-out now happens in one place, after the walk. The
record path already did this correctly and said why: a consumer here is
a module on a machine. It is the same rule.
Downstream: the secret's key gains the consuming module, the grant file
is named after both halves, needs are matched by provision and module
rather than provision alone, and the provisioners name the role and the
access key after the module. The refusal in ContributionsTo is gone
because there is nothing left to refuse.
Worth stating plainly: without that refusal, gitea's login would have
opened keycloak's database. From the provisioner's side it created
exactly what it was asked to create.
Existing secrets are discarded rather than backfilled. They cannot say
which module they were for, and a secret is remade and delivered to both
ends on the next push — so this costs one rotation and invents nothing.
Also guards the role name against PostgreSQL's 63-byte truncation, which
is a notice rather than an error and would reintroduce exactly this
collision at a length nobody tests.
Three faults injected — the fan-out removed, needs matched by name
alone, the grant file named after the machine — each caught.
The gap that stopped keycloak and gitea from starting. A granted
credential arrives as a file whose entire content is the password, which
is what a program reading a password file wants — and most programs do
not read one. They read KEY=value, or a JSON document with the token at
an attribute inside it. A module in that position could be handed the
bare value or nothing, and both are useless.
The host has been able to do this all along: content with ${secret:name}
in it, sealed values beside it, substitution on the machine, which is
the only place both halves exist. Nothing filled the values in, so the
hole could be written and never closed and the host refused the file.
That refusal was correct and the feature was unreachable.
A module reaches its own secrets and the credentials it was granted —
both things it wrote in its own manifest — and nothing else. Naming
another module's is refused: two modules on one machine are as separate
as two on different machines, and letting one read the other's
credential by guessing a name would end that to save writing a file.
Filling runs after settings, which is the whole reason it sits where it
does. A setting is how a placeholder gets into a JSON document in the
first place — the desktop client that reads its token from an attribute,
not an environment variable. Before the merge that file's content is
"{}" and asks for nothing.
Tested through Declaration rather than through the helper. Three times
in this repository a test asserted on a helper while the code calling it
was wrong, and each time the injected fault stayed silent. Three faults
injected here — the call removed, the call moved before settings, and
the module boundary widened — each caught by the test meant for it.
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/021. Two modules where one provided what the other
required, on one node, resolved cleanly with zero needs: no credential
was made, the consumer's secret file was never written, and whatever
read it would fail somewhere else entirely. Nothing was refused and
nothing was reported.
The world a node resolves against is every OTHER node, so a provider on
the same machine never became a Needed, and the credential loop walks
Needs. Every step reasonable, the sum a silent gap.
It survived because everything proven until now was cross-machine —
the interesting case for a mesh and the rare one in practice. The first
module to want a database on its own machine was the first real one.
The assumption underneath was that a local consumer needs no credential,
which holds for a process reaching a unix socket where the system can
vouch for the caller. It does not hold for containers, which is how
nearly everything here runs: the consumer reaches the provider over TCP
from its own container and the database asks for a password exactly as
it would from another machine. **The machine stops being a trust
boundary once both ends are containers.**
A brokered provision answered here is now a need naming this node, and
carries what the provider serves — which a local provider never
contributes through the world. A name nothing grants is unchanged: a
shell answered here is answered, and nothing more is owed. Both
directions tested, both injections bite.
Work breakdown 1.2. Two sessions run on the control-plane node — the
node's own and the mesh's (novox/hq ADR 0026) — so a machine stopped
being a usable answer to "whose licence is this".
14-model-access.md called per-module-per-machine "a step toward it and
not it", and that is true of a worker: many run on one machine from one
module, so the pair cannot name them apart. It is not true of a session.
The two sessions are two modules — the same mechanism started in
different context roots, and a context root is what a module delivers —
so (node, module) tells them apart and nothing needed adding.
Checked rather than argued: different licences on one machine, each with
its own key, and a session on no licence is not handed the other's.
