A module or seat holder assigned after the controller started was sent
its declaration and found nothing to bind: messenger on novox
("consumer novox_messenger not found", 2026-10-06) and every first
build-agent holder (2026-10-03). assertBusObjects ran only in the start
raise; a push ensured a module's consumer only when a bus credential was
minted, which a module carried by the runtime never is.
The send's grant now runs the same derivation (assertOnSend) before the
memberships, on every push, cascade, plan send and rotation. A failure
is said in the send's output and raised as bus.objects.unasserted, which
the next send that asserts everything clears; the send itself goes on,
because the objects are the mesh's and holding every machine back for
one would turn one fault into all. Module consumers are each tried and
every failure named. The start raise stays as it was.
Every one of the 48 core failures of research 031 was found by a person
looking; the mesh's answers carried the fact for whoever asked and told
nobody.
- The condition store (to-be 45 §2): mesh-controller_conditions, one key
per open condition, written by compare-and-set so a person's silence
and the watchdogs never lose each other's word; every transition kept
ninety days in mesh-controller_condition-history and said as the
seat's events condition-raised / condition-changed / condition-cleared
(the condition at the top level, with event, at, change, why, show),
offered again while the bus is away. Raised and cleared by observation
only; a clearing reopened within ten minutes is the same condition with
its count up, its silence kept. Verbs: conditions, conditions show,
conditions silence (a hand act, at most a week), conditions history.
- ADR 0224's provider standing is the first kind, provider-failing, held
by the provider's events; the provider_standing table is no longer read
or written (left in place: dropping it is the operator's word).
- status leads with the open conditions, urgent first, and says all well
only with none open; conditions it cannot read are said and not well.
- The signals table compiled in, one watchdog loop over it every 30s: S1
heartbeat (3 intervals, asleep machines excepted, control node urgent
after 30 min), S2 report after a send, S3 plan tier, S4 event loop deaf,
S5 merge not acted, S6 ask lost, S7 call hung, S8 provider silent, S9
advisories, S10 self-check silent, S11 node tools silent, S13 stale
refusals; S12, S14, S15 deferred with their reasons. A row that cannot
see raises probe-failed and clears nothing. A test generated from the
table suppresses each signal inside and past its bound.
- The bus's advisories (maximum deliveries, a mesh consumer deleted) and
the controller's own slow consumer and refused subjects, said in the
mesh's words.
- doctor: the probe registry D1-D10 (D5 deferred) and DW, every five
minutes, each in thirty seconds; a probe that cannot run is never a
pass. D1 validates with mesh-host's own validator. Every run ends with
the doctor-heartbeat event mesh-watcher listens for.
- The controller is granted its new buckets, events, the two advisories
and $SRV.INFO; the node tools their tools-alive heartbeat. The streams
and consumers the controller asserts and the ones D6/D7 expect are one
derivation.
jochen