The third test exists because a fault injection stayed silent. The first
two put the sessions on different licences, so the licence alone
disambiguates and the module argument is never load-bearing — removing
it from the query changed nothing and everything still passed. Two
sessions on the SAME licence is the case that needs the pair to be the
identity: releasing one must leave the other, and a machine-shaped
answer takes both.
A migration refused when the record and the files disagree is the
property that makes a schema trustworthy months later. The test asserted
it without naming the decision, so an audit of which decisions are
defended could not see it. novox/hq ADR 0017.
Provisions were named after roles: provides "database", requires
"database". Nothing distinguished engines, so a module written against
PostgreSQL could be matched to a provider of SQL Server, resolve as
satisfied, deploy, and fail on its first query — with nothing
connecting that error back to a match made elsewhere by something that
believed it had done its job.
The failure is in the direction that hides. Refusing on ambiguity
exists precisely so this does not happen, and the generic name walked
around it: with one provider of each name nothing is ambiguous, so
nothing is asked.
How it got in: every resolver test had exactly one provider per name,
so no mismatch was expressible and none was caught. The fixtures agreed
with the design — the same fault as the imagined test output in
04-ISSUES/005, at the level of a name.
Refused rather than documented, because the old naming *was* the
documented convention. Providing database/db/sql/sql-database is now a
parse error naming what to write instead.
The rule is about coupling, not specificity everywhere: route and
resolver stay role-named, because a consumer genuinely cannot tell
which proxy answered. novox/hq ADR 0027.
It sat beside `secrets` — where a *provision's* credential lands on a consumer.
Both were name-to-path, both held something secret, and the names
distinguished them not at all. Reaching for the wrong one parsed cleanly and
failed somewhere else entirely, which is the shape of fault this whole design
exists to prevent, sitting in the manifest format.
The axis that separates them is not how secret they are — both are — but
whose. `secrets` is keyed by the provision it is for and belongs to a
relationship with another machine. `own-secrets` is keyed by a name the module
chose and belongs to nobody else.
A manifest using the old name is told the new one rather than refused with
"unknown field": whoever wrote it knew what they meant, and the mesh knows what
it is called now. An invented key is still refused as one rather than guessed
at.
Found by auditing the 19 manifest fields for whether any could be mistaken for
another. This was the only pair that could — and while checking it, a second
instance of the same collision turned up one layer down: `Manifest.Needs` and
`Resolution.Needs` were different concepts sharing a name in Go. The rename
separates those too.
The host does not sort, so the order written here is the order a machine
applies. Selection walks outward from what was assigned, which puts a consumer
before the thing it pulled in — and a service that reads a file another module
writes then starts before the file exists.
It fails, and the next reconcile fixes it. That is the worst shape a fault can
take: what gets remembered is that it works, and nobody looks again. It is
04-ISSUES/013 one level up from where that was found — there, the mesh's own
computed files came after a module's resources; here, a whole module comes
after the one that needed it.
Nothing had hit it because no module until now both required something with
resources of its own and had a resource depending on it. Writing the resolver
module was what made it reachable, and it would have shown up as dnsmasq
failing once on every fresh machine and working ever after.
Unrelated modules keep the order selection gave them — assigned first, then
what they pulled in. That order is meaningful, and reshuffling it would make
every declaration's diff unreadable for no gain.
Two modules requiring each other are both applied rather than refused: a cycle
is not a machine that cannot work, and refusing would make a cooperating pair
impossible to assign.
Three manifests and the rule that keeps them apart. Serving and asking are
genuinely different roles, and systemd-resolved can only do the second — it
cannot answer a wildcard, it routes the mesh's suffix to something that can. A
module that treated them as one role could not work, which is the mistake worth
naming rather than discovering.
So `the-dns-port` and `the-resolver-configuration` are two claims. A machine
gets one of each, and two of either is refused by the mesh rather than fought
over on the machine — which is what ADR 0009's table meant by listing resolvers
beside the seat and pid 1. That table names the resource `/etc/resolv.conf`,
which is what it is; a claim is a name in the catalogue's own form, and the
catalogue refuses the path as one.
Neither module knows anything about the machine it is on, which is what lets
them be static manifests: they name `mesh0` and `127.0.0.54`, both chosen by
the mesh, rather than an address only that machine has. Not 127.0.0.1 and not
127.0.0.53 — taking either would be a module claiming something it did not say
it claims.
A service can now reflect a file another module put on the machine, written
`<module>.<id>`. The resolver has to restart when the mesh rewrites the names;
without it, it would serve the names it started with for ever, with every
machine that joined afterwards unreachable and every check passing.
Services are named under the machine they run on — postgres.novox.internal,
plex.ace.internal. The first label is the service and the rest is the node, so
what has to resolve is anything under a node's name. What routes it once it
arrives is a proxy's concern and stays separate.
A hosts file cannot do that. It answers exact names, and a wildcard there would
mean writing down every service in advance — which is the enumeration the
arrangement exists to avoid. novox/hq 08-connectivity named this exact case as
the trigger for needing a resolver rather than a file, and it is the first
thing to meet it.
The mesh writes the data and runs no daemon. A resolver is third-party
software, and third-party software runs on the mesh rather than being of it
(ADR 0001): the mesh has no business shipping one, choosing which one, or
knowing its configuration language. What only the mesh can know is which
machines exist and where they are. A module that runs a resolver requires what
this provides and reads one file, so swapping the daemon changes that module
and nothing here.
Separate from names rather than part of them: a machine with no container
runtime can still have a hosts file, and folding them together would take exact
names away from a machine that cannot run a daemon in order to give it a
wildcard it cannot use either.
A machine with no address is left out. A wildcard pointing at nothing is worse
than no wildcard — every name under it resolves and then hangs, where an
unresolvable name fails at once and says which name it was.
Internal names are written to the machine's hosts file, which serves the
machine and not what the machine runs: a container gets its own hosts file
holding only its own hostname. So every name the mesh wrote was invisible to
the majority of things that need one — and on the machine it always worked,
which is exactly what made it easy to miss.
It was hit for real in the lab, and worked around by resolving the address on
the machine and passing it in. That workaround is now removed, and its absence
is the assertion.
A file rather than a resolver, which is the decision the mesh already made
about names and this extends rather than overturns: it works on every runtime,
needs no package and has no failure mode of its own. The stated trigger for a
resolver — names that are not one-per-node, service names, wildcards — is
still not met.
Given by the mesh, not chosen by a module: a module that listed the machines
would go stale the day one joins, and one that did not would be a module whose
containers cannot reach anything by name. A container that named its own keeps
them and gets the mesh's beside them.
Only containers, and not the ones on the machine's own network: a runtime
refuses to write a hosts file for those, and a file or a service given the
field is a declaration the host refuses outright — so getting it wrong breaks
the whole machine for something that was never about names.
The machine that most needed a firewall was the one that could not have one. A
hub is dialled by every node at other sites and needs its port open; a machine
that is not a hub dials out and needs nothing open. They are the same module,
and `listens` in a manifest is one answer for every machine that runs it — so
the machine a static answer gets wrong is the one facing the public internet.
A generator can now say what it opens, in a second interface rather than a
method on every generator: most have nothing to say here, and requiring an
empty method of each would be a cost paid everywhere for one caller.
The port is the one in the endpoint, which is where the interface takes its
ListenPort from. One source, so a rule set cannot open a port the interface is
not on. Open to everywhere and deliberately: a node at another site is not on
the private network until this port lets it on, so restricting it to the mesh
would be a rule that can never be satisfied by the thing it exists for.
And a generator that cannot say is refused rather than read as silence. Closing
a port on the evidence of a failure to look is how a machine is severed by a
fault somewhere else — and the machine it would sever is the hub, whose only
route to being fixed is the network it just closed.
jschoubben